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This thesis counters the common postmodern privileging of distance over identification 
within artistic practice.
After Brecht, identification in the theatre has predominantly been imagined as a 
conservative operation that always aligns us with the status quo. These theories could be 
described in Eve Sedgwick’s terms as ‘paranoid’ practices that necessarily detest the 
objects they investigate. At the same time, as Sedgwick maintains, they assume a 
position of absolute knowledge (2003, p. 138). In other words, paranoid practices 
implicitly claim to reveal or expose underlying formations of brutality.
I argue instead that itd’s practice is not intent on denying identification, but rather holds 
distance and identification together. Our work recognises that identification is a 
necessary subjective practice, whilst also asking what is at stake in our specific 
investments and identifications. I maintain that itd’s work gets close to its objects: it 
caresses their forms with love. At the same time, it always negotiates the place of 
distance, yet without disgust and without definite knowledge. Distance, in this thesis, is a 
place of engagement and contemplation: even of provisional judgement. Concomitantly,
I argue that these very investments sustain us, give us a place to be in the world, whilst 
being the most productive form of giving and understanding.
Declaration:
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When embarking on this thesis I wanted to get to the heart of what Imitating the Dog 
(itd) try to achieve when making performance work. While it is self-evident that the 
company aims to experiment with theatre’s form -  for all sorts of reasons that I will 
go on to discuss in due course -  we also endeavour to construct worlds that audiences 
can be sucked into or seduced by in the act of spectating.1 All of the company love 
film. We are attracted to the sensuousness of soundtracks and lighting and the way 
you can be transported into other worlds. Perhaps even more so than in the theatre. 
Our first two shows, Einmal ist Keinmal and Ark were highly realised imaginary 
worlds in which we attempted to draw audiences into a fictional landscape. In fact, I 
often think of them as metaphorical worlds, since metaphorical theatre implies a 
world that ‘stands in’ for our own. In other words, it suggests some kind of parallel 
environment that does not try to literally represent the world around us (in the way 
some realisms attempt), but rather endeavours to explore the territory of dreams, 
memory, longing and desire that are seductive but sometimes seem disconnected from 
everyday experience. Metaphorical theatre, in my conceptualisation, describes a 
particular paradigm of theatre that is not primarily text-bound, but uses other 
mechanisms in order to evoke an otherworldly landscape. This theatre considers 
music, visual and physical performance and sometimes technological landscape as 
primary elements in its composition; that is, they are not just ‘extra’ components that 
are used to elucidate or bring life to the text. Although they may not use the word
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‘metaphorical’ to describe their own creative practice, Impact Theatre’s work is 
clearly based on such a model, particularly their seminal piece The Carrier Frequency 
(1984). This particular performance has inspired and influenced many practitioners 
and theatre companies since its tour in 1984, and even though we did not see an 
original version of this piece, it definitely had a significant effect on us and informed 
the making of our first two shows.3 Our fourth show, Five Miles and Falling (2002)4, 
could also be described as metaphorical, although this piece is a lot less physical than 
the others. In this specific case, as I will discuss later, it creates an otherworldly 
environment through the use of live and technological landscapes, and places the 
audience inside its representational machine.5 It also deals with the generic pull of the 
filmic romance narrative. Our third production, Guilty Pleasures (2000)6 does not 
remain inside a fictional world, but rather explores a number of fictional strands from 
the ‘outside’. It also lays bare the workings and technologies of each fiction we were 
practising. Instead of being on the inside of the worlds that we had created, we would 
‘present’ them. This piece takes as its starting point the classic canonical text, The 
Family Reunion by T.S. Eliot. Overall, despite their differences, all itd’s performance 
works are based on the creation or exploration of alluring fictions.
So what we are interested in is, essentially, narratives. In fact my original research 
questions concentrated on the ways in which fiction might be ‘reclaimed’ by an 
experimental practice, having been derided for so long as the form most suited to 
mainstream culture. The research questions were as follows:
1. What is the role of narrative in contemporary performance?
2. What are the ranges of genres of fiction that are evident in contemporary
performance?
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3. What are the theories surrounding narrative and narrative structures that 
can be applied to contemporary performance?
4. How do film genres interface with the narratives in contemporary 
performance?
5. How can a matrix that permits different forms of narrative to co-exist be 
created as practice?
6. Can models for the use of narrative be identified within the work of other 
contemporary performance practitioners? What relationship do these 
models have to an understanding of the role of narrative in contemporary 
culture and to the specific performance making practices of itd?
This thesis is still concerned with narrative, although its emphasis has shifted to 
specific aspects of narrative, namely theories of identification and distance in relation 
to character, canonicity and genre. This is because, whilst immersing myself in dry 
narrative theory, I realised that this theoretical discourse was of little help in 
understanding the role of fiction in the company’s work. The formal accounts of deep 
structures, patterns and blueprints so widely explored by narratological study did not 
appear to get me closer to what narratives actually do. In other words, how do these 
narratives, these stories, seduce us? What is it that absorbs us, that draws us in to the 
fictions we are exploring? It appeared that I was searching for something I had 
hitherto left unarticulated -  that is, theories surrounding identification. A simple 
example. When we created Guilty Pleasures we chose to place T. S. Eliot’s play The 
Family Reunion (1939) against a range of ‘other’ material. This is by no means a new 
practice. The New York based performance company, the Wooster Group, probably 
pioneered the deconstruction of canonical texts, and their work had a particular 
influence on Guilty Pleasures. The Wooster Group are indeed widely praised for 
their innovative placing of canonical texts against what David Savran has described as 
“wildly contrasting material” (1986, p. 1). Savran describes The Wooster Group’s
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use of juxtaposition as the performance of “incisive critiques that expose the 
contradictions lurking in each text” (1986, p. 1).
However, it is important to point out that we did not select Eliot’s text merely to 
undermine it (undermine: “to weaken gradually or insidiously” -  in (ed.) Sinclair 
1992, p. 1629), which is a common (mis)conception of a deconstructive aesthetic.
The dominance of the play in the structure of Guilty Pleasures would suggest 
otherwise: forty minutes is rather a long time to rubbish something. Indeed, Peggy 
Kamuf speaks of the “widely circulated image of deconstruction as an essentially 
negative operation, as if the term were really a synonym of ‘destruction’ and the 
additional syllable merely superfluous” (in (ed.) Royle 2000, p. 151). Indeed, Jacques 
Derrida, pioneer of deconstruction, speaks of his love of the text in his defence of a 
deconstructive practice:
I don’t feel that I’m in a position to choose between an operation that we’ll 
call negative or nihilist, an operation that would set about furiously 
dismantling systems, and the other operation. I love very much everything 
that I deconstruct in my own manner; the texts I want to read from a 
deconstructive point of view are texts I love, with that impulse of 
identification which is indispensable for reading.
(Derrida 1988, p. 152, emphasis in original)
And there you have it. Identification... is indispensable for reading. Although we 
could not help but ask questions of it, Eliot’s text is a text we love -  the rich 
complexity of Eliot’s alternating language structures, his quirky characters and their 
relationships, his philosophical ‘take’ on the operations of memory. The list goes on. 
These are all components (and ones that I will elaborate on later on) that we were 
intrigued and fascinated by. Indeed, this is a text with which we found various points
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of identification (a process that Derrida clearly sees as connected to or caught up in an 
act of love).7 Furthermore, if we imagine identification as an inescapable process of 
reading, then it follows that it is a necessary subjective practice. Indeed, Sara Ahmed 
substantiates this very point when she states, “reading is an enactment of subjectivity” 
(1998, p. 149). If this is the case, then making shows that offer exhaustive critiques of 
cultural material can never ensure the suppression identificatory practices. Nor would 
we want to.
So whilst wanting to question the culture in which we live through the performance 
we make, we also want to acknowledge our particular attachments to, our loves of, 
and affections for the objects of culture that we choose to make performance from. 
This is intrinsic to the work of itd and absolutely essential to my argument in this 
thesis. Rather than ‘exposing’ what lurks beneath canonical texts or filmic genres (the 
basic territory of the practice that I will be discussing herein) for what they are -  as if 
we are in a position to ‘know’ anyway -  it might be more useful to describe our 
position in relation to these objects as beside. Standing beside objects of culture, 
certainly in Eve Sedgwick’s terms, “seems to offer some useful resistance to the ease 
with which beneath and beyond turn from spatial descriptions into explicit narratives 
of, respectively, origin and telos” (2003, p. 8, emphasis in original). Sedgwick goes 
on, “[bjeside comprises a wide range of desiring, identifying, representing, repelling, 
paralleling, differentiating, rivalling, leaning, twisting, mimicking, withdrawing, 
attracting, aggressing, warping, and other relations” (2003, p. 8). For now, I will 
concentrate on identification (which probably includes many of the verbs listed here).
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Methodology -  Engaging with and Practicing Identification
In this thesis, I have chosen to analyse other performance works alongside or beside 
the work of itd. These are Play-boy (1998) by Desperate Optimists and L ’Ascensore 
(1992) by Insomniac Productions. These are two pieces of work that have specifically 
influenced itd. After all, it is important to acknowledge the obvious fact that itd’s 
work exists in a more contemporary context also. Our choice of company name, 
Imitating the Dog, is a rather ironic admission of this. Furthermore, these other 
works, as I will argue later, demonstrate a real affection for the cultural materials they 
select for performances. In each chapter that analyses practice, I begin by 
interrogating the works of either Desperate Optimists or Insomniac Productions 
before moving on to my own practice with itd. This method allows me to explore 
identification from the ‘outside’, in relation to the work of others, and then from the 
‘inside’ (or inside/outside) in negotiation with itd’s performance pieces. The focussed 
nature of my investigation (always the demand of a thesis) will allows me to get close 
to the practice without making broad generalisations. All the practice analysed in 
these pages explores critical questions about the construction of subjectivity and 
identity. Whilst I am concerned with the intricacies and implications of my practice 
in relation to the specific work of named practitioners, I also recognise that questions 
surrounding subjectivity and identity circulate in the practice of much contemporary 
British and American experimental performance: these include Forced Entertainment, 
Bobby Baker, Curious, The Wooster Group, Station House Opera, Split Britches, 
Bodies in Flight, Goat Island and others.
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Further, it is important to note at this stage that writing within practice must 
necessarily differ from writing about practice. In my attempt to write from a place 
within itd’s work, I have been prompted to reflect on my specific, embodied 
relationship to the material that makes up our performances -  as a practitioner but also 
as a performer. How do I fit in to this work? How do I identify with its specific 
components? What am I actually doing and feeling as a performer, and how does this 
alter and change from moment to moment in the performative situation? Stanislavski 
and Brecht, among others, devised specific rules for performing or acting, or in other 
words, they told us what to do in the act of performance. I shall be discussing these 
theorists in due course, but for now it is worth asking: without absolute rules for 
acting and performing that are based on certain stable notions of subjectivity, how can 
acting practices be described, embodied, and represented? Phillip Zarilli describes a 
‘postmodern’ acting practice thus:
What the actor ‘does’ on stage may range from a psychologically motivated 
realist character, through a character-structure into and out of which the actor 
steps on a moment-to-moment basis, to the sequential playing of multiple roles 
or sequences of action which require the development of a specific 
relationship to the audience as part of one’s score, to the playing of multiple 
personae, to the enactment of tasks without any characterlogical implications.
(1995, p. 21)
These movements between different ways of being on stage certainly have something 
in common with the performance practices of itd, as well as the other work I will be 
discussing in this thesis. Guilty Pleasures particularly operates in the above way, 
since I, as a performer, am required to move between a number of different roles.
This piece is constructed rather like Zarilli’s ‘map to action’, in which he describes a 
play text as being the:
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point of departure from which the [...] collective [...] devise and develop their 
own performance text which becomes the map to the set of actions that the 
actors will either perform as ‘themselves’ or as fictional characters.
(1995, p. 19)
However, Zarilli’s construction pays no attention to the specific relation between 
performer and the detailed material that makes up a devised performance. For 
example, how do acting practices connect to the personal interaction or investment 
with the materials encountered and negotiated in the rehearsal and performance 
structuring process? Such practices, as I will go on to show, are shaped and informed 
by specific cultural vocabularies. The vocabularies or ‘languages’ that I address 
specifically in this thesis are those of ‘authored’ canonical texts and (filmic) genres. 
However, despite the insertion of ‘self into performance -  in terms that connote 
autobiography or authorship -  performance is always and necessarily restored 
behaviour, to use Richard Scheduler’s term (Scheduler 1985, pp. 35-116). As 
Marvin Carlson points out, restored behaviour refers to a quality of performance that 
comprises a:
certain distance between ‘self and behavior (sic), analogous to that between 
an actor and the role the actor plays on stage. Even if an action on stage is 
identical to one in real life, on stage it is considered ‘performed’ and off stage 
merely ‘done’. [This demonstrates] a consciousness of [the] signifying 
potential [of actions].
(1996, p. 4)
This is one of the reasons why character, although displaced, has not been evacuated 
from experimental performance. I now want to address the grounds for which 
character remains significant in the works included in this thesis.
Awaking the ‘dead’ -  Character in Experimental Theatre
I would like to consider the role that character, with its implicit connection to 
identification, plays on experimental stages, particularly bearing in mind the 
following words by Elinor Fuchs:
[I]f character is ‘dead,’ then what notion of ourselves as audience is theater 
(sic) reflecting back to us? Perhaps we are coming to perceive ourselves as 
the fragmented, ephemeral constellations of thought, vision and action that the 
Buddha saw as the truth of human nature.
(1996, p. 176)
This quote fascinates me as, if read definitively, it is entirely incongruous. That is, if I 
am to assume, rather audaciously, that Fuchs is making positive statements rather than 
suggesting possibilities, that is, she is declaring that character is dead, and that there is 
a true human nature, the contradictions within her paragraph are striking.9 Let me 
explain. In like manner to many other theorists of ‘postmodern’ art forms, Fuchs 
appears to pronounce character, the ‘figure’ of narrative, ‘dead’.10 In her terms, 
character has met its demise based on its failure to represent, or mirror the 
contemporary self; after all, she would seem to have faith that theatre (throughout 
time?) has necessarily reflected back to us notions of “ourselves” as audience 
members. So if  character can no longer represent the contemporary self, the self that 
is “fragmented and ephemeral”, it might be a fair assumption that Fuchs determines 
character as opposite to this construction, which would be the stable and coherent 
‘figure’ of modem stages. Fuchs certainly gives the impression of equating the death 
of character with the ‘death’ of the founding subject of modernity, the latter of which 
is arguably the most consistent expression of postmodernism’s “crisis of legitimation” 
(Ahmed 1998, p. 94). In fact, Fuchs admits elsewhere in her book that her “death of
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character” idea “started out as a spark of insight ignited in alternative theaters (sic) 
and fanned by the various poststructuralist ‘deaths’ announced in the 1970s and 
1980s” (1996, p. 9). This crisis or death of the subject marks an interrogation of the 
humanist assumption that we have unmediated access to the world and knowledge of 
it, and consequently, can assume ‘mastery of the self. Fuchs then, appears to be 
taking the classic postmodern stance that there has been a shift from the dis­
embodied, autonomous, rational (and masculine) self to a self that is textual, 
contradictory and ‘in process’. She maintains:
One of the meanings of “postmodern” -  its psychological formation [...] [is] a 
dispersed idea of self, and [...] this dispersal [is] represented in many different 
ways in the contemporary alternative theater (sic).
(Fuchs 1996, p. 9)
However, as Ahmed points out, “an association has been set up between 
postmodernism and Death (the Death of the subject) such that the paradoxical 
question, ‘who comes after the subject,’ is askable” (1998, p. 94). In a note, Ahmed 
explains this paradox: “The ‘who’ evokes a subject as the question itself assumes its 
passing” (1998, p. 200). She asks, “does the narrative of the passing by of the subject 
itself constitute a writing of a form of subjectivity?” (1998, p. 200). Or in to sum up 
Derrida’s position, the line which crosses out subjectivity, ironically, permits it to go 
on being read (Derrida 1981, pp. 45-80). In other words, the very act of theorising 
subjectivity’s downfall, which cannot help but name the subject in writing, confirms 
the subject’s continued existence.
Yet if I were to believe that Fuchs invests in Buddha’s ‘truthful’ notion of (our)selves, 
that is, “ourselves as fragmented, ephemeral constellations of thought, vision and
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action” (1996, p. 176), the contradiction in her writing would appear more 
fundamental. Firstly, she effectively removes the subject, represented through 
character, from experimental stages yet in the same movement re-instates it as 
“fragmented and ephemeral” (1996, p. 176). Further, she invokes this alternative 
subjectivity as absolute truth. That is, the fragmented and ephemeral assemblage of 
self is indeed the very “truth of human nature” (1996, p. 176). This, on the one hand, 
would appear to re-inscribe the “ontological security” of modernism that she claims 
postmodernism undermines (Fuchs 1996, p. 1). Yet importantly, in her terms, this re­
instatement of subjectivity can no longer be channelled through the inadequate 
container of character, so to re-phrase Ahmed’s question, who comes after the 
character? That is, what are we faced with on stage when characters have been, in 
effect, forsaken? Do we, as Fuchs is possibly suggesting, witness the truth o f human 
nature, the self revealed in its purest form, as Artaud indeed dreamt of?11 
Considering that theatre, by its very nature, represents (selfhood) rather than reveals 
(selfhood), then the enactment of absolutely ‘true’ selves does not seem possible. 
Indeed as Herbert Blau points out, theatre, which comprises both mediation and 
repetition, “haunts all performance,” acknowledging that there is something in the 
character of theatre that “implies no first time, no origin, but only recurrence and 
reproduction” (1983, p. 143). However, Fuchs does consider another interesting 
perspective on character that appears to counter her assertion that character is ‘dead’.
Elsewhere in her book, she invokes Bruce Wiltshire’s definition of character. He 
describes character as the theatrical element that “stands in”, that is, in a performance 
“an actor must stand in for a character... and through this standing in the audience 
member stands in for this character” (Wiltshire in Fuchs, 1996, p. 8). This implies
11
that the character of fiction “stands in” for the subject of culture and history, or more 
specifically, theatrical fictions represent versions of (how we understand) ourselves in 
the specific period and culture in which we live. Fuchs interprets this as signifying 
that the ‘character’ of representational forms throughout the ages “constitutes at the 
same time the manifestation of a change in the larger culture concerning the 
perception of self and the relations of self and world” (Fuchs 1996, p. 8). In other 
words, the way character is presented in narrative forms might reflect the way in 
which the culture at large views subjectivity itself, proclaiming an unequivocal 
correlation between character and subjectivity, and also implying an inevitable and 
necessary identification o f audience with character. After all, Fuchs claims that as 
audience we see “ourselves” upon the stage before us. Phillip Zarilli again connects 
performer and audience in a dialectical relation that suggests identification:
For the actor, whatever the actions to be performed, these actions are the 
‘material’ conditions of his or her work. By means of these material 
conditions not only are meanings created for, by, and with the spectators but 
also the actor’s ‘who I am’ cannot be divorced from the ‘who we are.’ 
Individual and collective identities form a negotiable dialectic within the arena 
of performance practice.
(1995, p. 21)
I will return to the specific performer/audience relation in just a moment, but for now 
I want to make the point that if Fuchs understands character as reflective of current 
perspectives on subjectivity, character itself, in her terms, might be represented in 
contemporary narrative forms as “fragmented and ephemeral.” In this case, character 
is not dead in experimental theatre, but differently constructed. However, although I 
agree that character might be manifested in contemporary performance in different 
ways than the modem production, and that there is an implicit connection between
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(fictional) characters and (embodied) subjects, the problem still remains that 
character, and thus subjectivity in Fuchs are still invoked as truth: both are 
“fragmented and ephemeral”. Further, this postmodern construction of the self is 
actually internally done, as the perpetually shifting subject is paradoxically fixed (as 
truth).
I have to admit here that I have been somewhat misleading about Fuchs’ argument in
order to elucidate my own. My intention was to explore, through Fuchs, the
possibility that character has indeed ‘survived’ in some way on experimental stages,
especially if, as Wiltshire implies, character itself is representative of the historical
and cultural subject. However, as I mentioned earlier, my unpicking of Fuchs’
paragraph quoted at the opening of this chapter required that I make her suppositions
definitive; and I also chose to overlook, temporarily, the confession she makes
regarding the essay included in her book entitled “The Death of Character” from
which the quote is extracted, and from which indeed her publication is given its title.
She feels that looking back, her essay appears “idealistic in tone” and from the “first
wave of deconstructionist postmodernism” (Fuchs 1996, p. 9). She goes on to admit
that when she returned to the essay years later she was “more inclined to regard the
12loss of grounding principles in postmodern culture as transitional” (1996, p. 10) . 
However, I do not wish to return to ‘grounding principles’ of subjectivity per se, but 
rather intend to exploit Fuchs’ model of the eternally fragmenting self to account for a 
general trend in much postmodern theory that forecloses the possibility of attaching 
any value to the self or indeed grounding it or consequently the character in any way 
whatsoever.13 This is a tendency Marvin Carlson in fact refers to:
13
[T]he frequent associations of the postmodern [...] with a loss of origins, a free 
play of signification, and an instability of truth claims seem to suggest that to 
the extent that performance is a significantly postmodern form it is very ill- 
suited to the grounding of subjectivity or identity either for the purposes of 
defining and exploring the self or for providing a position for political or 
social commentary or action.
(1996, p. 8)
That is, the textual character of subjectivity -  its lack of a referent or ontology -  is 
taken to mean that it is indeterminate and unintelligible, which excludes the prospect 
of ever identifying oneself or indeed furnishing a point from which one can act 
politically. Additionally, this postmodern construction of the self divides the play of 
the subject from the relations within which it is entrenched, that is, it refuses to 
acknowledge the impact of power structures that define and determine the subject in 
the social world. Foucault in fact claims that although the subject can no longer be 
thought of as possessing a “transcendental consciousness” or essential meaning, it is 
still constrained by the ‘discursive practices’ to which in society, it is inevitably tied 
(Foucault 1970 p. xiv). Judith Butler expands on Foucault’s argument in relation to 
the sexed subject specifically:
The category of ‘sex’ is from the start, normative; it is what Foucault has 
called a ‘regulatory ideal.’ In this sense, then, ‘sex’ not only functions as a 
norm, but is part of a regulatory practice that produces [through the repetition 
of a norm with a Tost’ origin] the bodies it governs, that is, whose regulatory 
force is made clear as a kind of productive power, the power to produce -  
demarcate, circulate, differentiate -  the bodies it controls. [...] ‘sex’ is an 
ideal construct that is forcibly materialised through time [...] [it] is... not 
simply what one has, or a static description of what one is: it will be one of the 
norms by which ‘one’ becomes viable at all, that which qualifies a body for 
life within the domain of cultural intelligibility.
(1993, p. 1-2)
That is, the (sexed) subject is not free floating, as the postmodern fragmented and 
ephemeral subject implies, but is rather materialised or embodied through highly
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regulated and normalised identifications that are made ‘natural’ through constant 
repetition: they are forcibly materialised through time. This suggests that 
identification, sexed or otherwise, which Hall describes in basic terms as “constructed 
on the back of a recognition of some common origin or shared characteristics with 
another person or group, or with an ideal, and with the natural closure of solidarity 
and allegiance established on this foundation” (1998, p. 2) is the means by which 
subjects become subjects, even though the discursive approach “sees identification as 
a construction, a process never completed -  always ‘in process’” (1998, p. 2). He 
claims that through identifications, subjects are “multiply constructed across different, 
often intersecting and antagonistic, discourses, practices and positions” (1998, p. 4).
If identification can be thought of as a necessary and inevitable subjective practice, it 
is no surprise that it is one of the ways in which audiences are often described as 
interacting with (fictional) characters. Indeed, as I mentioned earlier, Fuchs asserts 
that theatre inevitably mirrors conceptions of “ourselves” as audience members. That 
is, in her terms, I should come to perceive myself as “fragmented and ephemeral” in 
relation to the figures (characters?) on the (contemporary) stage, which I take to mean 
that I would make an absolute identification with them. In other words, I recognise, 
in her terms, myself in the fragmented and ephemeral figures that are presented on 
stage before me. However, although I intend to deal specifically with the possibility 
of identification in experimental theatre in the course of this thesis, in the context of 
Fuchs’ argument it is problematic. First of all, it is at odds with a statement she 
makes elsewhere in her writing, in which she claims that experimentation in fact 
prevents “the sedimentation of empathy or identification with character” (Fuchs 1996, 
p. 173). As Ahmed points out, Raymond Federman similarly asserts that self­
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conscious fictions make identifications within the reading process impossible (Ahmed 
1998, p. 149). Ahmed maintains that Federman’s claim is in line with much 
postmodern (literary) theory (see Ahmed, 1998, chapter 6).14 Yet even if for the 
moment I overlook this discrepancy, and accept that identification does indeed take 
place, I am faced with yet another dilemma. If I am to conclude that both the figures 
on stage and I are both “fragmented and ephemeral”, which already marks an 
determination by an indetermination, my very act of identification is made impossible, 
as it has the effect of further consolidating what is perceived by Fuchs to be in infinite 
deferral, that is, subjectivity itself. After all, does not identification fix  the self in 
relation to the Other? Indeed, to identify is to make a determination, however 
temporary or fleeting: identify 1. to prove or recognize as being a certain person or 
thing; determine the identity o f ’ (Sinclair 1992, p. 753, my emphasis).
Of course, Lacan would argue that identification is not a fixing as such because it is 
always in the realm of the imaginary.15 He would explain the identifications that a 
subject makes as a result of the occurrence of the ‘mirror phase’ that apparently takes 
place in early infancy. The mirror phase is basically this. The child sees itself in the 
mirror as a unified ‘whole’ and thus misrecognises itself as a complete, autonomous 
Other. From this moment on the subject begins to establish an identity through a 
series of similar imaginary identifications, provoked by this initial sense of 
detachment, or difference. That is, the way we identify with other people throughout 
our lives and indeed with the characters of fiction are configured by this first, 
misrecognised identification with our own image.16 However, and this point is a 
critical one, Lacan’s model of the mythic and ‘failed’ condition of identification does 
not expel its part in specifying subjects in material terms, that is, in producing genuine
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and regulated social effects. For example, as Ahmed points out in relation to sexual 
identity specifically, “although the notion of sexual identity, of the intelligibility of 
sex, remains imaginary, it nevertheless organises the relations between subjects” 
(1998, p. 109). Ahmed refers to Lacan’s notion of point de caption, or ‘quilting’ 
where there is a temporary, although phantasmatic “fixing of the relation between 
signifiers and signified, leading to the securing of patterns of intelligibility, without 
which differences would become sheer indifference” (1998, p. 109).
To draw on the arguments of Foucault, Butler, Hall, Lacan and Ahmed, it would 
appear that the ‘identities’ of subjects are formed in the crucible of various and 
sometimes conflicting identifications that are simultaneously illusionary and material; 
they are a mirage of presence that distinguishes the subject, unachievable in any 
absolute or complete form, but are normative and regulative in their configuration. 
This would suggest, contrary to Fuchs’ construction, that the meanings of the subject 
do become fixed in time and space, however provisionally, in a way that constitutes 
the boundaries of the embodied subject. Or similarly in Stuart Hall’s words, 
“identities are [...] points of temporary attachment [through identifications] to the 
subject positions which discursive practices construct for us” (1998, p. 6).
However, if identification can be understood as a highly regulated practice, would it 
be a fair assumption that, in Fuchs’ terms, when we recognise “ourselves” in the 
figures on stage before us, we are indeed always fraternising or aligning ourselves 
with the established order of things? This is certainly the estimation of Bertolt 
Brecht, who devoted his career to investigating the problematics of spectatorial
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identification. He perceives identification as a reading relation of capitalism, as it 
reinforces the myth of a unitary bourgeois ego. He states:
The drama of our time still follows Aristotle’s recipe for achieving what he 
calls catharsis (the spiritual cleansing [through identification] of the spectator). 
In Aristotelian drama the plot leads the hero into situations where he reveals 
his innermost being. All the incidents shown have the object of driving the 
hero into spiritual conflicts. [...] The individual whose innermost being is thus 
driven into the open then of course comes to stand for Man with a capital M. 
Everyone (including every spectator) is then carried away by the momentum 
of the events portrayed, so that in a performance of Oedipus (sic) one has for 
all practical purposes an auditorium full of little Oedipuses [...] [events are 
bundled] together [and] portrayed [as] an inexorable fate, to which the human 
being is handed over helpless despite the beauty and significance of his 
reactions; [Aristotelian drama is made up of] human contriving.
(Brecht 1964, p. 87)
In this model, spectators become generalised beings, forced to subsume or repress 
their historical specificity in their identification. Brecht claims that this cultural 
regulation is the condition occasioned in dramatic realism, since realism is not a 
reflection of reality but reality’s production: it positions its spectators to identify and 
authenticate its truths. This is because realism naturalises the relation between 
character and actor, setting and world, in a process of fusion that, in Brecht’s terms:
extends to the spectator, who gets thrown into the melting pot too and 
becomes a passive (suffering) part of the total work of art. Witchcraft of this 
sort must of course be fought against. Whatever is intended to produce 
hypnosis, is likely to induce sordid intoxication, or creates fog, has to be given 
up.
(1964, p. 38)
This is the classic critique of identification in the theatre: it is through our 
identifications with the cultural ideals inherent in realist drama that the norms of 
society are upheld, maintained and policed.
18
Detour through Aristotle
It is worth noting that although Brecht uses Aristotle as a model around which to 
construct his critique of realism, much theory written in the twentieth century 
privileges a ‘psychological’ understanding of realism. Realism and Aristotle come 
together through a drive towards narrative coherence, although the tradition of realism 
itself is a more recent one that has developed in the West since the Renaissance. A 
good definition of psychological theatre can be located in the theories of Constantin 
Stanislavski, for whom the inward, or subjective, was elevated to a transcendental 
principle. Character, for him, was both the subject and the structural axis of narrative. 
To create a ‘complete’ character (in the Stanislavskian sense) is to imbue it with an 
inner truth or essential nature, reaching or tapping into a genuine sense of what it is to 
be a ‘self. Edward Braun maintains that Stanislavski was engaged in the “corporate 
search for the psychological truth of the character’s behaviour, directed through the 
revelation of that truth through all the available means of the production” (1982 p.
65). John Fiske similarly argues that in realism, audiences are usually thought to 
“experience the representation as though it were the real, and, in particular, to see 
characters as individually real people” (1987, p. 169). In other words, according to 
this argument, there is an assumption that character comes into existence through its 
‘embodiment’ by an actor: it is this embodiment that is often assumed to provoke 
identification, through a perception that the character is ‘real’. In other words, we 
identify with the characters in realism as though they are actual people, in much the 
same way as we might identify with the people we encounter in our daily lives. 
Aristotle, on the other hand, subordinated character to action in his construction of 
theatre:
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Tragedy is not an imitation of persons, but of actions and of life. Well-being 
and ill-being reside in the action, and the goal of life is an activity, not a 
quality; people possess certain qualities in accordance with their character, but 
they achieve well-being or its opposite on the basis of how they fare. So the 
imitation of character is not the purpose of what agents do; character is 
included along with and on account of the actions. So events, i.e. the plot, are 
what tragedy is there for, and that is the most important thing of all.
(1996, p. 11)
Characters, then, exist within plot structures for the sake of their actions only. That is, 
the sum of their total ‘doings’ adds up to character.
It is the thematic content then, that is important to Aristotle, represented through 
action and structured through plot. As Weber points out, “much of Aristotle’s 
discussion of tragedy [...] focuses on the question of how effective tragic plots are 
constructed”, and this “effectiveness” is measured by whether or not the spectators 
have a “learning experience” that “proceeds through feeling, pathos, [rather] than 
through conceptual understanding” (in (ed.) Scheer 2000, p. 10, emphasis in original). 
This learning experience is achieved through mimetic behaviour and actions. 
Importantly, similarly to realism, Aristotle insisted that a tragic plot should be “taken 
in at a single view” (Weber in (ed.) Scheer 2000: 10, p. 15), as unified narratives 
shape and lend coherence to human experience. That is to say that the coherence of 
such a view presumes a steadfast and removed ‘point of view’ from which “the plot 
can be taken in as a unified whole” (Weber in (ed.) Scheer 2000, p. 15). Like realism, 
Aristotle’s notion of tragedy is, most importantly, plot recognised as the temporal 
order of events so as to create a consequential and intelligible totality.
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It is important to point out at this stage that there are many theorisations regarding the 
human desire for ‘whole’ narratives, since they reflect a condition of (imagined) 
replete subjectivity. Indeed, the symbolic order only exists by virtue of the fact that 
individuals desire a unified identity within it -  despite the impossibility of attaining 
(or sustaining) that unity. As Elizabeth Cowie states with reference to Aumont et al:
The desire for narrative has [...] been stressed as a desire for identity, as an 
identification with the narrative and its contents, and hence a desire for such an 
identification so that ‘This capturing of the subject by a narrative, any 
narrative, reveals some primordial condition of identification by which every 
story told is, to some slight degree, our story.’
(1997, p. 117)
Paul Ricoeur again asserts:
Our own existence cannot be separated from the account we can give 
ourselves. It is in telling our own stories that we give ourselves identity. We 
recognise ourselves in the stories that we tell about ourselves. It makes very 
little difference whether these stories are true or false, fiction as well as 
verifiable history provides us with an identity.
(1985 p. 214)
Mark Currie, in Postmodern Narrative Theory, also proposes that identity exists as 
narrative, as we explain who we are by telling our own story. He argues that we 
select significant events and organise them according to the formal principles of 
narrative (a beginning-middle-end structure) as well as learning to self-narrate from 
outside ourselves sometimes constructing identities in relation to others around us, or 
from those ‘characters’ that impact upon us -  these might include figures from fiction, 
from film and television as well as ‘real’ people that we encounter in our daily lives 
(Currie 1998, p. 17). This appears to suggest that narratives of the self always take
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the Other into account. As Cowie claims, “Narratives set out stories of not how to be 
but how to be for  someone” (1997, p. 117).
To return to Aristotle, the figure of Other plays a significant part in his ideal narrative. 
This is because much of the Teaming’ that is supposed to take place in tragedy, is 
achieved through recognition, especially the “recognition of similitude between 
spectator and hero, no matter how great the distance between them” (Weber in (ed.) 
Scheer 2000, p. 17). As a spectator of tragedy then, I identify with the ‘actions’ of the 
hero by acknowledging that these things could happen to me. As Weber astutely 
points out, in Aristotle, character still becomes the driving force of action, even if the 
action is not psychologically motivated:17
The placing of human figures, otherwise known as ‘heroes,’ at the centre of 
the tragic ‘action,’ even if the significance of this action does not derive from 
them as individuals, gives to the action the requisite unity, coherence and 
wholeness required by theatre if it is to exercise its pedagogic function as 
Aristotle conceives it. For however one chooses to read the Aristotelian 
notion o f ‘purification,’ catharsis, the result of such ‘expulsion’ is more a 
unified conception of human beings and their relation to the world than that 
which was manifested by the tragic conflict. It is the confirmation of such 
unity through conflict that is the ultimate ‘goal’ of the theatre qua tragedy -  
and for Aristotle, we recall, the “goal is the greatest thing of all.”
(Weber in (ed.) Scheer 2000, p. 18)
That is, the characters are not psychologically rounded but they do exhibit the 
particulars o f human behaviour through their representation of purposeful ‘actions’. 
Spectators ‘recognise’ these actions that are presented to them in a linear, logical 
fashion (through possibly relating them to their own lives), and thus can ‘imitate’ 
them appropriately. Through catharsis, the spectators are guided to the recognition of 
ethical universals -  that is, they Team’ to accept the truth of the hero’s destiny (since
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they ‘make sense’ in human terms) and they can transfer this understanding to their 
own way of living.
What is important here is that to identify, which can mean to make ourselves 
‘identical’ -  to imitate, does not necessarily require that a character is psychologically 
motivated. It is clear that if ‘pity’ or ‘fear’ (forms of identification) can be elicited by 
tragedy (assuming spectators interact with Greek Drama in the way Aristotle 
describes) then this invocation occurs through the recognition o f human behaviour or 
actions on stage, not through the (mis)identification of a ‘real’ individual. Pity is 
certainly a form of empathetic identification (I know how you feel and I  feel 
compassion for you) and fear seems to suggest a psychic identification {I see what you 
see, from your position, and I  am frightened). Having said this, Weber suggests that it 
is through the representation of the logics of human behaviour that catharsis is made 
to ‘happen’. This corresponds to certain realisms since subjectivity is still represented 
in tragedy as unified and seamless (and made sense o f in relation to the logic of the 
plot) even if it is not psychological. In this case, we do not identify with the 
characters as if they are ‘real’, but rather, as if they are truthful. In other words, the 
characters communicate ‘truths’ about existence that we acknowledge and then 
(theoretically) go on to imitate. Aristotle then, may dismiss the notion of ‘character’ 
(as the subject of narrative), but he certainly seems interested in the notion of 
(influencing through instruction) the subjectivities of spectators.18
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Realism is Not Believed to be ‘Real’
Aristotle’s construction is useful since it foregrounds that we identify with what we 
believe to be truthful in a particular moment rather than ‘really true’. John Fiske 
claims, in relation to television (which I suggest transfers to theatre spectatorship), 
that we by no means believe that the fictions we are confronted with in realism are 
real as such.19 Rather, he claims that much of the pleasure we gain from viewing 
realism derives from a double relationship of the reader with the text that he describes 
as “implication-extrication” (Fiske 1987, p. 174, emphasis in original). This is a 
process whereby the viewer is concurrently “self-implicated in, and self-extricated 
from, the text” (1987, p. 175). He continues:
The viewer’s choice of certain points of identification does not preclude the 
ability to achieve an actively critical distance from other points, and these dual 
relationships with the text can be engaged with simultaneously. There is no 
pleasure in being ‘duped’ by the text into a helpless viewer, but there is 
considerable pleasure in selectively viewing the text for points of 
identification and distance, in controlling one’s relationship with the 
represented characters in the light of one’s own social and psychological 
context.
(1987, p.175)
Fiske recognises that realism is unable to do what it says on the tin: it must, by its 
very nature, fail to convince us that the events which appear on screen [or stage] 
before us are enactment’s of the ‘truth’ or the real world, by the very fact it is (and we 
know it is) a representation, or a bounded ‘act’ to use Judith Butler’s term (1993, p. 
234). Rather, we are disbelieving viewers, who know the events on screen are 
fictional, who nevertheless allow ourselves, at certain points, to be believing viewers 
in order to feel the pleasure of recognition (or indeed, difference). We are ‘double’
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spectators, to use Fiske’s term, that move selectively back and forth between wisdom 
-  knowing that the fiction is a fiction, and having some critical perspective on it -  and 
conviction -  that the fiction is in some sense, ‘truthful.’
However, although I am interested in Fiske’s conception of an interchange between 
distance and identification in relation to representation (a movement that I intend to 
reformulate in just a moment), his argument is problematic, since it suggests a notion 
of pure agency in relation to identification. To propose that audiences have total 
control over the ways in which they identify fails to take into account issues of desire 
and ideological power that I have already discussed. Firstly, we may, according to 
Elizabeth Cowie, be “moved by images [or indeed language, or other forms of 
representation] in ways which we neither expect nor seek nor want” (1997, p. 5) and 
cannot necessarily reject them as an act of conscious will. Furthermore, Fiske’s 
model fails to recognise the related issue that identifications, at least according to 
Foucault and Butler, are highly regulated practices. To elaborate, we remain subjects 
of ideology and are not entirely ‘free agents’ able to overthrow the establishment 
through reading against the grain, or indeed identifying against the grain -  that is, 
assuming antithetical subject positions in relation to the text. Reading, it must be 
remembered, is a socially (and psychically) determined activity, so although there 
appears to be the possibility of ‘openness’ occurring in relation to realism that allows 
for oppositional readings or identifications, this does not necessarily interrogate the 
ideological infrastructure inherent in the form that makes (or aspires to make) 
meanings that promote the dominant interests in society.
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Brecht and the (Perceived) Obstruction of Identification
To counteract what Brecht saw as the surreptitious ideological effects of realism (and 
its concomitant production of identification) he sought to impose an ‘actively critical 
distance’ between actor and spectator. Brecht aimed to prevent identification by 
defamiliarising or ‘alienating’ his audiences in the performance scene. He believed 
he could do this by encouraging a performance style that shored up the distinction 
between player and character, permitting the actor to be understood as 
‘demonstrating’ as opposed to (creating the impression of) ‘being’ a character. The 
audience could, theoretically, be distanced enough to recognise that the performance 
was an arbitrary manufacture of the real; consequently they were mindful that the 
people and events occurring before them were ideologically determined as opposed to 
being innocent reflections of an external reality. This ‘coming into recognition’ that 
was (designed to be) experienced by the audience members supposedly sanctioned the 
possibility that they could conduct themselves differently in a social existence that 
was both changing and changeable. Yet as Geraldine Harris points out, there is a 
fundamental contradiction in Brecht’s argument. That is, he believed he could shore 
up a unified identity as a preface to political identity:
Brecht’s theory implicitly places both the performer and the author (Brecht) 
‘outside’ the fiction in a position of ‘mastery’, implying the existence of a 
stable subject position from which to quote the character and indeed from 
which to represent ‘social reality’. The audience is then presumed to identify 
with the author or actor, who are constructed as knowledgeable, objective 
observers of social reality for whom the contradictions have actually already 
been resolved.
(Harris 1999, p. 78-79)
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In other words, he attempted to supplant the ‘falsehood’ of ideological structures with 
the ‘truth’ of socialism. Brecht, then, makes the predetermined judgement that the 
ramifications of his theatre are always unmistakable to his audience members, and 
although they may be “temporarily ‘split’ and caught up in contradiction” they will 
ultimately “achieve a state of synthesis or ‘wholeness’ through grasping the 
fundamental truth of social reality when it is presented to them in the correct scientific 
fashion” (Harris 1999, p. 79). In this sense he reinscribes the ‘fixing of the subject’ 
that is central to his critique of realism, as he seeks to assert an alternative ‘truth’ 
about existence which can only come about through the (re)grounding of selfhood. 
Interestingly, his theatre does not (attempt to) close down identification absolutely, as 
some theorists of Brecht take for granted. Rather, he advocates (complete) 
identification, paradoxically, when (he believes) it intensifies the alienation effect:
The performer’s self observation, an artful and artistic act of self-alienation 
stop[s] the spectator from losing himself (sic) in the character completely, i.e. 
to the point of giving up his own identity, and len[d]s a splendid remoteness to 
the events. Yet the spectator’s empathy [is] not entirely rejected. The 
audience identifies itself with the actor as being an observer, and accordingly 
develops his [self-conscious] attitude of observing or looking on.
(Brecht 1964, p. 92-3)
The spectator then, according to Brecht, cannot ‘lose’ herself in the character, but 
rather, by implication, is lost in the actor as being an observer of social reality. There 
appear to be two immediately recognisable problems with Brecht’s ‘construction’ of 
his spectators. The first is that there is an unproven assumption that formal 
performance methods can always close down identifications. I will come back to this 
line of reasoning in just a moment in relation to Sara Ahmed’s argument. Secondly, if 
I, as a spectator of Brecht’s theatre, make a complete identification with the actor
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(who is a representative of Brecht, the author), I am not “pulled out of [my] fixity” (as 
Stephen Heath places the Brechtian spectator, 1974 p. 112), but secured in Brecht's 
place: I take his place and ground my identity as the authoritative observer of social 
truths. This is a clear reinscription of the violence of assimilation (I become a copy of 
the Other or the Other becomes a copy of me) that Brecht and indeed many 
postmodernists ascribe to realism. However, as I have thus far pointed out, Brecht, as 
author, cannot hope to guide all of his spectators (through them effectively taking his 
place or metaphorically becoming him) towards (his) path to the revolution. 
Furthermore, his construction assumes that we always identify with realism in the first 
place, and that realism can always direct (ideological) meanings and identifications 
absolutely.
Identification in ‘Self-Conscious’ Fictions
In the wake of Brecht, it could be argued that a work of art has too often been 
considered subversive simply by opposing itself to realism. This has frequently led to 
the privileging of alternative aesthetic forms as more ‘politically progressive’ per se. 
Sara Ahmed illustrates how certain readings of postmodern texts privilege the 
subversion of realism as the correct method to obstruct identification -  and these 
subverted texts are, by extension, thought to be politically progressive. Countering 
this claim, she characterises identification as a more complex operation than many 
postmodernists have taken for granted:
Raymond Federman makes the claim that self-conscious fictions make
identifications within the reading process impossible. But I think
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identifications are more complex than this. [Sjubjectivity itself is a complex 
process of identification and dis-identification entailing phantasmatic acts of 
(mis)recognition in the daily meetings of others. If we understand reading as 
an enactment of subjectivity (a production of the reader as subject), then the 
processes of identification do not simply depend on the coherence of the text 
(as image, illusion, or real) but rest precisely on the complex investment of the 
reader in the process of self making.
(Ahmed 1998, p. 149, emphasis in original)
As she rightly points out, any artwork, whether formally experimental (‘self- 
conscious’ is her term) or ‘realistic’, that is, work that attempts to curb its fictional 
status, traditionally understood to promote or demand identification, has the potential 
to elicit a range of identifications and dis-identifications depending on the “complex 
investment of the reader in the process of self-making” (Ahmed 1998. p. 149). In 
other words, although self-referential texts may expose their fictionality, it cannot be 
taken for granted that the reader will not make (partial or fragmentary) investments in 
the material, and similarly, it is not a given that realist texts will elicit any 
identifications at all -  especially since identifications are very much bound up with 
the ways in which we are materially, historically and experientially constituted.
To expand, Ahmed is alluding to the fundamental problem with much postmodern 
theory, which is often formulated as the “over-coming of the generic limits of realism 
(as the over-coming of identity, fixity, transparency, closure and so on)” that is based 
on a notion of progress which relies on the premise that realism is a necessary 
mechanism of the establishment (Ahmed 1998, p. 48, emphasis in original). Realism, 
then, is posited as always ‘successful’ as an ideological construct -  either “in the form 
of the passive interpellation of the reader into a dominant subject position, or the 
transmission of common sense from text to reader.” (Ahmed 1998, p. 147). That is, 
all interpreters of the material unconditionally identify with the subject position
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offered to them in the text (so they make easy, obvious sense of it) as they are ‘duped’ 
by realism’s ability to conceal its constructedness and appear as ‘the truth’. This, she 
suggests, designates all realist texts as “already read”, and by implication, already 
read in the same way (Ahmed 1998, p. 147). She points out that this reading of 
postmodernism against realism presupposes that “the realist text can successfully 
resolve the contradictions it opens out in the form of a symbolic closure (in which ‘the 
real’ is maintained as the cohesion or even the destiny of the text itself)” (Ahmed 
1998, p. 147, emphasis in original). She decides that this reading of realism, which 
fastens it in place in order to position postmodernism as the ‘conqueror’ or over­
coming of realism, effectively ‘does’ two things. The first is that it takes for granted 
that the ‘real’ can be secured in the text, which is the very concept of realism that is 
being opposed. The second is that the politics of the text, or the ideological 
implications of realism, are decided by its formal properties alone. The political 
value of postmodernism or meta-fiction then is based on a subversion of realism, as it 
“works to make readers aware of both its production and reception as cultural product, 
as a fiction which is about itself, and the process of its own construction”, thus 
‘overcoming’ the possibility of (ideological) representation (Hutcheon in Ahmed’s 
words, 1998, p. 148).20 This reading, Ahmed argues, fails to tackle the role that 
specific representations might play within (postmodern) narratives in the instigation of 
reader identification (1998, p. 149). Put another way, this tradition of postmodern 
criticism erases what has traditionally been termed as ‘content’ as a feature of 
narratives that experiment with artistic form. In Ahmed’s terms then, it is arguably 
the content of these narratives, that is, ‘what’ happens, as opposed to ‘how’, that may 
cause certain identifications to take (their) place.
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However, I would argue that it is important not to reverse the terms of the 
form/content dichotomy, that is, to return to the privileging of content over form. 
Indeed, Ahmed does state that “differences and identifications may be partially fixed 
through formal experimentation” which is an admission that experimentation can 
certainly go some way towards distancing identifications, or complicating their 
operations, even if it cannot obstruct them entirely (1998, p. 150, my emphasis). This 
is an acknowledgment that the formal properties of narratives can make a difference 
to our practices of identification. This will be central to my analysis in the course of 
this thesis. However, as Ahmed persistently demonstrates, form, or specific formal 
techniques, cannot guarantee particular readings or identifications. Consequently 
form must always be analysed alongside its specific contexts of enunciation. In this 
thesis, I will always address form and content side by side.
As Ahmed maintains, postmodern theory tends to privilege distance or the 
suppression of identifications within (the reading of) artistic practice. On the 
contrary, I would like to explore theatre-making practices that are not intent on 
denying identification, but rather stage or perform a movement between distance and 
identification. In relation to itd’s performance making specifically, I suggest that our 
interest in identificatory practices lies in the recognition that as subjects in culture, we 
exercise varying processes of identification and dis-identification that potentially 
transform us. These are the ways in which we are made, or make, and are unmade, or 
we un-make, ourselves and our worlds (allowing for varying degrees of agency).
Perhaps I need to make a qualification before I continue. I have suggested above that 
the performances that I will be addressing in this thesis stage a movement between
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distance and identification. However, I am aware that distance and identification are 
not mutually exclusive categories. Here are my provisional lists that divide 
identification and distance (that I will go on to complicate). Identification could 
include similarity, recognition, implication, fixation, imitation, nourishment, comfort, 
sympathy, affinity, love, rapport, bonding, intimacy, closeness, seduction, desire, 
empathy, affirmation, acceptance, understanding, investment, appreciation, 
familiarity, warmth, absorption, emotion, feeling, affect, proximity, movement 
towards objects and knowledge. Identification could be expressed in Bill Nichols’ 
terms as “embodied (local, concrete, experiential)” (in (ed.) Sobchack 1996, p. 62).
Distance might comprise difference, withdrawal, perspective, intellectual reflection, 
contemplation, detachment, disconnection, competition, freeing, unearthing, 
extrication, objectivity, neutrality, impartiality, remoteness, alienation, gap, divide, 
break, breach, space, separation, division, severance, judgment, thinking, movement 
away from objects and knowledge. Distance could be described in Nichols’ terms as 
“disembodied (general, abstract, conceptual)” (in (ed.) Sobchack 1996, p. 62).
There are many ways in which the division I have made can be problematised.
Cowie, in terms of a psychoanalytical understanding of the subject, attempts to re­
establish difference as an implicit function of identification:
Psychoanalysis has traditionally been concerned with the process of 
identification as the production of identity [...] that is, with those mechanisms 
which involve the subject making itself the same as another subject or an 
aspect of another subject or object. As a result, the process of differentiation 
[...] has not been addressed. It is Lacan’s concept of identification in the 
mirror phase and his resulting theory of the subject which brings to centre- 
stage the issue of difference, in what Lacan terms the alienation of the subject 
in the process of identification. The reintroduction of differentiation as an
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element in this process shows what is central to and for identification is not in 
the first instance a set of contents, but a position in relation to the other of 
identification.
(1997, p. 74, emphasis in original)
In this sense, alienation or distance is already written into the process o f 
identification. However, I must say that I regard Lacan’s construction of the mirror 
phase with some suspicion, which explains why I have not used his psychoanalytical 
model of identification in any detail in this thesis. Stuart Hall gets to the heart of the 
matter with the following description. The mirror phase, he argues, is a 
“sensationalist proposition” in which “everything constitutive of the subject not only 
happens through the resolution of the Oedipal crisis, but happens at the same 
moment” (Hall 1998, p. 8, emphasis in original). Even as a metaphor, the mirror 
phase operates as an over-determination that ultimately troubles or questions the 
possibility of a subject in process. This is because Lacan’s mirror phase marks the 
constitution of the subject as the subject of lack.21 However, a subject in process by 
no means suggests an indiscriminate movement that operates without (necessary) 
points of delimitation and fixation. This is a subject that is potentially transformed by 
differing and multiple identificatory practices. As I have shown thus far in this 
introduction, these points of fixation both indicate and separate the embodiment of the 
subject. However, Lacan’s construction is useful in order to account for seeing the 
Other as other as well as the same. Similarly, this theory of alienation implicates 
identification in the operations of loss and potential rivalry since the Other can never 
be truly possessed. Identification, then, both anchors and unties at the same time.
This would suggest that identification and difference are always and inevitably 
intertwined. In this sense it is perhaps not always possible to discern exactly what 
constitutes either distance or identification, or indeed where one stops and the other
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begins. However, as I will elucidate in the analysis of my own practice, distance and 
identification cannot simply be conflated. As Nichols hints at in his analysis of the 
film Who Killed Vincent Chin? (1988) there is a “pivoting [that] upholds a tension 
between the particular and the general, the local and the historical, the need for 
abstract or conceptual knowledge, and the desire to impart knowledge rooted in the 
concrete” (Nichols in (ed.) Sobchack 1996, p. 62). This appears to describe a 
movement between distance and identification, whereby distance constitutes seeing 
the ‘bigger’ picture or meta-discourses (in this case race, gender and class) and 
identification comprises the personal, the specific, the embodied. Of course, 
embodiment, as I will discuss, is the primary task of the performer -  either to perform 
a ‘characterisation’ of oneself or a fictional character. In my analysis of my own 
performance practice in the following two chapters, I will explore in detail this 
complex relationship of being distanced and locating identifications.
Nichols’ astute observations would contradict or at least complicate Fiske’s 
assumption that alienation or distance always places the viewing subject in a position 
in which objects are seen negatively. He cites such negativity as being unpleasurable. 
Consider, for example, his analysis of “implication-extrication” or the “double 
relationship of the reader with the text” (Fiske 1987, p. 174, emphasis in original). 
Here, he elaborates, “implication-extrication is closely connected with pleasure and 
unpleasure, with liking and disliking, and with the real and unreal” (Fiske 1987, p. 
174). In other words, extrication, in Fiske’s terms, is always a disinvestment, a denial 
or rejection of the object. In relation to viewers surveyed by Ien Ang and Dorothy 
Hobson, Fiske goes on to remark:
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Both Hobson’s and Ang’s subjects judged characters on how real they seemed, 
but revealed that the characters they liked appeared more real than those they 
disliked. The ‘real’ characters were the one’s they identified with: Ang (1996, 
p. 30-1) also reports that her subjects were detached from the characters they 
disliked and were therefore more inclined to read them as embodiments of 
socio-political values.
(1987, p. 174)
Put another way, ‘liking’ a character makes her/him appear more ‘real’ and thus sets 
in motion an identificatory relation. Disliking a fictional figure apparently institutes a 
divide or distance that permits a ‘textual’ reading of character. What strikes me here 
is that there is a connection between Fiske’s analysis and the practices that constitute 
‘postmodernism’ as Ahmed defines it. This postmodernism, which is positioned as 
underscoring (or at least attempting to underscore) the ideological practices of 
cultural forms, falls in line with a current critical ethos that Sedgwick describes as 
‘paranoid’. These practices necessarily loathe the objects they engage with, whilst at 
the same time, as Sedgwick maintains, assuming a position of ‘all-knowingness’ 
(2003, p. 138). In other words, paranoid practices implicitly claim to make known 
underlying formations of brutality. It would seem that we can only be distanced from 
what we despise.
Distance, in this thesis, is approached as a position that is without loathing and 
without (absolute) knowledge. Rather, it is a place of questioning, of thought, of 
contemplation: even of (provisional) judgment. It is a place from which to ask what is 
at stake in our investments and identifications. At the same time, as I will explore in 
the following chapters, these very investments give us sustenance, give us a place to 
be in the world, whilst being the most productive mode of giving and understanding.
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Theoretical Framework
Since itd’s work and the work of the companies I discuss in this thesis might be 
described as postmodern, my theoretical framework initially developed through a 
reading of Sara Ahmed.22 She argues that postmodernism is generally constructed as 
a self-referential distancing strategy that exposes ideological forms. She maintains 
that this construction, as a practice of reading, privileges form over content, and fails 
to recognise that identifications might be made with the representations existent 
within postmodern forms (and that these representations might be ideological). She 
claims, like Jacques Derrida, that we always read through identification since it is a 
necessary subjective practice. Indeed, as I have thus far mentioned, Derrida claims 
that identification is in fact related to or entangled in an act of love.23 In this sense 
then, identifications cannot simply be suppressed. For me, Ahmed and Derrida 
appeared to articulate a key concern of itd’s work; that, is, our attachment to and 
identification with the objects or discourses that we engage with in our performance 
making.
I extend this argument through a reading of Eve Sedgwick’s Touching Feeling (2003). 
Here she does not use the word postmodernism as such, yet describes a ‘paranoid’ 
reading practice that would seem to correlate to Ahmed’s postmodern practice of 
reading. According to Sedgwick, paranoid reading always seeks to expose or reveal 
ideological forms whilst at the same time assuming a position of absolute knowledge. 
That is, the practice of exposure implicitly claims to unmask the facts. This makes 
paranoid reading always negative and destructive. Through Sedgwick, I argue in the 
thesis that paranoia can be isolating and that identifications are not always and
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necessarily ideological. After all, they also nourish us and give us a way to be 
situated in the world.
I develop these arguments by examining how itd embrace identification as a self­
making practice, whilst still wanting to ask questions of the specific investments that 
we make in cultural forms.24 We do this, I argue, through a specific staging of a 
movement between identification and distance. This is a reformulation of John 
Fiske’s “implication-extrication” or the “double relationship of the reader with the 
text” (Fiske 1987, p. 174, emphasis in original). This staging acknowledges our love 
and attachment to certain objects or discourses, whilst at the same time interrogating 
our investments in them. As I have already made clear, the position of distance that I 
explore is certainly related to Brecht’s conceptualisation, which seeks to bring to light 
the constructed character of narrative forms (this is in order to show that the culture 
and society are equally constructed and thus subject to change or transformation). 
However, I acknowledge that this place of distance cannot simply be prescribed 
through formal strategies. That is, form and content need to be worked through 
practice and then subsequently analysed together. Also, the place of distance in this 
thesis is not one of absolute knowledge or perspective in the way Brecht imagined. 
Rather, it is a contemplative space that is necessary in order to assess the implications 
or consequences of our identifications — which are, after all, according to Foucault 
and Butler, normative and regulative in their configuration.
To sum up, itd deal with the way subjects negotiate cultural material through 
identification and distance in a performance context. Indeed, as Stuart Hall claims, 
individuals construct their identities in relation to what he calls the ‘“positions’ to
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which they are summoned” by their culture and society (1998, p. 14). Observing that 
they perform these positions, he also explains that such positions are never completely 
realised, since the subject constantly struggles with (resists) the regulative rules that 
would order and fix them (1998, p. 14).25 In other words, as subjects of culture we 
play an active role in self construction, since we always contest and re-negotiate the 
discursive positions to which we are beckoned. Furthermore, as Ahmed makes clear, 
identificatory practices are differing and multiple, so these points of fixation both 
specify and divide the embodiment of the subject.26
My interrogation of identificatory practices is carried out in this thesis in relation to 
two particular aspects of narrative: canonicity (Chapter 1) and genre (Chapter 2). I 
deal especially with how the subject interacts with these cultural languages or 
discursive formations in terms of differing and sometimes contradictory 
identifications and measures of distance. However, despite the insertion of ‘self into 
performance -  in terms that might be imagined as autobiographical or authored - 1 
also acknowledge that performance is always and necessarily restored behaviour, to 
use Richard Schechner’s term (Schechner 1985, pp. 35-116). This is one of the 
grounds for which, I maintain, character, although displaced, has not disappeared 
from experimental performance. I maintain that character has indeed endured in some 
way on experimental stages, especially if, as Bruce Wiltshire implies, character itself 
is illustrative of the historical and cultural subject. This is particularly relevant for 
itd’s work since there is no attempt to display the ‘selves’ we present to the outside 
world. In other words, we do not try to utilise explicitly autobiographical material in 
our performances. The self is rather negotiated through formal and characterological 
means.
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This thesis tells a story of the lure of the fictive practices and how we become 
attached to them as a way of carrying out our lives. They help us subsist and be in the 
world, which is why itd choose to deal with them in a performance context. These 
fictive practices are, I argue, stories of a culture and by extension, the stories of the 
self and how it relates to others. Indeed, as Martin Esslin astutely maintains, “without 
identification and empathy, each person would be irrecoverably imprisoned within 
himself (sic)” (1971, p. 131).
1 This is the mission statement of the company:
itd make performance work for national and international touring that experiments with the 
role of story-telling and narrative in the contemporary theatrical experience.
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itd make innovative use of digital media, design and physical performance to create off-kilter 
worlds within which public and private obsessions - identity, death, love and sexuality - are 
explored.
(http://www.imitatingthedog.co.uk/company/default.asp)
For public information on the company, see http://imitatingthedog.co.uk
2 Pete Brooks, a founder member of Impact Theatre, has been known to describe his work as ‘magical 
realism’.
3 We saw Stan’s Cafe ‘restage’ The Carrier Frequency in April 1999 as part of Birmingham’s Towards 
The Millennium Eighties Festival.
4 Five Miles and Falling is the second show submitted as practice-as-research for this thesis.
5 The audience stands inside the lift when viewing Five Miles and Falling, looking one way to see live 
performance action and then turning in the opposite way to see recording events on a screen. Although 
this places them within the wider operating framework of the representational machinery of the 
performance, it is important to note that in crucial ways the audience are excluded from the 
performance’s representational mechanisms: certain divisions such as performer/spectator persist. I 
shall discuss this further in chapter two.
6 Guilty Pleasures is the first show submitted as practice-as-research for this thesis.
7 Of course, love as Derrida points out, is an impulse of identification, however, love is also caught up 
in the dynamic o f profound loss. This is explored in Gillian Rose’s Love’s Work. The philosopher 
Lyotard also describes the desolating effect of love. He writes: “And yet, if  you ever happen to be in 
love, really in love, the vista of the face continues to grip you even as you bow to the law that emanates 
from the countenance. And that is why you no longer know where you are” (Lyotard 1989, p. 218). 
Love, it would seem, both fastens and undoes at the same time. I discuss this further in my exploration 
of Five Miles and Falling.
8 See my discussion o f Guilty Pleasures in chapter one.
9 Fuchs admits that her ‘death of character’ essay is now old fashioned. I will return to this point later.
10 See, for example, Jill Dolan in Carlson’s Performance, 1996, p. 170, and Phillip Zarilli in Acting 
(Re)Considered, 1995, p. 19.
11 Artaud constantly invokes a mode of being that exists outside representational frameworks; this is 
one definition of cruelty (see Derrida’s essay, ‘The Theatre of Cruelty and the Closure of 
Representation’, in Writing and Difference (1978). See also Antonin Artaud: The Collected Works — 
Volume 4: “Life-manifestation: theatre-manifestation and cruelty-exactness, for it is intense, for life is 
present.” (Preface 11, The Theatre and its Double, p. 159).
12 Rather confusingly, she claims on only the next page that her “entire project has been tutored by 
deconstructive ideas” (1996, p. 11) suggesting that she does not in fact invest in a return to 
foundational concepts.
13 Fuchs’ ‘The Death of Character’ essay does in fact mention the danger of postmodernism’s potential 
loss of values when she writes, “It is a frightening thought that theater (sic) could well be on its way to 
becoming a vast supermarket, a Bloomingdale’s of empty signs from ever more exotic sources 
recombined to create an artificial and dehumanized culture” (1996, p. 175) but she admits in her book 
that this idea “finds its way into the essay more as a threat than as an inevitable ‘cultural logic’ (1996, 
p. 9).
14 Yet Ahmed would say that preventing identification is not possible. I will return to this shortly.
15 For an excellent summary of Lacan’s theories of subjectivity, see Jane Gallop’s Reading Lacan 
(Cornell University Press: Ithica 1985)
161 shall be offering a critique of the mirror phase on page 33 of this introduction.
17 Aristotle clearly describes preindividualistic narratives; that is, they emerge from a social world in 
which the psychological subject has not yet been constituted as such, and, therefore, in which later 
categories of the subject, such as the ‘character’, are not relevant. It is important to acknowledge that 
‘modem’ performance texts also engage with an unconstituted psychological subject as well, although 
it is highly probable that psychological motivations are constantly projected by spectators in the West. 
See my discussion of L ’Ascensore in chapter two.
18 Brecht did not like realism’s characters because they were not real enough -  they resolved 
contradictions.
191 do not want to suggest that identification in television and theatre (and indeed film) are 
synonymous -  merely that they have certain similarities. I will explore these differences in the course 
of this thesis.
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20 Hutcheon defines meta-fiction as a ‘manifestation’ of postmodernism (in Ahmed 1998, p. 148).
21 For a more detailed critique of the limitations of the mirror phase see Ahmed 1998, p. 98.
22 Ihab Hassan describes postmodernism thus: “postmodernism veers towards open, playful, optive, 
disjunctive, displaced or indeterminate forms, a discourse of fragments, an ideology of fracture, a will 
to unmaking, and invocation of silence -  implies all o f these yet implies their very opposition, their 
antithetical realities” (Hassan 1980; 125). The practices of formal experimentation that we engage in, 
for example, the collaging of genres of story-telling such as theatre, film, video, pop-video and 
photography, as well as the utalisation of techniques such as montage, repetition, physical expression 
and non-linear narratives (stretching, compressing, re-configuring time), to name but a few, could be 
said to correspond to Hassan’s formulation.
23 See introduction, pages 4-5.
24 If we accept that theatre always deals with subjective practices.
25 See chapter 1.
26 This is discussed more fully in relation to Desperate Optimist’s Play-boy on page 63.
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CHAPTER ONE
CONTRADICTORY AND CONFLICTING IDENTIFICATIONS IN 
PRESENTATIONAL THEATRE:
MECHANISMS OF THE CANON AND NOTIONS OF AUTHORSHIP AND 
AUTHORITY IN PLAY-BOY BY DESPERATE OPTIMISTS AND GUILTY
PLEASURES BY ITD
As I pointed out in my introduction, our third production, Guilty Pleasures, took a 
different direction to Einmal ist Keinmal and Ark. In this performance, we wanted to 
change our relationship to ‘fiction’. We had felt very restricted by the rigidity of the 
narrative structure that dominated the previous two shows, and wanted space in the 
performance to ‘step’ outside the fiction and ‘look on’, in the same or similar privileged 
position that an audience member has.1 What had become limiting in our adherence to 
specific logics of narrative was the demand that closure, bringing into resolution, made 
upon us as makers. The rules of the diagetic worlds created meant that only certain paths 
were open to us for exploration and the logics of character came to dominate stage action. 
In a deliberate move away from these enclosed worlds we wanted to create self-conscious 
fictions (and present more than one fictional strand) as well as showing the ‘workings’ 
and technologies of each fiction we were pursuing. Instead of being ‘inside’ the worlds 
that we were exploring, we would ‘present’ them.
Indeed, the style of both the performances I will be discussing in this chapter, Play-boy 
by Desperate Optimists and Guilty Pleasures made by itd, is presentational, and both take 
a canonical text, The Playboy o f the Western World (1907) by John Millington Synge and 
The Family Reunion (1939) by T. S Eliot respectively, around which to construct their
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action. Neither company entirely ‘embodies’ the texts, but rather negotiates them from 
the ‘outside’.2 Presentational theatre, in which the actor’s ‘persona’ is foregrounded, 
could be described as a common trope of experimental performance, and has some 
parallels to Brechtian concept of ‘alienation’. However, as I pointed out in the 
introduction, Brecht sought to use presentation rather than embodiment of character as a 
means to replace the dominant ‘false’ understanding of reality with the ‘truth’ of social 
justice. Yet as many critics have pointed out, Brecht’s theory intrinsically situates both 
the actor and author (Brecht) as exterior to the fiction and thus in a position of mastery, 
suggesting “the existence of a stable subject position from which to quote the character 
and indeed from which to represent ‘social reality’” (Harris 1999 p. 79). In other words, 
his methods reinstate concepts of a fixed subjectivity and the restoration of ‘author’s 
intentions’.
However, without wanting to return to the grounding principles of a Brechtian method, I 
would like to consider Philip Auslander’s conception of a possible “deconstructive 
theatre.”3 Auslander compares the Brechtian model with a deconstructive practice in the 
following way. He claims that Brecht posits “the self as the autonomous foundation for 
acting” since, in Roland Barthes’ terms, “the [Brechtian] actor must present the very 
knowledge of the [play’s] meaning... The actor must prove... that [she] guides meaning 
towards its ideality” (Auslander 1987 pp. 30 and 33, brackets are Auslander’s). Thus, in 
theory, we identify with the actor as the purveyor of authoritative truths. Instead, 
deconstructive theatre, according to Auslander, has the capacity to undermine “theatrical 
presence” which he defines as “the actor’s revelation of self through performance” (1987
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p. 36). This is because it prevents, through the actor’s deliberate acknowledgement that 
s/he cannot ‘master’ the material that makes up the performance, the actor’s self from 
securing, or attempting to secure, “a grounding presence that precedes the performance” 
(1987 p. 36). By implication then, since the actor’s subjectivity is not defined in 
advance, or rather, is generated by the performance context, (complete) identification 
with her or him is prevented or made difficult. This is because, if I follow Auslander’s 
argument through, the performing self has no ground or fixed points of reference that an 
audience could identify with.4 Furthermore, although he states that he could not possibly 
speculate on what deconstructive acting might “look like” as it “runs counter to the spirit 
of deconstruction itself’, he goes on to do so in a detailed exploration of the performance 
style of the New York based theatre company, the Wooster Group (1987 p. 38).5 Rather 
than ‘revealing the self through performance, Auslander sees their approach to 
performance as being principally exemplified by Elinor Fuchs’ portrayal of a 
‘postmodern’ theatre. This is:
[A] stage turned curiously upon itself, blurring the old distinctions between self 
and world, being and thing; and in doing so not through a representation of the 
outside world but through the development of a performance art ‘about’ 
performance itself.
(in Auslander 1987p.41)
That is, in Auslander’s words, “Wooster Group performances, indeed, are less 
representations of an exterior reality than of the relationship of the performers to the 
circumstances of the performance” (1987 p. 41).
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However, the extensive quotations that he uses by Willem Dafoe, a key ‘player’ in the 
Wooster Group’s twenty odd year performance history, seem to suggest that the 
negotiation of Dafoe’s embodied ‘self is a crucial and necessary dynamic of the work. 
Although Dafoe, in the Wooster Group performances, enacts a performance ‘persona’, 
incorporating for example, the ‘playing’ of himself, of re-enacted versions of himself on 
acid trips, as well as various fictional characters, he, perhaps inevitably, sees the 
‘constant’ of these roles as his embodied self. This is a ‘grounding’ of sorts upon which 
his performance persona is pinned. Consider the following statements:
I am this particular guy that has to go through these particular paces. It’s not so 
much that I am putting forward my personality, but because of the various actions 
I have to do, I’m presenting my personality in how I field those actions [...] how I 
field them is how I live in this piece.
These [pieces] are made specifically for us.
When we make a theatre piece, we kind of accommodate what [the performers] 
are good at or how they read. They have functions, so it’s not like we treat each 
other as actors and there has to be this transformation. We just put what Ron 
brings to a text and formalize it: it definitely comes from Ron as we know him, as 
he presents himself to the world and then, of course, when you formalize it and it 
becomes a public performance it ups the stakes a little bit. That’s not to say Ron 
is just being himself, but you are taking those qualities that he has and pumping 
them up and putting them in the structure.
The way I get off in performances is when I hit those moments of real pleasure 
and real clarity and an understanding about myself in relationship to the structure; 
it is work, it is an exercise of me for two hours, behaving a certain way, and it can 
become meditative.
(Dafoe, cited in Auslander, 1997 p. 39-44)
These quotations suggest that Dafoe sees the performances as a structure through which 
to present and negotiate the self, as he makes identifications with the characters, actions 
and objects that are woven into the performance, as he “hits those moments”, as he comes
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to points of self understanding through the work. Arguably, devised performance is more 
about the ‘self of the performer/maker because there is a specific, personal investment in 
the material than in, say, a scripted play by Chekhov or Brecht, in which the actors 
embody or present the author’s words and actions on stage.6 This is particularly true of 
the Wooster Group since they bring many of their own objects, interests, past experiences 
and obsessions into the rehearsal room. However, Auslander describes Dafoe’s 
relationship to his work as a kind of ‘catharsis’ which “takes self understanding as its 
object, and is therefore therapeutic rather than communal” (1997 p.44). At the same 
time, Auslander maintains, Dafoe’s “understanding is limited to a clarity of perception 
about the relation of the self to the performance” (1997 p. 44). He goes on:
No larger structure of knowledge, whether of the individual psyche or the collective 
unconscious, is invoked. If, in postmodern performance, the self is understood to be a 
persona, a textual entity generated by the performance context, catharsis too, must be 
defined in textual terms.
(Auslander, 1997 p. 44)
However, although it might be a fair assumption that no “larger structure of knowledge is 
invoked” Auslander appears to overlook what I would describe as a fascinating tension 
between Dafoe as an embodied, specific person as performer and Dafoe as textual or as 
persona. According to Auslander, the audience witness only the exploration of ‘acting’ 
processes, not the processes by which the self might reach temporary points of cohesion, 
of a fragile sense of being, through performance. This hints at a mode of self-authorship, 
which I will elaborate on in just a moment. Furthermore, since Auslander defines the 
Wooster Group’s work as an “investigation of the suppression of difference within
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political and cultural representations” and a “deconstruction of presence [that] avoid[s] 
merely restating the images and structure it invokes”, he leaves unaddressed the ways in 
which authoritative structures or voices might be repeated, or re-circulated within the 
frame of the performance (Auslander 1997, p. 38). I will now move on to a consideration 
of authorship and authority, in order to unravel some of Auslander’s assumptions.
Authorship and Authority
Auslander describes the Wooster Group’s aesthetic as consistent with a “poststructuralist 
idea of textuality”, and indeed quotes Roland Barthes in order to describe their work 
(1997 p. 71). He claims that Barthes’ description of a text could be used to describe a 
Wooster Group show, that is, “a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, 
none of them original, blend and clash” (Barthes, in Auslander, 1997 p. 71). Indeed, in 
relation to the Wooster Group’s production of LSD (...Just the High Points...) (1984), 
which incorporates a significant portion of Arthur Miller’s The Crucible (1952), he 
makes the case that Miller, as author, disappears.7 That is not to say that the Wooster 
Group actually expel his name in their own re-rendering of his text, but instead (or as 
well as) the author as figure in all contemporary culture, is no longer relevant. He 
asserts, again in line with Barthes, “the text is made up of quotations to begin with” and 
“it arises in some sense from the culture itself and not from the idiosyncratic mind of the 
writer” (Auslander 1997, p. 71). To elucidate, Barthes claims that the authority of the 
author cannot predominate since “language knows a ‘subject’, not a ‘person’” (Barthes,
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1977 p. 145). In this sense the use of language in writing is always socially and 
culturally situated. Furthermore, language is a “gesture of inscription (and not of 
expression)” as it always incorporates quotations or references to writings from the past 
(1977, p. 146). Barthes states that:
As soon as a fact is narrated no longer with a view to acting directly on reality 
but intransitively, that is to say, finally outside of any function other than that of 
the very practice of the symbol itself, this disconnection occurs, the voice loses its 
origin, the author enters into his own death, writing begins.
(1977, p. 146 emphasis in original)
Barthes intimates that the author, in the act of writing, cannot prevent her or himself from 
being lost in a ceaseless process of imitation, since s/he must always operate within 
symbolic structures. However, it may be a little hasty to assume the total annihilation of 
the author, and this is important, since it will facilitate a crucial distinction between
Q
authored and genre texts -  the latter of which I will discuss in chapter two. In his essay 
‘What is an Author?’ Foucault, without attempting to reassert the author as 
transcendental signifier, points out:
It is not enough [...] to repeat the empty affirmation that the author has 
disappeared. For the same reason, it is not enough (after Nietzsche) that God and 
man have died a common death. Instead, we must locate the space left empty by 
the author’s disappearance, follow the distribution of gaps and breaches, and 
watch for the openings that this disappearance uncovers.
(1984, p. 105)
Indeed, to rephrase Foucault, the question is not ‘who is the author?’ as if the title of 
author is connected to a specific individual or subject, but rather, ‘what is the author’s
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function within our society?’ In this sense, the author becomes a crucial operation of 
discourse. Indeed, the return of the subject as author is not “in order to re-establish the 
theme of an originating subject” but rather to “grasp the subject’s points of insertion, 
modes of functioning, and system of dependencies” (Foucault 1984, p. 118). Indeed, the 
authors I will be addressing in this chapter, John Millington Synge and T. S. Eliot, 
operate within specific terms and contexts. First of all, we must take into account the 
precise ‘status’ and circulation of each author as author. This is particularly clear in 
relation to the canonical authors I am discussing herein, since the canon is widely 
understood as a container of traditional cultural value. In other words, as Charles Altieri 
rephrases Samuel Johnson, canons “play obvious social roles as selective memories of 
traditions or ideals” (1990, p. 21). Further, we must consider the impact of critical 
writings (especially Eliot’s own) that have the effect of ‘situating’ the meanings of an 
author’s text. In other words, authored texts, particularly of the canonical variety, can be 
described as already (culturally) read or as having ‘authoritative’ interpretations.
Authored texts are also broadly positioned within certain movements or traditions. In this 
sense, the figure of the author has the effect of limiting, taming and containing meaning, 
or in other words, s/he is an ‘anchor’ of meaning. As Foucault points out: “we are used 
to thinking that the author is so different from all other men (sic), and so transcendent 
with regard to all languages that, as soon as he (sic) speaks, meanings begin to proliferate 
indefinitely” (1994, p. 118). In reaction, he pertinently remarks: “the author is the 
principle of thrift in the proliferation of meaning” (1994 p. 118). He goes on:
[T]he author is not an indefinite source of significations which fill the work; the
author does not precede the works; he (sic) is a certain functional principle by
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which, in our culture, one limits, excludes and chooses; in short, by which one 
impedes the free circulation, the free manipulation, the free composition, 
decomposition, and recomposition of fiction. [...] The author is therefore the 
ideological figure by which one marks the manner in which we fear the 
proliferation of meaning.
(1994, p. 118-19)
To reiterate, the author is a figure or function that actually closes down meaning’s 
potential multiplication. Therefore, whilst I am prepared to accept the ‘textuality’ of the 
author that Auslander (in relation to Barthes) describes, I think it is important to 
remember that there is a contextual and historical ‘weight’ to the author’s name that 
Auslander fails to acknowledge. I would like to claim, on the other hand, that even in the 
reffaming of the authored text -  as in the Wooster Group’s (re)rendering of Arthur 
Miller’s The Crucible -  the figure or function of the author and his contexts still maintain 
a presence in the work. In fact, it could be argued that the author’s name in fact becomes 
more concrete in a Wooster Group performance. This is because Miller’s work is placed 
in parenthesis, rather than being hidden behind the seeming transparency of the realist 
text. Put another way, since the reframed play is thrown into relief, arguably, so are its 
specific contexts and modes of functioning. It is significant, for example, that Elizabeth 
LeCompte (director of the Wooster Group) describes Miller’s vision of himself as “in the 
realm of high moral art,” whilst most Americans, she claims, see his play “in high school 
productions, with people wearing cornstarch in their hair” (in Savran, 1986 p. 191).9 This 
is because his text is studied on the standard school syllabus as part of the established 
American canon. In LSD, LeCompte actually had the actors working on The Crucible as 
if in a high school play.
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Whilst not wishing to dwell on this particular piece by the Wooster Group (it is not in the 
remit of this thesis), I will take care to foreground the ways in which the authors and their 
contexts might still function within the performances that I will be discussing: Play-boy 
by Desperate Optimists and Guilty Pleasures by itd. It is true that in the re-framing of a 
(canonical) text, the original meanings will undoubtedly pass into the texture of the new 
text’s significations. Furthermore, I will also take into account the possible effects of de­
centring (rather than obliterating) an authored text in terms of other modes of authority or 
authorship. To put it a different way, if we imagine Play-boy and Guilty Pleasures as 
‘texts’ that are created through a devising process, then the performers/makers are not 
properly outside of them. This is to say, performers/makers also operate as authors (of a 
kind). To use Foucault again, I will attempt to: “grasp the subject’s points of insertion, 
modes of functioning, and system of dependencies” (1984, p. 118).
In Play-boy and Guilty Pleasures, both Desperate Optimists and itd stage the relationship 
of the subject to discursive formations (such as the canonical text) in terms of an 
articulation. In other words, since “all articulations are properly relations of ‘no 
necessary correspondence’” they are “founded on that contingency which ‘reactivates the 
historical’” (Hall, citing Laclau, 1998 p. 14). This may be where the possibility of 
agency lies. In other words, the historical material (of the canonical text) is re-animated 
or read again in the act o f performance. Stuart Hall maintains that:
Individuals as subjects identify (or do not identify) with the ‘positions’ to which 
they are summoned; [they also] fashion, stylise, produce and ‘perform’ these 
positions, and [...] they never do so completely, for once and for all time, and 
some never do, or are in a constant, agonistic process of struggling with, resisting,
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re-negotiating and accommodating the normative or regulative rules with which 
they confront and regulate themselves.
(1998, p. 14)
In other words, what the performers appear to foreground in Play-boy and Guilty 
Pleasures is not an overriding meta-narrative that solidifies identity, as Stanislavski’s 
realism or Brecht’s alienation arguably seeks, but rather a negotiation of identificatory 
processes that mark and divide the subject. Both performances are elaborately structured 
and scripted, so neither Molloy, Lawlor nor any of itd’s identifications are made in the 
‘present moment’ of performance, at least, not in the same way that an audience member 
might identify whilst engaging with the material for the first time. Rather, audiences 
witness identificatory processes ‘at work’ in the performances themselves. Put another 
way, we, as performers, (even though this is an ‘effect’ of the performance and not what 
is ‘truly’ occurring) construct versions of ‘ourselves’ as we negotiate, read and field the 
elements that make up our performances. In Auslander’s terms, the ‘self is not 
‘revealed’ as such in Play-boy or Guilty Pleasures, as both Desperate Optimists and itd 
do not provide “the audience with access to human truths” (Auslander, 1997 p. 30). 
Rather, the ‘making’ or negotiation of self is manifested through, or is an effect of, the 
performer’s identifications with or investments in different sets of (hi)stories and 
materials.
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Play-boy by Desperate Optimists
Production Details: Play-boy was devised and performed by Desperate Optimists: Joe Lawlor and Christine 
Malloy. The video element was directed and edited by Desperate Optimists and filmed by Chris Dorley- 
Brown. Play-boy toured extensively in 1998-99 throughout the UK and also toured to Dublin, Finland, the 
Netherlands and Sweden.
Let me begin by setting the scene of the performance itself. There are two ‘live’ 
performers in Play-boy, a woman and a man, clearly of Irish origin, wielding 
microphones and wearing simple white shirts and plain trousers, with identical pairs of 
cowboy boots. They have apparently come as ‘themselves’. As our ‘hosts’, the two 
performers, Molloy and Lawlor, weave a number of stories, mythologies, legends and 
anecdotes around the ‘concept’ of The Playboy o f the Western World by John Millington 
Synge. I use the word ‘concept’ as the text itself is notably absent in the playing space of 
the theatre, as well as all the mechanisms, or machinery, that are usually manipulated, at 
least within traditional Irish theatre, to make the text ‘come to life’ -  the costumes, the 
scenery, the properties, the sound and lighting effects and notably, the actors that play the 
characters. The performance space is very pared down, with a hardboard floor broken up 
into even squares with black tape, a green tarpaulin backdrop, and dual video monitors 
placed centre stage, one set slightly farther back than the other. At the front and running 
across the width of the stage is a raised platform, about two feet high and two feet deep. 
There are two high stools, one up stage and one down stage, and two microphone stands. 
There is a smoke machine that pumps out a burst of smoke every so often. There are no 
other objects on the set.
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As the performance unfolds we are accorded, courtesy of our hosts and their pre-recorded 
‘guests’ that appear on the video monitors, all the elements that are kept hidden or are 
cast out in the making of a coherent theatrical narrative such as The Playboy o f the 
Western World’, direct references to the play’s ‘staging’ through accounts of its early 
production at the Abbey Theatre in Ireland, tales about the life and times of its Irish 
writer, Synge, and importantly, reconstructions of the story and the characters Synge 
invented by the video taped guests who are introduced to us by the performers as their 
friends and family.10 Sometimes the video recorded figures hold guns loaded with blanks 
up to the camera and fire at the screen. We are also told a seemingly random set of 
stories about (mainly South American) revolutions, both historically ‘real’ and fictional, 
which are more or less related to The Playboy o f the Western World, and occasionally 
Molloy and Lawlor embody the characters from stories during the course of the show.11 
It might be interpreted that these stories generally have some sort of connection to 
Ireland. Intermittently, and often in the middle of a story, the performer who is not 
speaking holds the gun loaded with blanks up to the other and shoots. Using pins, they 
take it in turns to pierce blood bags that are somehow attached to the inside of their shirts. 
They work the blood out by crushing the bags with their fingers, dousing their shirts with 
uneven bloodstains. At particular moments, a samba track, which is accompanied by an 
intricately rehearsed dance sequence, is played over the loud speakers. This always ends 
or temporarily interrupts the flow of a given speech or story.
If Sara Ahmed insists that the ‘about-ness’ of experimental forms is too often overlooked, 
I would argue that although Play-boy is not reducible to the politics of place, of national
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identity, it could be read as circulating principally around certain notions of Irishness. 
However, crucially, when watching the show, these notions of Irish national identity are 
not explored through continued fictional characterisation, which, according to Alex 
Johnston, is contrary to Irish theatrical custom:
The overwhelmingly dominant theatrical tradition in Ireland is psychological 
realism. [...] Irish actors love to show you that while the characters they’re 
playing may be behaving in objectionable ways, it’s only because they have 
complex and tortured inner lives, which if you but understood, you wouldn’t 
judge them. So that normally we look into Irish theatre, rather than at it.
(2000)
I love his expression of looking ‘into’ Irish theatre. Yet, as Johnston points out,
audiences of traditional Irish theatre are expected to identify with the fictional characters
in a way that brings them to a recognition of what Irish national identity actually is. In
other words, all of us, in the same way, will come to a (perfect) understanding of
Irishness by identifying with the characters that embody the “complex and tortured inner
lives” of an historically poor and subordinated people: I  can understand your turmoil
(which is outside my own comprehension) by putting myself in your position. It is
allegedly through (complete) empathetic identification then, that Irish drama can summon
the outside world to understand what Irishness really, or essentially is. In other words,
traditional Irish theatre attempts, however successfully, to delimit an essential Irish
12sensibility (an Irish ‘self).
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Interestingly, as Alex Johnston points out, Irish reviewers were “less than happy” with 
the Desperate Optimist’s performance, apparently wishing that the fake blood bags 
concealed in Molloy’s shirt were real (2000). Johnston believes that the Irish press 
would prefer politics to be tackled in “a measured, literary manner with a strong dose of 
humanism”, rather like the plays of the popular Irish playwright Brian Friel (2000). As 
he remarks ironically, “Brian Friel’s characters don’t interrupt passionate speeches to 
engage in carefully choreographed samba dancing” (Johnston, 2000). The reviewers 
seemed to be identifying what they saw as a ‘failure’ by the Desperate Optimists to 
acknowledge Ireland as the ‘romantic land’ that figures in much celebrated Irish art and 
literature. This is an Ireland with which its people can make a strong and confirmatory 
identification.
However, whilst not wanting to undermine the importance of affirmative identifications, 
it is important to point out that the definition an essential Irish character seeks to conceal 
the power relations at work in the making or fixing of any category. In other words, it 
fails to take into consideration the question of who has the authority to fix the limits of or 
sanction the criteria for what constitutes national identity. Indeed, how can it be possible 
that the “dominant theatrical tradition” of Ireland, as Johnston puts it, can ‘speak for’ 
what Irishness is and indeed always will bel Especially since, as Derridian 
deconstruction would indicate, essentialism is always impossible as such. Any 
conception of pure essence always necessitates contingent and supplementary details and 
so is always already tainted by what is other to it, or outside of it. To assert an 
autonomous identity then, requires that everything other to it is either consumed, or
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another autonomous identity has to be placed in opposition, which demands violent 
exclusion. Moreover, the attempt to define Irishness absolutely works to expel the 
heterogeneity that inflects the category, as well as working to prevent the possibility, in 
Butler’s terms, of transformation o f that meaning.
However, importantly, Irishness or ‘being Irish’ may not have an essential or ‘pure’ 
meaning, although the de-essentialisation of any collective identity category leaves it
without reference to, in Jane Flax’s words, “any historical, specific beings constituted by
1 ^and through different sets of social experience” (in Ahmed, 1998 p. 89). Yet it is 
arguably a way, and certainly only one way among others, in which a set of people, 
particularly in a nationalistic country, come to identify themselves, and indeed are 
differentiated by others. After all, as Stuart Hall reminds us:
Identities are, as it were, the positions which the subject is obliged to take up 
while always ‘knowing’ (the language of consciousness betrays us here) that they 
are representations, that representation is always constructed across a ‘lack’, 
across a division, from the place of the Other, and thus can never be adequate -  
identical -  to the subject processes that are invested in them.
(1998 p. 6)
In other words, on the one hand, we are compelled to take up identities that are regulated 
by and through representation. At the same time, however, these very same regulatory 
processes of identity creation fall short of corresponding exactly to our lived or embodied 
experience. Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that there is a level at which we 
want to identify ourselves with specific objects or representations, in order to feel a sense 
of belonging, or to have ‘self-knowledge’, even if this can only ever be provisional.
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In Play-boy, through a certain characterisation of the self, there is a playing through of 
the tension between the performers identification with the regulatory fictions of Irishness, 
and a distinct embodied-ness or individuality that the performers appear to possess. 
Consider the opening words of the show spoken by Joe Lawlor:
Good evening. We have been thinking about a question for quite some time now and 
the question goes as follows: What do we need to know? And we’ve decided in 
response to this question that what we really need to know are the facts. And that’s 
just about it. The plain, simple, ordinary, no messing about, cutting straight to the 
chase, down on the farm, home cooked facts. Facts unencumbered by our opinion, 
any subjectivity we might possess, fancy digressions, literary ornamentation, 
irrelevant embellishments. Just the facts. So for what it’s worth, that’s exactly what 
we’re going to give you this evening. Just the facts. No more, no less.
(Desperate Optimists, 1998)
There are probably a number of reasons why I found myself laughing out loud at these 
definitive opening statements. It may be my doubt that the truth can ever be captured 
completely, or the irony with which his words are spoken -  although this irony may only 
be recognisable to me since I have seen previous performances by Desperate Optimists.
In Play-boy, Desperate Optimists do not even attempt an apparently factual account of 
the events they describe. Instead, as I anticipated, they perform exactly what Lawlor 
insisted they would not. This show is full of opinions, anecdotes, digressions, downright 
lies and extravagant embellishments. All of this is, of course, played through a heavy 
dose of ‘subjectivity’ as Lawlor describes it, which happens to be what makes this show 
so pleasurable. It is the performers apparent embodiedness or authorship of this 
performance (and themselves) that makes them so attractive and makes me identify with 
them and want to invest in them. Interestingly, the performers in Play-boy have a
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charismatic presence, which Auslander argues historically demonstrates a “collusion 
[with] repressive power structures” (1997, p. 63). He maintains:
In theatre, presence is the matrix of power; a postmodern theatre of resistance 
must therefore both expose the collusion of presence with authority and resist 
such a collusion by refusing to establish itself as the charismatic Other. Bertolt 
Brecht’s theory and practice are exemplary in this regard, but [...] Brecht’s 
formulation of the need to maintain a distance between actor and character depend 
on a traditional notion of presence to the extent that the actor’s persona as 
commentator on the character must be invested with the authority of presence in 
order for that commentary to carry more weight than the character itself. There is 
much that a postmodern political theatre can learn from Brecht, but such a theatre 
must also move beyond Brecht...
(1997, p. 62-3)
It is fair to say that Play-boy does not attempt to offer an indisputably ‘true’ way of 
seeing the world. However, at the same time, it would be too simple to argue that 
Desperate Optimists simply undermine the facticity of the stories they present in their 
performance. Instead, we are bombarded with tales that appear to be ‘true’ yet turn out to 
be fictional, or seem fictional yet turn out to be ‘true’ -  at least in as far as we can believe 
the records of history which are always a matter of perspective. Lawlor and Molloy 
appear to have some sort of control over the narratives they tell, by the way in which they 
tell them. That is, I never quite knew if they were being honest (if I can indeed expect 
honesty from a performance) or not. The effect of this process was disorientating 
although ultimately led me to question how I make decisions about what to invest or 
believe in -  especially since they performed their particular investments in the material 
they engaged with.
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The telling of a good story is a notably, or indeed stereotypically, Irish ability, and this 
seems to be a trait the performers both purposefully manipulate. The supposed 
characteristically Irish ability to come across as knowledgeable about a subject one 
knows little or nothing about or to ‘spin a good yam’ is repeatedly emphasised in the 
performance. Yet this ‘playing’ of the Irish character, as I have already implied, also 
seems to be embodied by the performers. As Tim Etchells remarks in a short essay on 
their first touring show, The Anatomy o f Two Exiles'.
They have this way of telling it whereby they own their statements utterly, straight-up 
and no messing but at the same time they make it absolutely clear that they are talking 
nothing but shit. I have seen Jo and Christine [Desperate Optimists] doing this in 
bars. I have seen them doing it on stage for years. They have a blank commitment as 
speakers, a commitment to what they say which seems to value no part of the 
sentence more than any other, as if every fact were vital, or, and always at the same 
time, everything they speak is the biggest amount of nonsense ever invented.
(2000)
This is exemplified in Play-boy time and time again. For instance, in one narrative, 
Lawlor, betraying the blank commitment that Etchells speaks of, tells the story of Don 
Bernardo O’Higgins, who apparently had an Irish father and a Chilean mother, and was 
the first Chilean leader after the collapse of Spanish rule. To paraphrase Lawlor, the 
Chilean people finally realised they could not tolerate a leader with an Irish name, and 
this ultimately led to his downfall. Having been (almost) certain that Lawlor had 
invented the story, as it sounds too ridiculous to be true, I have since found out, from a 
quick and curious search on the web, that O’Higgins was in fact a dictator in Chile at the 
turn of the Eighteenth century. This is a classic representation of the stories that are told 
in Play-boy. In my delight and astonishment that (at least some of) Lawlor’s story is
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bona fide, I am reminded of how I was continually in the rather disorientating process of 
being tom between ‘buying in’ and indeed ‘wanting’ or desiring to buy in, to the stories I 
was party to when watching Play-boy and at the same time finding them utterly far­
fetched and absurd. The performers seem only too aware of their ability to manipulate 
this dynamic in the performance. Early on in the show, Lawlor introduces a group of 
video recorded ‘guests’ who are ‘played back’ on two video monitors centre stage. He 
proclaims: “We have invited some guests to talk about The Playboy o f the Western World 
-  some of which have read the play, some of which have seen a production, and some 
have frankly done neither but being Irish they are going to give it a go anyway” 
(Desperate Optimists, 1998). Later, Molloy translates the word ‘gringo’ as being Spanish 
for “an Irishman that speaks a load of shite” (Desperate Optimists, 1998). This exercise 
of “giving it a go anyway” or indeed, speaking a “load of shite” is exactly what Molloy 
and Lawlor have the effect of ‘doing’ in Play-boy. This suggests that is not necessarily 
the integrity of the story that matters, but their (stereotypically Irish?) need or demand to 
have an opinion on the matter, whether rooted in ‘truth’ or not. Their behaviour not only 
reminds me that ‘history is in the telling’ but also appears to tell me something about 
Lawlor and Molloy. This autobiographical feel is further emphasised by the fact that the 
video recorded ‘guests’ that appear in the show are, as I have already mentioned, their 
family and friends. This is the putting of one’s subjectivity into the act of articulation 
that Lawlor (ironically) denied would take place in the performance.
So what, then, is the consequence of this ‘characterisation of the self in Play-boy?14 For 
me, while I engaged with the show, I felt as if I was constantly in negotiation with them
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as apparently embodied people/performers and as seeming authors of the narratives they 
spun in the performance. Their style of narration put me in the perpetual, uncertain 
situation of being determined not to be ‘had’, or for the joke to be on me. I had to ask 
myself the question, does it matter if the stories they tell are true or not and why should 
this concern me so much? After all, this is a performance -  the territory of fiction! But 
somehow it did matter, since it made me reflect on the decision-making process that is 
necessary to distinguish between what constitutes belief or non-belief. How do I decide 
to believe and invest in representations, and what might be at stake in such choices and 
alignments?
However, significantly, at other instances in the show, the actual ‘truth’ seemed 
secondary to other resonances their stories had. Indeed, the first story Lawlor tells us is 
about the way in which Synge, author of The Playboy o f the Western World, was 
condemned by the public who attended the play’s first showing in 1907. This is because 
the images he presented of the Irish people were not exemplary enough. Lawlor remarks 
that, at a time of political unrest in Ireland, the Irish people were looking for positive 
images of themselves in literature and theatre. Lawlor claims that pandemonium broke 
out in the auditorium as the viewers stomped their feet and became violent. He enacts 
this feet stomping for a very long time. He then goes on to tell us that the second 
performance of Synge’s play was presented with all the ‘offensive’ parts removed, which 
happened to be “all of the words” (Desperate Optimists, 1998). This story sounds absurd, 
although I discovered later on that this is how the history books tell it.
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Significantly though, the ‘truth’ of this story, as I have already stated, is not necessarily 
what is at stake in its telling. Two things strike me here. The first is that the Desperate 
Optimists frequently suffer, in the same way Synge did when his show was first received, 
a ‘rejection’ or their work by Irish spectators and press. This clearly shows their 
identification with him, as author, as well as bringing to light the identificatory 
expectations and demands that audiences make when coming to the theatre.
Furthermore, it reflects on the process of canonisation itself- after all, Synge’s play is 
now seen as a respected Irish classic. This points towards the transformation of the Irish 
sensibility over time, rather than a static ahistorical notion that essentialism and canons 
would seem to privilege. It is also significant (and witty) that Desperate Optimists mirror 
this removal o f the text by taking Synge’s dialogue out of their own ‘illustration’ of the 
playwright’s narrative.
Perhaps paradoxically, I often wanted the stories Molloy and Lawlor told to be true, 
partly, I suggest, because they were good stories: there is a lot of pleasure to be had in 
finding out that a fantastic or improbable story did actually occur. But also because, as I 
have already mentioned, the performers had a mischievous appeal that I found attractive 
and wanted to invest in, in the same way that one might want to invest or believe in a 
fictional character. This is one of the ways in which I identified with Molloy and Lawlor. 
This is possibly why I felt a little cheated and disappointed, as well as wryly amused, at 
the moment late on in the performance when Molloy confesses to Lawlor that she had 
invented one of her narratives (which incidentally, is a great story):
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Lawlor. Now you said that at the time Trotsky got murdered, he was sitting at his 
desk, writing.
Molloy. Yes.
Lawlor: And you said that his last words were, “is there another way to live?” 
Molloy: Yes. I did say that.
Lawlor: Is it true?
Molloy: No, it’s not true.
Lawlor: So you made that bit up then.
Molloy: Yes, I just made that bit up.
Lawlor: Why? Why did you make that bit up?
(A man on the video monitor shoots a gun loaded with blanks at the camera) 
Molloy: I don’t know.
(Desperate Optimists, 1998)
I suggest that this story also appealed to me because I identify with Trotsky’s (made up) 
last words, and thus would like to believe that he had such a pointed, philosophical 
demise. At the risk of gross generalisation, it is the classic question that we spend our 
lives asking (and if I cannot speak for others, then I can at least make this claim myself): 
would life be better/more rewarding/more worthy if we (I) had made different choices or 
different judgments?
The making of judgements appears to be required of me as a spectator, as I make multiple 
and simultaneous identifications in my confrontation with what it might mean to have an 
Irish background when engaging with Play-boy. This is particularly brought to the fore 
when I read the ‘troubles’ through Molloy and Lawlor’s various enactments of violence 
in the performance. There are several examples of this that are layered into the structure 
of Play-boy. One instance, which does not reference Ireland directly, is when Molloy 
describes the revolutionary sentiments of the character and figure from history Zapata in
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the film Viva Zapata. She begins, “Now Brando’s playing the part of Zapata and he’s 
standing by the window with his back to his beautiful young bride whose being played by 
Jean Peters— ” and then Molloy describes Brando as becoming angry and passionate 
about the revolution in response to his wife’s longing for peace (Desperate Optimists, 
1998). Here Molloy embodies his character and completely flies off the handle, shouting 
at an excruciating volume:
And then he gets very wound up and angry and he says, “THIS LAND, THIS 
LAND, THIS LAND IS YOUR LAND. BUT IT WON’T BE YOURS LONG IF 
YOU DON’T PROTECT IT, IF NECCESARY WITH YOUR LIFE, AND 
YOUR CHILDREN WITH THEIR LIVES. AND IF YOUR HOUSE IS 
BURNED, WILL YOU REBUILD? AND IF YOUR LAND IS DESTROYED, 
WILL YOU REPLANT? AND IF THEY DRIVE YOU OUT OF THE VALLEY 
WILL YOU LIVE ON THE SIDE OF THE MOUNTAIN? AND EXACTLY 
WHAT ARE YOU PREPARED TO DO TO PROTECT WHAT BELONGS TO 
YOU? ARE YOU PREPARED TO KILL AND MAIM INNOCENT PEOPLE 
IN THE NAME OF WHAT YOU BELIEVE IN? ARE YOU PREPARED FOR 
A CAMPAIGN OF TERROR AND VIOLENCE... AND FOR MANY YEARS 
OF PAIN AND SUFFERING TO ENSUE? ARE YOU PREPARED TO HAVE 






Firstly, as Molloy launches into her angry and passionate address, I am startled into an 
identification with her. After all, it is through witnessing another’s emotion that we 
recognise that another human being is another human being. But I must ‘allow’ or desire 
this identification, as I am simultaneously aware that it is a female Irish performer 
standing before me. She is speaking, or rather screaming, through a microphone, wearing 
cowboy boots enacting the words of a character from a film. Here, Molloy appears to
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stage the differences between identifications. Indeed, her ‘convincing’ rendition not only 
transports me momentarily into the world of the film, or even the world of the historical 
Zapata. I am also made to confront the fact that she is a woman shouting the words of a 
male revolutionary, and I reflect on all the implications this enactment has -  especially 
since the woman in the narrative she has just described is a beautiful innocent bride and 
seeker of peace. Here Molloy dislocates the myths, both fictional and historical, that 
circulate around the figure of Zapata. Consequently his authority and status as a 
masculine presence (and canonical figure) are subtly brought into question. At the same 
time the classic feminine portrayal of the subservient woman is also displaced since 
Malloy embodies Zapata’s role in the scene rather than taking on the role of his bride.
Furthermore, I read the Irish fight for land and liberty through Malloy’s ‘frame’ (or frame 
within in frame, as she references a film version) of South American history. This 
reading is perhaps inevitable since it is Synge’s Irish text, The Playboy o f the Western 
World, which structures the whole performance. The Irish conflict may also be invoked 
because Lawlor and Molloy shoot at each other throughout the show, and the figures on 
the video monitors point guns at us in the audience, provoking an unmistakable sense of 
violence. But what strikes me is that my identifications are fragile, confusing and 
contradictory, since the operations of place, home, (fictional) film and history are made to 
overlap. I feel compassion, bewilderment as well as displaced colonial guilt.
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Molloy’s apparent simultaneous identifications with various sets of histories and 
materials appear to correspond to Ahmed’s rewriting of Louis Althusser’s concept of 
interpellation. Althusser describes interpellation thus:
Ideology ‘acts’ or ‘functions’ in such a way that it ‘recruits’ subjects among the 
individuals (it recruits them all), or ‘transforms’ the individuals into subjects (it 
transforms them all) by that very precise operation which I have called 
interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of the most 
commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: ‘hey, you over there!’
(in Ahmed, 1998 p. 114)
However, contrary to Althusser’s construction, Ahmed stresses the possibility that 
interpellation “may miss its mark” (1998, p. 114). This is because a subject “may think 
she or he is being hailed or addressed (when they are not) or not think they are being 
hailed or addressed (when they are)” (1998, p. 114). She goes on:
This may suggest that the process of becoming a subject is more fractured and 
potentially unsuccessful than Althusser’s schema seems on the surface to suggest, 
and that this fracturing and failure is a way of theorising differences between 
structures of identification does not fully or adequately name the subject, or 
divides subjects by naming them in contradictory and conflicting ways. Given 
this, the subject as such is never the subject as such, because its points of excess 
to the very name or signifier of ‘the subject’ locates it precisely as marked or 
named by colliding regimes of address which attach (asymmetrical) value and 
meaning to specific subject positions.
(1998, p. 114, emphasis in original)
In other words, the passage into subjecthood is always a constant negotiation of colliding 
or contrasting identifications. In Play-boy, Malloy and Lawlor actually enact the 
divisions that frustrate the identity of the subject in the first place. Furthermore, the
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overlapping of Malloy’s (performed) identifications that I described above suggests that 
identification is constitutive but also conflict-ridden, since the situation of the subject is 
continually allocated and endangered by their designation in connected, but distinct 
systems of difference. Furthermore, whilst watching identificatory processes at work in 
Play-boy, I felt compelled to make a (distanced) judgment about what it means to come 
from a land where there has never been peace, as Molloy (and indeed Lawlor) perform 
the violence that has become the central response in Ireland for autonomy itself. This is 
what happens when people stake their claims for place, for home, for identity.
As I have thus far explained, factual and fictional accounts appear to bleed into each 
other in Play-boy. The conflation of fact and fiction, according to Baudrillard, marks out 
the contemporary condition. He maintains in his book The Gulf War Did Not Take Place 
that the war in the Gulf became fictionalised or “simulated” as a result of its excessive 
media coverage (1995). It is perhaps the case that the current Hollywood obsession with 
the ‘historical epic’ (JFK 1991, Braveheart 1995, Schindler’s List 1993, Gladiator 2000, 
Pearl Harbor (sic) 2001) indicates that it is becoming increasingly more difficult to 
discern where history ends and fiction begins. However, unlike Baudrillard, Desperate 
Optimists do not appear to flatten the world out into an indistinguishable and indifferent 
fiction. In a world where truth is never absolutely certain, Desperate Optimists appear to 
ask, what exactly are our specific alignments? How do we decide? What can we believe 
in? What is at stake in our investments, and in the assertion of the self?
What is evident in the performance of Playboy is that narratives (of the self) are never 
allowed to come to an easy resolution. In fact, an anxiety is created by the fractured and
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dislocated nature of the narratives they present. Dancing or the firing of the gun 
continually interrupt these narratives or they simply disappear as other narratives take 
over or gain prominence in the performance moment. What seems to be occurring in 
Playboy is the continual struggle to create a sense of identity through identifications with 
personal and national narratives. Indeed, the coherent self demands a procedure, a 
narrative or performance that is always authoritative; a performance in which narratives 
(or the parts of a ‘whole’ narrative) are consolidated into an ordered system that forms a 
unequivocal history, a certain and determined account of the individual and the national.
Instead, Playboy yields an excess of narratives that cannot be absolutely controlled, 
contained or mastered; even when Lawlor assembles all the individuals from the various 
stories in the Mexican cabaret venue ‘Casa Amores’. This fictional scene gathers 
together all the figures that have been mentioned thus far in Play-boy. These include 
actors and directors, revolutionary figures from history, surrealist painters, Don Bernardo 
O’Higgins and of course John Millington Synge himself, in an attempt to find some sort 
of ending or resolution -  this, of course, is what all narratives require. According to 
Lawlor, there is much drinking and excitement in the cabaret venue. Pablo and his 
dancing chiwawas perform extraordinary tricks and, of course, scenes from The Playboy 
o f the Western World are carried out. But he describes the final act as the most 
sensational of all. The female actor Molly Allgood stands up in the bar with a big pistol 
in her hands and blows away John Millington Synge. Lawlor describes the moment 
when the audience comprehends that this incident is not an act, but the ‘real’ murder of 
the Irish playwright (or indeed the ‘death’ of the author):
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(The audience realises) that what they are looking at is not theatrical blood, but real 
blood. And this is no stage death they are watching, but a very real death. And before 
anyone gets the chance to call for help, raise an alarm, the audience at the Casa 
Amores has to try and make sense of what they are looking at. They have to work 
that little bit harder to fill in the gaps and make sense of this world they are seeing. 
And they are sure, although they can’t name it, that they have seen a scene like this 
before somewhere...
(Desperate Optimists, 1998)
And as I am left to make sense of the world /  am seeing, the world of Play-boy, Molloy 
and Lawlor perform the theatrical death that in their version of events should have been 
Synge’s. On the one hand, this could be read as a performed identification with death as 
a form of closure. Or, on the other, death provides the limit from which the self is 
defined. In other words, it is an identificatory act. For it is the very concept of death that 
compels the subject to be a subject.15 In this closing moment, Molloy and Lawlor lie 
down on the platform at the front of the set, their shirts splattered with fake blood, and 
shut their eyes.
And as I attempt to draw my own conclusions and trace my own trajectories through the 
events that make up Play-boy, I am reminded of Walter Benjamin’s assertion. Death, he 
claims, marks the closure for every storyteller, since every story is told in the face of 
death: “Death is the sanction of everything that the storyteller can tell. He has borrowed 
his authority from death” (Benjamin, 1973 p. 94). This is certainly the implication in the 
metaphorical demise in Play-boy of Molloy, Lawlor and their principal hero, John 
Millington Synge. Narrative always demands the ‘casting out’ of all that is other to its 
operations, and always requires an ending. These necessities make the passage of
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coherent narrative (or self) savage, violent and exclusionary. Instead, the self, as 




Production details: Guilty Pleasures was devised by itd in collaboration with Andrea Carpenter, itd are 
Alice Booth, Seth Honnor, Richard Malcolm, Andrew Quick and Simon Wainwright. Guilty Pleasures 
was made in 2000 and was commissioned by the Nuffield Theatre and additionally supported by Yorkshire 
Arts. The show toured to 20 professional theatres across the UK in Autumn 2000 and Spring 2001.
In Guilty Pleasures, the style of presentation differs in some ways from that of Desperate 
Optimists. Although, like Lawlor and Molloy, we, as performers, place ourselves outside 
of the fictions that are incorporated into the performance, there is no explicit 
‘characterisation of the self, which, as I pointed out earlier, dominates the structure of 
Play-boy. Rather, we negotiate sets of materials without commenting on them explicitly. 
Although I will deal with notions of ‘Englishness’ in due course, our choice not to 
‘express ourselves’ overtly or to show a repressed outward face as (embodied) 
people/performers perhaps characterises a stereotypically English sensibility, as opposed 
to Desperate Optimists’ performance/embodiment of a certain stereotypical Irishness.
Let me begin by setting the scene. Guilty Pleasures marks our three ‘terrains’ or styles of 
performance, which are divided into rooms drawn out (like a ‘ground plan’ of rooms yet 
to be erected) with green tape on the floor. The neat, sleek lines of aluminium trussing 
frame each section. The central ‘technology area’ or control booth divides the 
performance space, and is flanked by two distinct rooms. This contains all the sound 
equipment and technology for the show (bar the lighting), and houses two video monitors 
on top of a flight case, which are high enough to conceal all except the head and 
shoulders of the ‘technician’, who is one of the five performers, behind. The (floating) 
technician is lit for the duration of the performance. The monitors show either a pre­
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recorded piece of video footage, or a live-relay, and we switch between these images 
throughout the show. The pre-recorded footage is of a real-time car journey from night to 
dawn, which is played on either one, or the other, or both of the screens at any one time. 
This lasts the exact time of the show, and, providing our timing is right, the sun comes up 
just as the show comes to an end. At other times, live-relays of events occurring on stage 
in one of the rooms each side of the control booth are shown. We named the chamber to 
the right of the control booth the ‘Eliot room’, in which sections (totalling about forty 
minutes) from T.S. Eliot’s The Family Reunion are presented (along with short clips from 
a radio version of the play). This room contains a white chair and three microphones on 
stands. There is no other furniture. The room to the left of the control box is the 
‘bathroom’, where a contemporary party occurs. There is a sink, a toilet and a plain 
white chair in the back comer. In this room (but often spreading across the whole space) 
vodka is dmnk, karaoke is sung, dances are performed and a number of morally 
questionable (enacted) happenings occur — failed sexual relations, sado-masochistic 
fantasies and finally murders.
The first stage in the making of this show was the selection of Eliot’s text, The Family 
Reunion. We were interested in this play for many reasons. We were fascinated by 
Eliot’s exploration of alienation and violence, his investments in history and tradition, his 
examination of how desire distorts experience and how the ‘real’ event is restructured by 
memory’s failure. We were also intrigued by his representation of a certain performed 
‘Englishness’ as well as his search for a new dramatic means. I will return to some of 
these points of interest in just a moment, but for now I will clarify the last one — Eliot’s
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search for a new dramatic method. In The Family Reunion, Eliot has taken a well- 
worked genre, the drawing-room drama, and endeavoured to change the form. He does 
this by utilising a conventional theatrical structure and destabilising it from within 
through his use of language and particular thematics, especially the question of finding a 
meaningful pattern of existence behind the materialism of the modem world. As the 
main character Harry proclaims in Act Two of The Family Reunion, “Oh there must be 
another way of talking that would get us somewhere” (Eliot, 1969 p. 327). Eliot seems to 
be expressing a desire that is still at the heart of much contemporary thinking: the need to 
find ways of locating ‘meaning’ and thus a sense of identity (however fragile and 
transitory) in a world where language always appears to be inadequate. It is, of course, 
the search for a coherent and stable identity that is the major thematic of Eliot’s play.
The anguished central character, Harry, suffering guilt for the death of his wife, returns to 
the family home in search of a redeeming ‘truth’ in the landscape of his childhood. To 
Eliot, this pursuit for authenticity and Being is a necessary journey in a world he believed 
to be spiritually empty. He elucidates this search in the final chorus in The Family 
Reunion:
We do not know what we are doing 
And even, when you think it,
We do not know much about thinking. 
What is happening outside of the circle? 
And what is the meaning of happening? 
What ambush lies beyond the heather 
And behind the Standing Stones?
Beyond the Heaviside Layer 
And behind the smiling moon?
And what is being done to us?
And what are we, and what are we doing? 
To each and all of these questions
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There is no conceivable answer.
We have suffered far more than personal loss -  
We have lost our way in the dark.
(Eliot 1969, p. 348-9)
This constant barrage of questions manifests a sense of urgency to locate the ‘secret 
knowledge of the self withheld behind the “Standing Stones”, beyond the “Heaviside 
Layer” and behind the “smiling moon”. Importantly, for Eliot such questions are not 
solely problems presented to individuals. The line “We have lost our way in the dark” 
also reflects the spiritual void that Eliot identified as being at the heart of contemporary 
life, a thematic that is central to much of his writing.
Yet the play does offer a ‘conceivable answer’ to these soul-searching questions -  that 
the ‘true’ self can find explanation in God, or at least by accepting God’s existence and 
seeking salvation by acknowledging his presence. This is the (sentimental) pathway to 
spiritual enlightenment that Harry, in the course of The Family Reunion, embarks upon. 
Eliot’s use of a “spiritual substructure” was utilised to penetrate the true nature o f 
religious experience, in order, ultimately, to bring about Harry’s transformation and 
indeed the “spiritual transformation of society” (Innes, 1992 p. 388). Here it is possible 
to see how his theatre connects to that of Antonin Artaud: he sought the metamorphosis 
of the bourgeois social order through formal innovation. What is required of the actor 
when playing a character in The Family Reunion, at least in terms of Eliot’s ‘intentions’, 
are two distinct performance registers. The first is a naturalistic style, or ‘imitation’ of 
ordinary social discourse. The second, is a heightened, rhythmic delivery, that in Eliot’s 
terms, might have the effect of penetrating reality itself, by concealing its own condition
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as language. As Maud Ellman points out, Eliot longed to write “poetry so transparent 
that we should not see the poetry, but [...] see through the poetry [...] To get beyond 
poetry, as Beethoven, in his later works, strives to get beyond music” (1987 p. 42, 
emphasis in original). So despite the repeated acknowledgment by Harry in The Family 
Reunion that language cannot express the true nature of feeling and experience, language 
itself is meant to disappear behind the divine manifestation or true logic of the self.16 
Ellman maintains that in Eliot’s terms, “when the ‘formula’ is right, the subject’s feelings 
will transmit themselves in tact, in spite of their translation into objects” (1987 p. 42). 
Eliot appears to be asserting that for his audience, pure and complete psychic 
identification is possible. That is, the actor (as character) does not express feeling, which 
must be translated by the spectator ( / -  the spectator -  know how you -  the character -  
feels) but rather, I, as spectator, experience the feelings, in Eliot’s terms exactly as they 
are, or in other words, I become consumed (traversed) by the desires and fears of the 
Other (actor/character). This, theoretically, will have the effect of bringing me closer (or 
making me at one with) God.
One of our main concerns in Guilty Pleasures was to put into question or displace the two 
key principles of Eliot’s writing that I have outlined above. The first is that he believes it 
is possible to evade expression (language) itself through a musical or poetic order, 
revealing pure and unqualified human feeling. The second is that he defines and explains 
the self in continuous relation to God, which is the ultimate identification: human 
subjectivity is thought of as a direct reflection or mirror of God (man — sic — is made in 
God’s image). In other words, faith can promise that one’s identity is made coherent and
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complete in direct relation to the deity. Such an economy, from which the concept of 
replete human subjectivity is established, relies on the concept of God as its foundation 
stone. This is the ‘rock’ that figures in much of Eliot’s poetry. Interestingly, such 
metaphors of the rock are absent from The Family Reunion and the concept of God is 
built around the repeated reference to an “All Seeing Eye” and references to the story of 
Jesus.17
However, as I expressed in my introduction, we did not select Eliot’s text merely to 
undermine it, as this is suggestive of a negative aesthetic, an aesthetic of undoing or 
effacing, that might designate Eliot’s play as being without contemporary value. The 
dominance of the play in the structure of Guilty Pleasures would certainly suggest 
otherwise. Rather, through the presentation rather than embodiment of The Family 
Reunion characters, and the strategic juxtaposition of the text with other elements (for 
example, the contemporary party) we were attempting to acknowledge that in some ways 
Eliot’s thematics are still deeply ingrained in the culture in which we live.
Take this example. The performance was physically shut down since we did not attempt 
to ‘stage’ The Family Reunion. Rather, we were interested in the aural texture of the 
radio play that we had found, so the small actions that did take place in the Eliot room, 
we felt, were less important. The stage was a manifestation of the conceptual space of 
the recording, not as a place where drama occurs or where actions take their place. In 
rehearsal we were amazed by the hypnotic quality that the text took on when spoken 
without emotion and amplified through the microphones. It seemed to encourage a mode
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of attention that belongs to a forgotten wireless culture -  that of simply listening to the 
flow of words and conjuring up one’s own images. It seemed to offer us, and hopefully 
the audience, a way to engage with the text, leaving it open to a kind of identification 
with the Eliot characters. We did not want to ‘put on’ Eliot’s drawing room drama, but 
were still interested in finding a way back to it. We wanted the play, in a sense, to still 
carry out its ‘work’ on us and on the audience.18
I remember being so excited when we found the old record of The Family Reunion in the 
library. It is a solid historical document of a certain dusty and old fashioned Englishness, 
with vintage actors such as Alec Guinness working their magic on Eliot’s text. We liked 
this idea that echoes from the dead could come back through our layering of them into 
our contemporary performance. English history was literally traced through the texture 
of the show. This seemed very much in the spirit of Eliot’s vision as well -  his strong 
sense that the best literature listens to the voices of the past:
This historical sense, which is a sense of the timeless as well as of the temporal 
and of the timeless and of the temporal together, is what makes a writer 
traditional. And it is at the same time what makes a writer most acutely conscious 
of his place time, of his own contemporanaity. No poet, no artist of any art, has 
complete meaning alone. His significance, his appreciation is the appreciation of 
his relation to the dead poets and artists. You cannot value him alone; you must 
set him, for contrast and comparison, among the dead.
(Eliot, ‘Tradition and individual talent’ p4, ref?)
In other words, to be contemporary requires an explicit understanding of our historical 
context. Of course, Eliot had a rather romantic conception of an English tradition, which 
he imagined as a container of cultural importance and worth. As A. Marshall points out, 
“England was the scene of Eliot’s encounter as a poet with the particularities of history
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and place. He went on to develop an idea of England of classical proportions.” (in 
Moody (Ed.) 1994, p.94). Marshall also claims that Eliot, “elicited what he saw as the 
essentials of empire from the absence of empire, by addressing the civic void in Christian 
terms” (in Moody (Ed.) 1994, p. 96). This obsession with England’s religious traditions 
is interesting considering that Eliot was in fact bom in the USA. Indeed, Eliot admitted 
that his writing would be very different had he stayed in the USA or been bom in 
England. This provides a sense that Eliot’s England is more mythology than geography, 
and highlights the difficulty of “taking place or past for granted” (Marshall in Moody 
(Ed.) 1994, p. 97). It also connects to Eliot’s idea that personal identity is connected to 
historicity. Indeed, Harry in The Family Reunion replays inherited patterns, since, like 
his father before him, he desires the death of his wife. Eliot felt strongly that “history is 
the record of the struggle to understand why, given the feeling of individuality, the shape 
of a person’s life is not unique: there is always a precedent, another version, a mocking 
mirror image” (Marshall in Moody (Ed.) 1994 p.97). We repeat this idea by presenting 
Eliot’s text as document, as history. Importantly, as a company, what we were trying to 
express is that our own identities are not original but enmeshed in a cultural tradition (of 
which Eliot’s writings are a part).
Furthermore, Foucault’s words in relation to the death of the author, God and man that I 
cited in the introduction to this chapter are particularly pertinent in terms of the 
maintenance of God’s presence in contemporary culture: “It is not enough [...] to repeat 
the empty affirmation that the author has disappeared. For the same reason, it is not 
enough (after Nietzsche) that God and man have died a common death” (1984, p. 105,
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my emphasis). Instead, to reword Foucault, we must review “the space left empty by 
[God’s] disappearance, and follow the distribution of gaps and breaches, and watch for 
the openings that this disappearance uncovers” (1984, p. 105). After all, there is no doubt 
that Judaeo-Christian morality is still very much part of the fabric of our everyday lives, 
particularly in terms of (re)viewing moral codes and behaviour in society. Also, finding a 
meaningful pattern of existence behind the materialism of the modem world is arguably 
an ongoing contemporary obsession or even a necessity.
However, it might be possible to argue that the narrow intertextual practice of re-framing 
a canonical text might have the effect of providing a shared space o f interpretation, both 
for us as performers, as well as for the audience. Let me expand. In Guilty Pleasures 
what was attempted was to stage a practice of reading from within the playing space of 
the performance itself. What might be a result of this process is an examination of the 
processes of interpretation and the forces that govern this activity. In the context of the 
deeply layered and self-examining text of Eliot we felt that there was a meeting ground 
between the thematics of coming to a sense of self-understanding and the dynamic 
practices of readership (identification) that an audience might be subject to. In the 
introduction to this chapter, I described the way in which canonical texts are ‘already 
read’. Our process of ‘dealing with’ the text in the moment of performance might 
constitute a practice that asks for the text to be read again. This might produce a space 
for Lyotard’s “reading as anamnesis”, which works through an initial forgetting of what 
is ‘already read’ in order to begin (Lyotard, 1992 p. 93). As Bill Readings elaborates 
further:
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The canon should not stand as a concept of value but as the figure for the 
encounter with all reading with an immemorial past, an encounter that may give 
reading itself the status of an event, an experiment. Not a pure innovation, a new 
modernity, but a paralogical re-writing. To return to the Latin 'invenire’, to find 
out by reading is to perform an act, an act of both rendition and ingenious 
fabrication.
(1991, p. 139)
In this sense then, in Guilty Pleasures, we perform the act o f reading, in order that 
reading can move towards an encounter with an indeterminate law, or a law reconsidered, 
instead of the determined interpretation that canonicity implicitly prescribes. One of the 
possibilities that we were exploring was to set up situations where the audience are 
invited to examine their own (possibly contradictory) identifications with the material 
presented in Guilty Pleasures, as we negotiate the elements of the show in front o f them.
At this point it is worth considering how /  identify with or relate to the differing roles 
and/or components that make up Guilty Pleasures. After all, our layering of performance 
styles and textures prevents a naturalistic interpretation of character. Is there an extent to 
which I play a character, am I myself, or do I play myself? Or do these performance 
registers overlap, or move into each other over the course of the performance? I walk 
onto the stage and stand in front of the blue backdrop, on the edge of the set. I have 
arrived on stage as Alice, although I never introduce myself as such to the audience. At 
this stage I do not consider myself a character, as I am not pretending to be someone else. 
However, it is difficult to ‘feel’ like myself because my action of walking on stage and 
the position that I take up has been decided on in advance. I stand silently, observing the 
audience, although I can only make out the faces of those in the front row. They are in
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darkness apart from the glow of light that spreads across them from the stage. I am aware 
that they are observing me, and that I am on ‘show’. Of course I am conscious of the fact 
that I am in a performance and that those sitting in the dark have been given permission, 
by paying for their ticket, to scrutinise my every word, movement, or just my body as it is 
now, relatively still and silent. I do not ‘feel’ like myself because I know that those 
sitting in the dark are watching me, and that I am here for a specific purpose: to allow 
them to experience the ordered and rehearsed world of Guilty Pleasures.
I am myself and not myself, but in a different sense to Constantin Stanislavski’s Third 
Being, in which the “the actor/role begins to emerge” (Benedetti, 1998 p. 10). This is the 
combination of the “life experience and imagination [of the actor], physical 
characterisation and the written script” (1998 p. 10). There is a score to this performance, 
as it is intricately structured, and there will be a (traditional) ‘script’, and even some 
physical characterisation, but they come later. In this moment, I am not myself, because I 
am performing pre-determined actions under the observation of an audience. I am 
myself, that is, the embodied, social Alice, because firstly, as Stanislavski recognised, the 
social and bodily self can never truly disappear, even in a make-believe performance 
situation. This is why, in his opinion, the actor only has the resources of her/his own life 
experience, imagination and physicality to bring to the creation of a role. But I might be 
more o f myselfin Guilty Pleasures than Stanislavski’s Third Being because the structure 
of the show allows me to be an observer as well as an actor/performer. At certain points 
I can stand outside of the fictions that are (re)presented by the other performers in a 
similar (but not equivalent) way to an audience. I can also acknowledge the actual
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audience. Arguably I am performing the act of observing, but it feels different to the 
embodiment of a role, and will presumably appear different to an audience, as they can 
experience my act of watching, or of ‘looking on’. I extract myself at certain points from 
the action, giving me the time and space to consider how the machine of the performance 
operates, and giving the audience an opportunity, through me and the other performers, to 
see the show as a ‘machine’, that is, to see the representational apparatus ‘at work’. 
Although I am never truly outside of the performance, it feels different. I feel as though I 
have an outside perspective on what is occurring on stage. I have time to consider my 
relationship to the material. I can watch, I can have distance, I can contemplate. I am 
inside and outside of the performance at the same time (however, I don’t wish to be as 
romantic as Brecht - 1 will explore in a moment the difficulty of attaining knowledge 
through having a visual perspective).
Standing at the back of the performance space and watching the world of Guilty 
Pleasures unfold is just one of the ways that we attempted to mirror and re-configure 
Eliot’s obsession with the ‘All Seeing Eye’ that I mentioned earlier. Further, the set itself 
would appear to reflect the mechanisms of vision. Indeed, the configuration of two 
rooms astride a small area of technical control gives the impression of two eyes with a 
brain behind. The two video monitors that are placed on top of the flight-case inside the 
technical ‘booth’ mirror this impression; they seem like two eyes staring out of the set, 
and the audience effectively ‘see through’ these eyes, occupying the space of the 
unknown driver in the ‘road movie’ travelling into the emerging daylight. We also
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manipulate the camera in various ways, perhaps the embodiment of an all-seeing 
visuality that defines meaning and creates subjectivity in our contemporary society.
The camera that is directed into the Eliot Room frames extreme close-ups of lips, hands 
and especially eyes, scrutinising the small, usually un-noticed movements of social 
interaction (here the tiny actions that allow us ‘read’ people’s emotions, to identify with 
them, are magnified). The camera that is directed into the bathroom watches and 
penetrates with digital intimacy the orifices of bodies. (I imagine that the audience might 
distinguish a similarity between the repeated textual and visual figure of the eye and 
seeing, and their own voyeuristic practice). This super-abundance of the visual image is 
the defining feature of what Jean Baudrillard has called the “pornographic culture” that 
he claims marks contemporary experience. Such a culture, according to Baudrillard, is 
formed out of an:
ideology of the concrete, of facticity and use, and its concern with the pre-eminence 
of use value, the material infrastructure of things, and the body as the material 
infrastructure of desire. A one-dimensional culture that exalts everything in the 
“concreteness of production” or of pleasure -  unlimited mechanical labour or 
copulation. What is obscene about this world is that nothing is left to appearances or 
to chance. Everything is a visible, necessary sign.
(Baudrillard 1990, p. 34)
In other words, that which is ‘seen’ becomes commodifiable and exchangeable within the 
capitalist system. Subjectivity resides in the visible, as that which is made visible is 
configured as the real. That which exists outside the visible is expendable, and indeed 
forced out of the system.
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One way that we explored the limitations of the ‘visual’ was through the camera’s 
penetration of bodies in Guilty Pleasures. At the close of each bathroom scene the 
camera zooms into someone’s mouth, eye, bellybutton and finally Simon’s anus. Each 
close-up concludes with the screen going into pixolated darkness. This was in fact a 
peculiarity of one of our cameras. The mechanism switched from an optical to a digital 
zoom and enlarged the pixels to fill up the frame. We became fascinated by this and 
imagined it as the limit of the camera’s field of vision -  the frontier, perhaps, of 
Baudrillard’s pornographic culture. To us, the camera finally failed to see the figure it 
was objectifying -  the figure indeed, disappears. The digital black hole, the image 
without object, became for us a space that might lie outside language and signification -  a 
space that Eliot indeed frantically searched for. This move to the body’s voids became, 
for us, the playing space of the imagination (that which cannot be seen) where narrative 
closure (and indeed the closure of subjectivity itself) might be delayed. Here we repeat 
Eliot’s failure to get beyond language, as we fail to penetrate or get beyond the visual 
field. This signified for us the fact that there are always holes and blind spots in our 
perception, and that the subjective practices of desire, memory and imagining have the 
capacity to exceed what can be known and understood (about ourselves).
In terms of visual practices, it is interesting to me that our set design took us down a 
particular route in terms of how we presented the material in the bathroom. We chose the 
bathroom as our ‘other’ room since it seemed like an appropriate ‘abject’ space with 
which to contradict, conflict with and sometimes illuminate the former, ordered world of 
T.S. Eliot. The bathroom is a private place of excretion and waste but also a place for
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cleansing and preparing for the real or outside world -  a place to ‘drop the mask’. The 
bathroom is also the only room in the house where the door can be locked, so it is the 
place at a party where ‘things happen’ -  where people go to be sick, to tell secrets and to 
take part in sordid sexual encounters. In very simple terms, we imagined the bathroom as 
a place of the body, and the Eliot room as the place of the mind. The bathroom is 
perhaps a literal representation of Harry’s guilt and passions, the underbelly of drawing 
room austerity. This world of passion or of guilty pleasures was originally meant to 
occur behind a reveal in the bathroom. In this way, terrible or explicit occurrences could 
be implied by us and then imagined by audiences, rather than ‘really’ shown on stage. I 
envisaged these sections as something like the climactic scene in the film Psycho when 
what was not shown in the shower was far more horrific than what might have been 
manageable with the rather primitive special effects of the 1970s. However, our final set 
design -  sleek clean lines of aluminium trussing -  put everything on view and made 
‘realistic’ violence or sexual acts difficult to represent on stage. Instead, over the 
rehearsal period, these scenes developed into violent or sexual constructions or 
reconstructions.
The show’s structure of ‘composing’ fictions for an audience could be said to provoke a 
network of exhibitionist behaviour — behaviour to be seen — a layering of constructions 
and poses. In the bathroom, we ‘set up’ the scenes to be enacted (the seductions, drunken 
games and murders) and then performed them ‘for’ the camera rather than ‘for’ the 
auditorium. For example, in the second of the bathroom scenes, Richard and I perform a 
series of kissing actions into the camera, operated by Seth. We contort ourselves into
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obviously unnatural and uncomfortable positions in order that Seth can capture our 
mouths and tongues in tight camera shots. We have to stay as still as possible. The 
‘realness’ of the kissing on camera — the swilling of saliva, the movement of lips and 
tongues, the flashing of teeth -  contrasts with the awkwardness of our bodies, the need to 
stay still so we could remain ‘in shot’. It would seem that the confines of the process of 
filming made demands on our bodies and ensured our failure to present a ‘convincing’ 
passionate embrace. We were emphasising the constructed nature of these acts, so 
despite their explicit or violent character they remained in the sphere of play acting -  that 
is, they were not just carried out, but shown to be carried out. The shots were intended to 
present another view to the audience -  something like a reconstruction of a 
reconstruction. We were interested in the secondary act of framing that the camera 
achieved and the possible effects of this framing on our bodies. Here I present myself 
presenting myself, or producing a performing self. The camera, the apparent marker of 
authenticity in the news, documentary footage and the recurrent reality TV shows, does 
not just ‘show’ in Guilty Pleasures, but instead is shown showing. In this sense the 
object is complicit with the camera’s eye. The effect of this is an interrogation of what 
the camera, such a prevalent signifier of the world we live in, actually bestows upon us, 
what it promises us, what beliefs are embodied in its picture of the world.19 But perhaps 
another interpretation of these scenes, and more Baudrillardian, might be our 
representation of a series of surfaces, that could only ever refer to other surfaces — in 
other words, the ‘real’ referent is lost.
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Having said this though, there was something really interesting to me in terms of this 
presentation of a ‘double’ performance — one for the auditorium and one for the camera. 
Here I imagine myself attached to two different and contrasting subject positions or 
discourses. This playing out of ‘doubles’ is something that runs through almost every 
aspect of Guilty Pleasures. In the Eliot Room, there is clear evidence of the ‘real’ 
performer behind the fagade of ‘character’ in the presentation of The Family Reunion.
All five of us ‘play’ roles in the Eliot drama, but ‘drop out’ of character between lines, 
relaxing our bodies and casually drinking out of glasses or vodka bottles. Here we appear 
to watch the action before us in an objective way, as if we are (like the external audience) 
onlookers to the ‘performance’. We also whisper to each other and take it in turns to 
make hand signals, directing the action on stage. In effect, I ‘play’ Agatha (the character) 
but I also appear as Alice (myself). The process of dropping in and out of roles recalls 
the behaviour of musicians in a band, stage managing between songs, making 
adjustments to their musical instruments and having a rapport with each other. Our 
orchestration of the scenes on stage is of course choreographed (our conducting of the 
action is slick and clearly ‘designed’ within the piece) which presents yet another double 
— the ‘real’ performer is also performed. That is, I am Alice and at the same time, a 
representation of Alice -  the real me ‘playing’ the performed me. The double is doubled 
again in the enactment of the self. Throughout the performance, I occupy sets of identity 
doubles that are set against each other:
1. I am the performed Alice and Agatha, the Eliot character
2. I am the performed Alice and the ‘drunk’ kissing in the bathroom at a 
contemporary party
3. I am the performed Alice and the silent witness watching the performance
4. I am the performed Alice and the technician
5. I am the performed Alice and the singer
6. I am the performed Alice and the dancer
7. I am the performed Alice and the televisual Alice
8. I am the performed Alice and Alice (although Alice, being part of the real, is 
never truly visible)
This is in recognition of the argument that the process of becoming a subject is fractured 
and contradictory, since we are attached to different ways of being in the world.
However, it is significant that these doubles are not always clearly separated.
In Guilty Pleasures, ‘getting in to character’ literally means taking a deep breath and 
throwing myself into the next performance register. There is little or no time to prepare 
for the next performance moment and rarely time to ‘get into’ a role -  as one might have 
the opportunity to do when embodying a ‘realistic’ and logical character with several 
lines and/or actions that (usually) occur in a coherent sequence. Stanislavski believed 
that the time would come in rehearsal when stage situations would take on a ‘reality’ for 
the actor. As his character Tortsov explains in An Actor Prepares, if you sense the truth 
in a play subconsciously, your faith in it will naturally follow, and the state of “I am” 
(Stanislavski, 1980 p. 291) will come into being. The move between performance 
registers in Guilty Pleasures does not allow for this sustained and almost transcendental 
state, if indeed this state is possible. After all, even Stanislavski admits that i f  this state is 
ever reached, it is unlikely that it can be sustained for a whole performance:
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‘of course, it wasn’t real truth and a real sense o f faith,' Tortsov said as he 
recalled his sensations. ‘Although we might almost say that, for the purposes of 
theatre, I really did live those sensations. And yet there was no solid stretch of 
believing in what I was undergoing. There was a constant wavering back and 
forth between belief and doubt, real sensations and the illusion of having them 
[...] .. .the illusion left traces...”
(1980 p. 284)
Instead of trying to conceal this ‘wavering back and forth’ we stage this process as a 
dynamic within the work. As a performer, Stanislavski’s notion of ‘I am’ is useful way 
to create a set of performance instructions. However, as opposed to a Stanislavskian 
method that follows a single progressive through line, Guilty Pleasures is structured 
around many different and incomplete performances of “I am”. Here is an example of 
my shift between various performance registers in literally a few minute section of the 
piece:
1. I am being (the performed) Alice drinking water out of a vodka bottle in the Eliot 
room, making faces as I pretend that the liquid is burning my throat.
2. I am being (the performed) Alice (functionally) setting up the microphone in order 
that it is correctly placed for the delivery of my lines. (Note: I could have set up my 
microphone before the performance, but the deliberate and staged ‘setting up’ of each 
scene is an important dynamic of the performance. We wanted to foreground the 
process of putting fictions together. In this sense my action is not entirely functional).
3. I am being (the performed) Alice awaiting my lines in the first The Family Reunion 
scene. I am ‘really’ waiting, although when my lines approach, I straighten my 
posture and prepare to speak.
4. I am being (the performed) Alice and Agatha, The Family Reunion character. I 
partially embody the role of Agatha only as I attempt the clear, fast delivery of her 
lines. I have used the word ‘partial’ since, as I have already mentioned, we perform 
The Family Reunion as though it is a radio play; that is, I do not fill my body with the 
character. I remain as still as possible and do not perform any gestures. Nevertheless 
the text, and our use of sections from Eliot’s radio play impacted on our performance
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style of The Family Reunion. We play a very theatrical mode of upper-class 
‘Englishness’.
5. I am being (the performed) Alice promptly dropping my stance and swigging more 
from the bottle, repeating the expression signifying that the water (vodka) tastes 
bitter.
6. I am being (the performed) Alice exiting the Eliot Room, and then taking my place 
before the blue screen at the back of the set. To a certain extent, I feign curiosity 
about The Family Reunion scene that is spoken before me: after all, I have heard it 
performed many times before. However, I usually listen carefully to what is being 
said, as it gives me pleasure. I enjoy listening to Eliot’s words. At the same time the 
very act of my watching reminds me that at this very moment the audience could be 
watching me. I become more self-conscious. This has the effect of making me 
‘perform’ more. My slight movements, the turn of my head, the shifting from one 
foot to another, become more considered.
7. I am being (the performed) Alice preparing to enter the bathroom. I am actually 
preparing myself, but at the same time, I want to communicate this act of preparation 
to the audience. I take a calculated deep breath before stepping over the green line 
into the bathroom.
8. I am being ‘a drunk’ at an unspecified party, so I allow my character’s body to 
weaken at the knees in order that she appears unbalanced (drunk). I completely 
embody the character’s physicality, and attempt to totally conceal (the performed) 
Alice. As my character approaches the toilet, which has its lid down, she (I) slump(s) 
onto it. I bring some of Alice to my characterisation: I use a combination of the 
memory of what it feels like to be drunk, with the movements I have rehearsed for 
this scene many times in preparation for the show. I remember to contort my face 
ever so slightly, and allow my eyes to roll and shift slightly out of focus. (What is my 
relationship to these scenes in the bathroom? I have been here before. I have 
witnessed a scene like this. I saw a scene like this in a film).
9. I am being ‘a drunk’ suddenly recovering some of my composure and becoming (the 
performed) Alice again. I stand up and execute a short dance, which although is 
based on movements that represent those from a real (drunken) party, they have 
actually been cleaned up and incorporated into a polished, choreographed sequence.
This series of actions should present an impression of the how the roles that I occupy 
throughout Guilty Pleasures are not entirely separated. Indeed, what is interesting for me 
about this movement between roles is the bruising around the edges. For example,
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performing a dance and then arriving, out of breath, trying to recover my composure to 
perform Agatha’s lines in The Family Reunion. In other words, there are points when the 
transition between each ‘I am’ is not smooth and seamless. (However, I think this could 
have been pushed even more in the performance).
In Guilty Pleasures, I move in and out of roles but the ‘constant’ is always the 
performance of (my)self, since my own relationship to the material is always being 
negotiated. However, the wavering back and forth that Stanislavski describes denotes a 
subject always on the move, always moving from one state to another, or from one 
identification to another. Further, these identifications can never be absolutely separated. 
I would argue that although this performance is intricately rehearsed, it is also always a 
matter o f process, since finding a route through this show, for me as a performer (and I 
imagine for the audience too), is always difficult. In other words, performing in Guilty 
Pleasures is a practice of navigation or a mapping through of different elements. Since 
we generally maintain the coherence of Eliot’s text, the elements that make up this show 
do have some progressive logic. However, they often feel un-connected since they 
involve different ways of ‘being’ in the performance. These are the various demands that 
are made of me throughout the show’s one-hour-and-ten-minute duration. Without 
absolute logic, my formal journey through this show always compels me to trace the 
interconnections, disparities, oppositions, clashes and parallels between its components, 
and my specific relationship and to, and identifications with, them.
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One element of the show that I haven’t discussed in any detail is the pre-recorded ‘road 
movie’ of a journey into the emerging sunlight. This video recording actually opens the 
show, since Simon walks onto the set and switches on the monitors to show the 
recording. For me this section seems the most unconstructed in the whole show, since it 
was filmed in real time, and only once. We actually scheduled a rehearsal of this 
journey, but the recording turned out so perfectly that we used this footage in the show 
itself. At moments whilst performing in Guilty Pleasures, I would catch a glimpse of the 
car’s progression and think back to that journey into the daylight. I planned to go on the 
ride from Leeds to Filey beach with Seth and Richard at five in the morning. Richard had 
agreed to drive and Seth would hold the camera whilst sitting in the passenger seat. I had 
no particular job to do but just went along for the ride (and for a slap up breakfast on 
Scarborough seafront). The trip was just flawless -  the beautiful scenery cooled by the 
shadows of the night, and our arrival at Filey at exactly the right time. As Richard pulled 
the car up the sun was just rising over the sea. This simple and rather romantic journey 
operated as an overall framing mechanism for the show, since, as I mentioned earlier, we 
timed the show itself to fit into the length of the recording -  just about one hour and ten 
minutes. This real time narrative journey concluding with the sunrise could be seen as a 
moment of redemption for Harry, after a harrowing journey of self-discovery. It may be 
interpreted as an ironic picture-postcard ending; a cheap offering in a world represented 
as being spiritually empty. For me, it was a really reassuring element of the show — a 
structure that moves the clashing textures of Guilty Pleasures forward, that pushes it 
towards some kind of narrative closure, despite the ambiguity of the show’s overall 
message. It is a kind of ironic but also hopeful journey of self progression and discovery.
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It is a life story, continually disrupted and punctured by the ‘other’ elements of Guilty 
Pleasures. In perhaps a similar way to Play-boy, the self is revealed in Guilty Pleasures 
as continually on the move, but fixed at certain points by various and sometimes 
conflicting identifications.
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1 Nevertheless, we return to a fictional structure in Five Miles and Falling.
2 However, there are moments of ‘embodiment’ in both shows, as I will go on to describe.
3 Our work and Desperate Optimist’s might be described as being deconstructive.
4 Auslander’s argument relates to Fuchs’ argument that I criticised in the introduction.
5 The Wooster Group’s work influenced Guilty Pleasures in a number of ways. One example is the 
deconstuction of a canonical text, a practice undertaken frequently by the Wooster Group. Another is our 
set design for Guilty Pleasures. The two rooms in perspective and a technology section in between is 
actually a direct steal from The Wooster Group’s Rumstick Road -  although their set comprised fully 
constructed rooms with walls and ceilings, and just the ‘fourth wall’ opened out for the audience.
6 This does not mean to say that the ‘author’ or authority disappears.
7 LSD is structured in four parts: the first consists of readings from Beat literature from the 1950s and 60s, 
the second a highly speeded up version of Miller’s The Crucible, the third is a reconstruction of the 
company’s rehearsal of Miller’s text while on acid and the final part incorporates the Liddy/Leary debates 
from the 1970s. For a full description of this performance, see Savran 1986, pp. 169 -  220.
8 Authors arguably always write within genre. Derrida, in his essay ‘The Law of Genre’, poses the 
following rhetorical question: “can one identify a work of art, of whatever sort, but especially a work of 
discursive art, if it does not bear the mark of genre, if it does not signal or mention it or make it remarkable 
in any way?” (Derrida, in Duff 2000, p. 229).
9 Miller indeed shut down the production of LSD for a time as he claimed the Wooster Group’s use of his 
text breached his copyright. See Savran 1986, pp. 188-195.
10 It is interesting that the various family and friends that describe their responses to The Playboy o f the 
Western World often refer to the play’s fictional characters as if they are real people.
11 Some of the stories they tell appear to be real, but it is not always possible to separate ‘real’ stories from 
fictional ones. I will be addressing this in the course of my analysis.
12 For an excellent history of Irish theatre, see Christopher Fitz-Simon (1983). For an exhaustive study of 
Synge and the Abbey Theatre, see Kilroy (1978).
13 Flax refers to the category of ‘woman’, but arguably her theory transfers to all collective identity 
categories.
141 do not want to suggest that this is the ‘real’ Molloy and Lawlor teasing and testing their audiences -  
after all, this is a performance.
15 This connects to Freud’s conceptualisation of the Death Drive. I have not time in the thesis to engage 
fully with Freud’s thinking on the Death Drive. For a definition of what he calls the death instinct see 
Laplanche and Pontalis , 1973, pp 97-103.
16 There is a clear connection to Artaud here. See, for example, ‘Production and Metaphysics’ in Artaud 
1974, p. 164:
From language to reality.
The stage, the place where art comes closest to life.
Dreams of effective language.
The temptations to go from this imitation of life to life 
Itself.
^  For example, in the scene where Harry is confronted by his father and his Aunt Agatha s relationship in 
the past Harry refers to the wilderness within which he has been lost:
To and fro, dragging my feet
Among inner shadows in the smoky wilderness,
Trying to avoid the clasping branches 
And the giant lizard. To and fro.
Until the chain breaks.
The chain breaks,
The wheel stops, and the noise of machinery,
And the desert is cleared, under the judicial sun 
Of the final eye, and the awful evacuation
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Cleanses.
(Eliot 1969, p. 335)
It is clear that Eliot is referring to Jesus in his description of Harry’s journey to self-discovery. Indeed, 
Harry’s path to salvation mirrors the story of Jesus although Harry’s departure at the end of the play is 
perhaps more hopeful than the crucifixion that marks the end in the Biblical narrative. Interestingly, as is 
evident from the section above, Eliot relates technology to the wilderness, and by doing so marks the limit 
of the endeavour to master the environment, to control human destiny through the machine: a world in 
which man literally, as Eliot would have it, plays at being God.
18 The drawback to this approach however, meant that we became a little bit trapped by it. I wish that we 
had pushed the relationship between Harry and Agatha for example -  even in rehearsal -  to see where it 
would take us. This scene moved me. Yet somehow it felt like a part of the performance that was bursting 
to get out. I performed it with my left eye in the frame of the camera, so I could barely move at all. In my 
opinion, it was finally too rigid and restrained. Where to take this scene exactly is a question that needed to 
be answered in the rehearsal room. Lastly, I feel we should have broken up the monumentality of Eliot’s 
text, since it came to dominate stage action. The structure of the play with the most important and 
revealing scene coming near the end meant that it was difficult for the structure to be broken up, and the 
two worlds (the Eliot room and the bathroom) never really coalesced. But it is probably a result of our 
seduction by Eliot’s richly metaphorical drama. We wanted to maintain its through line, to keep some of 
what Eliot intended. (Perhaps one can love too much).
19 However, writing this whilst distanced in time from Guilty Pleasures, my feelings for, and attachment to 
the ‘doubled’ bathroom scenes is ambivalent. In my opinion, these sections were finally too distancing. 
These entirely constructed scenes meant that tactile relations were driven out of the performance as a 
whole. Everything, it seemed, was kept at arms length, and the boundaries were finally too rigid. Maybe it 
would have been too obvious to have been really explicit or plausibly violent in Guilty Pleasures, but 





MANIPULATING GENRE THROUGH THE MEETING POINT BETWEEN 
THE FILMIC AND THE THEATRICAL IN L ’ASCENSORE BY INSOMNIAC 
AND FIVE MILES AND FALLING BY ITD
As I described in my introduction, itd have always focussed on the ‘lure’ of popular or 
mainstream film. In our first show, Einmal ist Keinmal, our aim was to create a really 
solid, sensual world that had a ‘filmic’ atmosphere and intensity. We also used music 
in a similar way to film: to create a mood, as well as to invoke humour, sometimes 
heightening the sense of tension in a scene, and at other times undercutting the action 
in an ironic way. An example of the latter. A speeded-up version of an Elvis Presley 
song was played while a performer (diagetically) attempted to escape the dramatic 
world. He frantically built a tower out of all the furniture in the box set and climbed 
right to the top of the theatre space. Once again in Ark, our aesthetic was dominated 
by the creation of vivid and atmospheric filmic moments on the small stage. Guilty 
Pleasures is probably our least ‘filmic’ show so far although there were instances that 
we saw as very much connected to film; for example, the use of ‘close-ups’ shown on 
the video monitors that occupied centre stage.1
In this chapter I want to focus on Five Miles and Falling, our most cinematic work to 
date. However, before discussing the show in detail, it is important to point out that 
in the sphere of experimental theatre, the exploration of filmic fictions has a particular 
history. Indeed, Insomniac Productions, artistically directed by Pete Brooks, have 
made several shows that explicitly traverse cinematic territory. His show
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L Ascensore, made in 1992, had a great influence on us and informed the making of 
Five Miles. L Ascensore presents a pastiche of the cinematic gangster genre.2 In the 
mise-en-scene of the show, Insomniac both reference and re-construct the cinematic 
apparatus, as well as employ a genre distinctively associated with film. Two things 
are particularly significant here, and they bring L Ascensore and Five Miles together. 
The first is the meeting point between the theatrical and the cinematic, and the second 
is the use of generic structures by both companies.
Utilising Genre
Since I am interested in how we identify or interact with specific narrative forms and 
components, it should be no great revelation that itd are concerned with the popular 
narrative form of ‘genre’: a recurring type or class of narrative that is “defined by 
structural, thematic and / or functional criteria” (Duff 2000 p. xiii). After all, genre is 
one of the key indices we use to understand the culture in which we live. It is also 
perhaps no surprise that a company working within the domain of what would often 
be described as ‘postmodern’ performance is re-looking at a form that is usually 
derided as the formulaic and standardised province of the mainstream. After all, does 
not, as Duff argues, postmodernism’s “elevation of popular culture” have a much 
more “favourable estimate of the value of genre” (2000, p. 2) compared with the 
literary avant-garde? Especially since, as Peter Barry proclaims, postmodernism 
“rejects the distinction between ‘high’ and ‘popular’ art” (1995, p. 84). However, it is 
important not to resort to the ‘anything goes’ philosophy that is often ascribed to 
postmodernism; that is, genre is thrown into the mix as just another element in
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postmodernism s eclectic ‘free-play’ of signification. Rather, I would like to explore 
the idea that Gunther Kress proposes; that genre could be, “precisely that theoretical 
term which encapsulates, in the problems that it poses, all the uncertainties, 
contradictions, and confusions of the post-modem era, whether in the cultural, 
intellectual, or political domains” (in Duff: 2000, p. 15).
Jacques Derrida characterises genre as being paradoxical in his essay, ‘The Law of 
Genre’ (in Duff, 2000). Firstly, he is troubled by the authoritarian imperative of genre 
in relation to literary genres specifically:
As soon as the word genre is sounded, as soon as it is heard, as soon as one 
attempts to conceive it, a limit is drawn. And when a limit is established, 
norms and interdictions are not far behind: ‘Do’, ‘Do not’, says ‘genre’, the 
word ‘genre’, the figure, the voice, or the law of genre.
(Derrida in Duff, 2000, p. 221)
That is, genre implicitly demands limits and draws boundaries. Indeed, genres could 
be described as ‘reiterative’, to appropriate Judith Butler’s use of the term. That is, 
genres are normative and regulative in their configuration. In this sense it could be 
argued that the criteria of judgement about how to formulate a genre have already 
been decided on in advance by an irrecoverable authority. In other words, genre 
implies systematic thought, and upholds an understanding of events according to what 
is already grasped about the world. It follows that the components that make up a 
generic framework then are not innately meaningful since they actually have the 
effect of defining or closing down meanings and identifications for us. Put another 
way, they do not tell the ‘truth’ about the world around us, rather, the world is made 
sense o f  according to the Taw’ of genre. This law is indeed a set of conventions
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naturalised through the process of the reiteration and re-inscription of an authority. 
Also, significantly, in the realms of television and film, where genre fiction tends to 
dominate, genres themselves are controlled by powerful commercial industries that 
attempt to ‘channel’ popular culture. As Steve Neale maintains:
it is ‘popular culture’, mass culture, that is generic, ruled as it is by market 
pressures to differentiate to a limited degree in order to cater to various sectors 
of consumers, and to repeat commercially successful patterns, ingredients and 
formulas.
(1990, p. 63)
Again Tzetan Todorov points out:
In a given society, the recurrence of certain discursive properties is 
institutionalized (sic), and individual texts are produced and perceived in 
relation to the norm constituted by that codification. A genre, whether literary 
or not, is nothing other than the codification of discursive properties [...] It is 
because genres exist as an institution that they function as ‘horizons of 
expectation’ for readers and as ‘models of writing’ for authors [...] Like any 
other institution, genres bring to light the constitutive features of the society to 
which they belong.
(Todorov in Duff 2000, p. 198-200)
He goes on to state, “Society chooses and codifies the acts that correspond most 
closely to its ideology” (2000, p. 200). In other words, genre is a system of discursive 
properties.
However, as Derrida would have it, any authority, which would include that of genre, 
necessarily ‘creates’ that which is other to it, outside it, around it, or in Butler’s 
words, “A constitutive or relative outside is, of course, composed of a set of 
exclusions that are nevertheless internal to that system as its own nonthematisable 
necessity. It emerges within the system as incoherence, disruption, a threat to its own
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systematicity” (1993, p. 39). Indeed, this uncontainability is particularly prevalent in 
genre since, as Derrida maintains, genres are formed out of a set of indicators or 
textual signals that paradoxically cannot be contained by the genre itself. That is, an 
individual component or ‘textual signal’ that supposedly forms part of the definition 
of a genre could quite feasibly be present in another genre at the same time. 
Consequently, genres are very precarious institutions, since the generic frontier is 
disbanded at the very point of its institution.
Further, and significantly, since genres exist in the space between artists, audiences 
and texts, the diverse practices of spectatorship potentially dislocate genres from their 
ideological stranglehold. It is also worth taking into account that genres are not static 
forms, but are subject to a continual process of evolution. Duff, in reference to 
Todorov, describes the condition of genre itself as, “something like a state of 
permanent revolution” since “genres ‘evolve’ because the act of belonging to a genre 
involves both adoption of and resistance to its conventions” (2000, p. 7). This is 
indeed another of genre’s contradictions -  it implies the maintenance of specific 
conventions while necessarily having to evolve or change as well.
However, the agency implied by the performative character of genre needs to be 
carefully considered. It could be argued that a genre text actually conceals its 
intertextual status by only implicitly referring to the genre texts that have preceded it. 
In other words, as I have thus far stated, if genre can be understood as a collective of 
enunciations, it actually enacts its own uncontainability in its numerous replications 
with differences. However, importantly, this uncontainability is denied or suppressed 
in each individual generic example, indeed, on whose repression its authority is
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grounded. This authority is definitely vigorous, since as Martin Amis proclaims: “I 
am a comic writer. You have to submit to the huge power of the genre you are in. 
Genre really does determine outcomes” (in Duff 2000, p. 1).
To counteract the authoritarian imperative of genre, Dubrow claims that the re­
shaping or re-interpretation of a genre could be seen as, “a highly polemical gesture, a 
way of attempting to initiate a new chapter of literary history through the act of 
creating a single work of art” (1982, p. 30). However, this movement attempts to 
attach genre to an author’s name -  that is, to show how the ingenuity of an author can 
revolutionise a generic structure. Without wanting to negate this possibility, it 
perhaps neglects something very particular about genre that separates it from the 
institution of authorship discussed in chapter one. That is, that genres are cultural 
property that can be appropriated by anyone without restriction. After all, the 
collective material of genre is, what Donna Haraway might describe as, the “literary 
commons” (1997 p. 71). Indeed, she argues that the ‘author’ with “legally 
enforceable rights to intellectual property” (1997 p. 71) and indeed copyright law are 
somewhat recent institutions that: “rework the collective material and semiotic 
processes that constitute public and private life” (1997 p. 74). Genres are indeed that 
‘collective material’, which perhaps partly explains why they continue to endure as 
dominant cultural forms. It also possibly accounts for why postmodernists take a 
keen interest in genre, since the form implicitly questions the unqualified command of 
authorship. Genre theory similarly counters the assumption that texts are autonomous 
or ‘original’ objects that have no stake in culture, society and history.
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In terms of access to meanings and identifications then, genre texts appear to indicate 
democratic meaning. In other words, they belong to everyone in a particular culture. 
Put another way, we identify with (filmic) genres and their constituents because we 
know them culturally. Genre then, is a ‘shared’ language and shared knowledge, 
which perhaps reflects the process of its construction in the television and film 
industries.4 That is, genre fictions are often made collectively. This certainly 
connects genre to the mutual creation of our own devised work, which perhaps makes 
it appealing to us as makers. But what do we love about these democratic objects of 
culture? What is their lure? As Neale points out, “these systems [genres] provide 
spectators with means of recognition and understanding. They help render films, and 
the elements within them, intelligible and therefore explicable” (1990, p. 46). 
Therefore, it could be argued that generic structures put us in the position of narrative 
mastery since we experience the pleasure of our predictions being proved right. In 
our culture, it is probably fair to say that one of the reasons we like genres is because 
we know how to identify with them. For example, (Western) audiences have no 
problem differentiating between the conventions of Shakespearian comedy and 
tragedy, which arguably channels the way each genre is read, understood and felt.
For example, in relation to Shakespearian comedy, Dubrow points out:
We know The Comedy o f Errors is, as its title announces, comedic, and thus 
we do not take the threats of death in the opening scene seriously. Rather than 
being distracted by fears for the well-being of the characters, we remain free to 
focus on the most important and most delightful element of the play, the 
convolutions of the plot.
(1982, p. 32)
In other words, audiences are aware of the assumptions behind the genre of 
Shakespearian comedy; that is, that they habitually end in marriage rather than death.
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In this sense, as Dubrow goes on to state, “our knowledge of the generic contract 
allows us to maintain the appropriate mood and to concentrate on what is most 
significant about the work” (1982, p. 32).
However, what is important about genre ‘knowledge’ for us as makers is that it allows 
for narrative economy. As a culture, Dubrow points out that we are sophisticated 
readers of genre. She states that in reading only a paragraph of text, “we are 
inevitably, though perhaps unwittingly, responding to generic signals” (1982, p. 32). 
In other words, when we read, and indeed when we watch films, television and 
theatre, we are usually directed by our ‘learned’ generic expectations. This may mean 
‘knowing’ how to respond emotionally, as in Shakespeare’s comedies that I 
mentioned above, or in Aristotle’s characterisation of tragedy. Here he describes not 
only the subject matter appropriate to that genre but also the effect it should have on 
its audience -  “the plot ought to be so constructed that, even without the aid of the 
eye, he who hears the tale told will thrill with horror and melt to pity at what takes 
place” (Aristotle 1996 p. 17). This is his renowned theory that tragedy generates the 
identificatory practices of pity or fear. In this case experimental theatre can use genre 
as a way of condensing and or extending the possible mechanisms (meaning creating 
regimes) that narrative offers without resorting to the potentially cumbersome and 
rule bound order of the realist text.
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Introducing Film into the Scene of the Theatre
When looking back on itd’s work, I remember discussing how we wanted to provide a 
(relatively) coherent and pleasurable generic landscape that our audience’s could 
navigate, as well as explore the possible disruptive mechanisms that genre, as an 
‘uncontainable’ form, can bring to bear on narrative structures. In other words, we 
attempt to ‘stage’ the uncontainability of genre rather than allow genre to appear 
stable in the discrete instance of its citation (this is perhaps less true of Insomniac’s 
L ’Ascensore, although I will discuss this in more detail when I come on to analysing 
the show). At the same time, however, we were interested, following Insomniac, in 
the possibilities of juxtaposing two representational discourses within the same frame, 
or two genres o f discourse as Lyotard might describe them (1988 p. 13).5 These are 
the discourses of the filmic and the theatrical. Much theory has been written 
concerning the differing practices of identification that theatre and film might invoke 
in their spectators. Here, I would like to trace the general thrust of these arguments, 
before going on to show how the interaction of these two regimes within the space of 
the theatre might effect, explore or even question the processes of identification that 
each is said to bring into play.
It is no secret that film is more readily considered to invoke spectatorial identification 
than theatre, through the simple fact that theatre cannot equal cinema’s powers of 
verisimilitude. Indeed Andre Bazin makes this very argument in What is Cinema? 
Here he claims that cinema is a far superior form to theatre since the former has 
access to the ‘real’ or ‘natural’ world. He states, “if the cinema makes use of nature it 
is because it is able to. [...] Drama is freed by the camera from all contingencies of
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time and space” (Bazin in Mast, Cohen and Braudy 1992, p. 379). He goes on: “the 
screen is not a frame, but a mask which allows only part of the action to be seen. 
When a character moves off the screen, we accept that he is out of sight, but he 
continues to exist in his own capacity at some other place in the decor which is hidden 
from us” (1992, p. 379). In this sense, the characters that are not ‘seen’ are still in the 
world of the film; the camera can simply pan back to them, or reintroduce them in the 
editing process. The camera then, according to Bazin, can reveal everything, it can 
show us “the world” (1992, p. 379). The theatre, on the contrary, operates through a 
continuous use of space. When characters leave the stage, they no longer exist as part 
of the play’s action since we always ‘know’, in the back of our minds, that they have 
gone to the dressing room, or are waiting in the wings for their next cue. The theatre 
is not “the world”, since its architecture “serves in greater or less degree to set the 
place apart, to specify” (1992, p. 380). Theatre, according to Bazin, is a fa9ade that is 
separate from the world around it, since the scenery, no matter how elaborate and 
detailed, conceals what is behind; that is, cloth, nails and wood. The viewer is much 
more conscious that the fiction is a fiction, and thus must actively and consciously 
invest in its illusions.
However, the ‘active’ suspension of disbelief that Bazin accords to theatre, is, in his 
terms, also tied to the actor’s live presence in the theatre event. He quotes 
Rosenkrantz (1937) thus:
[T]he characters on the screen are quite naturally objects of identification, 
while those on stage, are, rather, objects of mental opposition because their 
real presence gives them an objective reality and to transpose them into beings 
in an imaginary world the will of the spectator has to intervene actively, that is 
to say, the will to transform their physical reality into an abstraction. This
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abstraction being the result of a process of the intelligence that we can only 
ask of a person that is fully conscious.
(Rosenkrantz in Bazin in Mast, Cohen and Braudy 1992, p. 377)
In other words, the cinema offers the abundance of the image whilst the theatre 
requires a literal leap o f faith\ this is because the materiality of the actor on stage is at 
odds with her/his fictional function. Bazin’s overall argument is that theatre and film 
demand two separate attitudes of mind, or in his words, “two psychological modalities 
of performance” (1992, p. 379). He asserts:
[T]he theatre acts on us by virtue of our participation in a theatrical action 
across the footlights and as it were under the protection of their censorship. 
The opposite is true of the cinema. Alone, hidden in a dark room, we watch 
through half open blinds a spectacle that is unaware of our existence and 
which is part of the universe. There is nothing to prevent us from identifying 
ourselves in the imagination with the moving world before us, which becomes 
the world. [...] the ensemble conditions that constitute the theatrical play [...] 
deprive the spectator of active participation.
(1992, p. 379)
Cinema, he maintains, operates through identification, and theatre, through collusion. 
This argument would appear to be in line with Christian Metz’s: that is, that cinema 
is, from the outset, “more strongly established than that of the theater (sic) in direct 
line from the primal scene” (Metz 1982, p. 63). He goes on: “certain features of the 
institution contribute to this affinity: the obscurity of the onlooker, the aperture of the 
screen with its inevitable key hole effect” (1982 p, 64). Cinema, he insists, “is more 
radically ignorant of its spectator, since he is not there, than the theatre can ever be” 
(1982 p, 63). Thus, according to Metz, cinematic viewing is voyeuristic and 
unauthorised (1982 p. 62).
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However, although I agree that that the cinema’s keyhole effect is perhaps more 
suited to (the manipulation of) our desires than the theatre, Bazin and Metz describe a 
very monolithic version of identification. Identification, for both of them, seems to 
imply an absolute ‘loss’ of self into the image (if indeed this is really possible).6 
Furthermore, the binary between film and theatre that both Bazin and Metz set up is 
probably not as rigid as they imagine. Bazin’s assertion that in the cinema, we see the 
world literally as it is is a startling oversight, since it suggests that cinema does not 
engage in artifice. After all, in the cinema, we do not see the world, but instead, we 
see what the camera (wants us to) see(s). As Susan Sontag points out, “In the cinema, 
narrative proceeds by ellipsis (the ‘cut’ or change of shot); the camera eye is a unified 
point of view that continually displaces itself’ (in Mast, Cohen and Braudy 1992, p. 
368). The fact that we can identify with film (project ourselves into it) and its 
characters is only because we understand and accept cinematic conventions -  thus we 
(want to?) stop seeing how cinema is constructed -  we (want to?) stop seeing the 
cinematic edits. In other words, we disavow? Nevertheless, it is interesting that 
Bazin’s argument hinges upon the different ‘real’ to which each art form lays claim -  
cinema’s being the implied reality of the image and theatre’s being the physical 
reality of the human body on stage. Indeed, as he points out:
The human being is all-important in the theater. The drama on the screen can 
exist without actors. [...] some (cinematic) masterpieces use man only as an 
accessory, like an extra, or a counterpoint to nature which is the true leading 
character.
(Bazin in (eds.) Mast, Cohen and Braudy 1992, p. 379)
For this reason, as Metz indicates, theatre might be more naturally aligned with the 
representer rather than the represented (Metz 1982 p, 67). This is certainly the case
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in the ‘presentational’ work that I discussed in the last chapter, although as I have 
shown, this did not prevent identification. However, it is true that theatre operates 
through a ‘feedback loop’, however ‘fictional’ the representation. Even if the actors 
do not refer to the audience directly, there is always an extent to which the audience 
and performers interact. This possibly allows audience identification to shift from 
fictional character to performer, but importantly does not exclude identification all 
together. I shall explore the audience/performer relationship over the next few pages. 
What becomes clear in my analysis of both L ’Ascensore and Five Miles and Falling is 
that the very act of attempting to present the cinematic within the context of the 
theatre seems to emphasise theatre’s obstinate Tiveness’.
The performance pieces that I interrogate in this chapter could be described as ‘closed 
fictional worlds’ in the sense that both erect a fictitious fourth wall between stage and 
audience, and perhaps a return to the Aristotelian aesthetics that Brecht so deplored. 
However, both pieces (metafictionally) refer to filmic genres, so arguably the fourth 
wall is indicative of the actual cinematic screen (as well as, inevitably, replicating the 
conventional divide in which the spectator -  metaphorically at least -  sees without 
being seen in turn). In the following pages, I intend to explore how identification 
might be negotiated through and across this boundary.
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L ’Ascensore (The Lift)
Performance details: L ’Ascensore was written and directed by Pete Brooks, Artistic Director of 
Insomniac Productions. The show was performed by Richard Hawley, Sarah Bailes and Andy Frame 
(principal actors) and toured nationally and internationally from 1992-1996. L’Ascensore was funded 
by the Arts Council.
As I have thus far mentioned, L ’Ascensore operates through a classic generic structure 
-  that of the gangster movie. Let me begin by describing how the show is established 
as specifically generic. The set is a detailed imitation of a 1930s hotel elevator, and 
the audience watch the action through its back or ‘fourth’ wall.8 Indeed, the first 
image reveals the empty interior of the lift with open doors and a replicated hotel 
corridor behind. The hotel setting is a classic of the genre. Indeed, as Kitses points 
out, settings in gangster films are places that low-life’s inhabit, for example, “seedy 
bars and nightclubs, cheap hotels and precinct stations” (Kitses, in Lacey 2000, p.
135). Furthermore, in L ’Ascensore, Insomniac clearly mimic the dress and speech 
patterns of stock gangster characters from cinema. Indeed, as soon as the characters 
enter the space, the audience members who have knowledge of 1930s gangster films 
or even more contemporary versions such as the Godfather Trilogy (1972, 1974 and 
1990) or Casino (1995), are likely to take pleasure in recognising the ‘filmic worlds’ 
from which these characters have been extracted. The first figure we see is a room 
service attendant who enters the lift area, and is followed by Salvatore, the show’s 
central character. The protagonist of the drama is dressed in a smart suit, a long coat, 
and he is smoking a cigarette. His hair is slicked back, he speaks in a clipped, 
hardboiled New York drawl, and he quickly begins to wave a gun around -  all these 
signifiers immediately identify him as a character from a gangster film.
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Again, in classic gangster genre style, Salvatore kills the attendant in order to wear his 
uniform as a disguise. (Indeed, gangster films are developed around the sinister 
actions of their heroes, who operate outside the law, stealing and murdering their way 
through life). Our protagonist drags the dead body out of the enclosure, and then 
hurriedly returns to select the ‘floor’ where his boss is staying.9 The lift apparently 
grinds to a halt, and Salvatore exits via the sliding doors. He announces “room 
service!” (Brooks, 1992) off-stage, seemingly outside his boss’s room. Then we hear 
two gunshots and the dying man’s cry, again in the ‘off-stage’ area. Salvatore returns 
to the lift to meet his accomplice and lover Maria, the beautiful ‘gangster’s moll’. 
Their conversation indicates the closing moments of the classic gangster genre 
scenario, whereby the femme fatale uses seduction to lure the male protagonist to a 
‘bad end’10. The conversation runs as follows:
Maria: Did you do it?
Salvatore: Yes, I did it.
Maria: Are you sure?
Salvatore: Yes, I’m sure. Just like you told me.
Maria: One in the head and one in the heart?
Salvatore: One in the head and one in the heart.
(Brooks 1992)
The couple kiss and Maria raises a knife above Salvatore’s head. She plays out the 
archetypal double-cross by stabbing him in the stomach and leaving him to die. 
Gangsters, indeed, are doomed to failure and inevitable death (usually violent).11 
Salvatore then slips into a delirium, and the show takes us, via the lift (a descent in to 
hell?), on a dream-like journey of the stretched out moments of a dying man’s final 
imaginings. Here Salvatore attempts to comprehend his own downfall by facing the 
consequences of his actions and working out the discontinuities in his knowledge.
I l l
The visions, which he both watches and participates in, are both fantasises and 
memories and they include the following. There are re-enacted meetings with his 
lover, Maria (which establish the involvement of her other lover, and his part in 
Salvatore’s downfall) as well as scenes that revisit his expulsion from his community 
and family.
Yet up until the moment of Salvatore’s death, despite the Tiveness’ of its enaction, we 
have remained within the conventions of the generic gangster film. From this 
moment on, the show appears to perform a more complex allusion to the gangster 
genre, and to the ‘cinematic’ in general. Indeed, Salvatore’s death at the beginning of 
the film rather than the end is probably more typical of the film noir tradition of which 
the gangster genre is a precursor. This would also hold true for the flashback 
sequences that form the greater part of the performance. Insomniac’s inclusion of 
characteristics from film noir perhaps illustrates Derrida’s theory that any genre must 
contain indicators of other genres as well as their own, referred to earlier on in this 
chapter. However, the flashback sequences also appear to be a device for bringing 
into play the discourses that surround film, since Salvatore’s unconscious journey 
would seem to parallel psychoanalytical film theory’s construction of the ‘dreaming’ 
cinema viewer.12 Indeed, the show contains several examples that refer explicitly to 
psychoanalytical film theory. I will elaborate on these in just a moment, since they 
are, in my opinion, a crucial dynamic of the performance.
However, for now it seems important to consider how the piece might operate in 
terms of exploring, or eliciting identifications. The first and most obvious point to 
make on this count is that L ’Ascensore is a metafiction. Metafiction, as the reader
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will be aware, is put forward as a key ‘distancing’ strategy in postmodern art forms. 
That is, although L ’Ascensore plays out the classic gangster drama, it draws attention 
to its frame by literally staging the cinematic in the space of the theatre -  thus 
pointing to the construction of a cinematic original. Indeed, Patricia Waugh describes 
metafiction thus:
[Wjriting which consistently displays its conventionality, which consistently 
lays bare its conditions of artifice [which] problematises more or less 
explicitly the ways in which narrative codes -  whether literary or ‘social’ -  
artificially construct apparently ‘real’ and imaginary worlds in the terms of the 
particular ideologies while presenting these as transparently ‘natural’ and 
‘eternal’.
(in Ahmed 1998, p. 148)
Theoretically then, the self-conscious process of reflection allows the text to avoid 
replicating the conservative values of the ‘original’ text, and consequently prevents us 
identifying with these values, since they are exposed as ‘fictional’. As I mentioned in 
my introduction, Ahmed’s critique of this position is as follows. She claims that 
identifications can be made with the values of the original text, on the basis that 
identifications are more complex than a “singular investment in the ‘real’” (1998, p. 
149). In addition to Ahmed’s argument (and critical for mine), Waugh’s postmodern 
stance appears to assume that identifications are necessarily reactionary. That is, they 
always align us with the status quo.
Interestingly, Sarah Gorman appears to stake out the identificatory lure of 
Insomniac’s work, although only by assuming that our identification returns us to 
ideological stasis. She maintains that L ’Ascensore provokes identification with its 
conventional structural logic:
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The narratives of L ’Ascensore, SW// Life, The Mobius Room and Clair de Luz 
[all shows by Insomniac Productions] each take place in what could be 
understood to be ‘post-apocalyptic’ settings, in so far as they occur ‘after the 
trauma’, which was, an abused childhood, the loss of the child, and a murder. 
They all invoke a sense of crisis which continues into the present, but which 
can be retrospectively solved by conferring a sense of order on the past. The 
linear narratives present in this work are shown to be therapeutic and to 
encourage the main protagonists towards a moment of self-realisation.
(2002, p. 151)
In other words and in relation to L ‘Ascensore specifically, she asserts that Salvatore is 
shown to erect the stabilising paradigms of narrative in order to come to sense of self- 
understanding, albeit, she points out, “in a self-conscious act of creating ‘discourse’” 
(2002, p. 151). This, she argues, is “an engagement with a structural understanding of 
narrative, and a causal, diachronic model of history” (2002, p. 147).
I must say that I am drawn to Gorman’s argument, even though her ‘spin’ on 
identification appears to be a negative one. I am also interested in the fact that she 
does not resort to the traditional idea that it must be rounded psychological characters 
that we identify with. Indeed, in L ’Ascensore, the characters are probably too 
stereotypical for that.13 Gorman seems to foreground the specific actions of the 
characters as the source of our identificatory attachment. In this case, we do not 
identify with the characters as if they are ‘real’ (in the way John Fiske describes our 
relationship to realism), but rather, as if they are truthful, that is, the characters 
communicate ‘truths’ about existence that, in her terms, reinforce our place in the 
ideological stranglehold. In L ’Ascensore, according to Gorman’s argument, the
• til(reactionary) ‘truth’ we come to understand in L ’Ascensore is that “a late 20 century 
society still has linear strategies of organisation” (2002, p. 152).
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However, as Jackie Stacey points out:
Any cultural process that is productive of identities is seen as confirming the 
fixed place of the subject within discourse and thus reinforcing the dominant 
culture; it further offers the subject the pleasure of illusory unity, it is claimed. 
The implied corollary of this is the claim that cultural forms that fragment and 
deny identity are necessarily radical and transgress bourgeoisie, patriarchal 
norms.
(1994, p. 172)
L ’Ascensore, I would argue, neither advocates a denial of identity, nor asserts an 
absolute coherence of the self. Rather, it is possible to argue that the show does the 
following. That is, Insomniac use specific strategies to disrupt epistemological 
closure and thus prevent the full re-installation of the symbolic/discursive authority, 
whilst at the same time articulating their dependence on that symbolic framework for 
their very identity. In other words, Insomniac have created a relatively linear 
narrative, whilst concurrently showing how difficult is to make the narrative(s) (of 
identity) cohere or stick. In simple terms, Insomniac accept the rules of the game (the 
game of genre) in order to interrogate our investments in it.
Gorman suggests that the formal strategies at work in L ’Ascensore operate as a self­
reflexive ‘frame’ to L ’Ascensore’s action. This implies an edging or border that 
surrounds its totality. Rather, I think it is possible to observe that, within the structure 
of L ’Ascensore, the theatrical and the filmic are continually played against each other. 
That is, instead of operating as a frame, these conflicts are worked into the body of the 
performance, potentially disturbing the closure implied by Gorman’s analysis. It is 
arguably this play between the cinematic and the theatrical that articulates the rules by 
which we continue to revolutionise our identities through identifications. However,
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importantly, L ’Ascensore appears to be an affectionate celebration of the gangster 
genre, rather than a suspicious practice intent on revealing the genre’s underlying 
‘truths’.
Indeed, one of the most striking features of L ’Ascensore is the pleasure it brings. I 
would argue that much of this pleasure is simply induced through sets of recognitions. 
Insomniac do not need to tell the whole story. As a culture exposed to a plethora of 
American gangster films, and through the way in which they are continually 
referenced in popular cultural forms, we already know the plots, characters and 
iconography of the genre so well14. In this instance, the company offer us a 
condensed gangster drama (only forty minutes) that uses clever ways to approximate 
the cinematic within the context of the theatre -  and we take delight in watching this 
‘play’ carried out before us. This is the operation of repetition (we know how this 
genre operates) and difference (it is played in the theatre, not the cinema). Indeed, it 
is through the processes of repetition and difference that we establish our identities 
through identifications.
Eve Sedgwick implies that much cultural theory written in the last twenty years has 
repeatedly denigrated pleasure as a “merely aesthetic” affect (2003, p. 114) and thus 
without critical or historical value. As I mentioned in the introduction, she describes a 
current critical culture of ‘paranoid theory’ that places its faith in exposure or the 
unveiling of “hidden patterns of violence” (2003, p. 143). She uses the specific 
example of the queer-identified practice of camp to illustrate her theory. As she 
explains, “camp is most often understood as uniquely appropriate to the projects of 
parody, denaturalization (sic), demystification, and mocking exposure of the elements
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and assumptions of a dominant culture” (2003, p. 149). These practices, Sedgwick 
maintains, are negative, suspicious and intent on humiliation, as well as 
“masquerading as the stuff of truth” (2003, p. 138). In other words, within the 
practices of exposure, there is an implicit claim to ‘unmask’ or expose the facts. She 
goes on to state that:
[T]he degree to which camping is motivated by love seems often to be 
understood mainly as the degree of its self-hating complicity with an 
oppressive status quo. By this account, the x-ray gaze of the paranoid impulse 
in camp sees through to an unfleshed skeleton of the culture; the paranoid 
aesthetic on view here is one of minimalist elegance and conceptual economy.
(2003, p. 114)
Or put another way, ‘paranoid theory’ is a taut and scientific practice that denies the 
‘flesh’ of cultural forms or objects that might provide pleasure, comfort and 
nourishment to specific selves and communities. That is, there might be valid and 
substantial rewards from pleasurable feeling and identifications that do not always 
denote collusion with the dominant ideology. Or indeed, in Sedgwick’s terms:
[F]or someone to have an unmystified view of systematic oppressions does not 
intrinsically or necessarily enjoin that person to any specific train of 
epistemological or narrative consequences. [...] to practice other than 
paranoid forms of knowing does not, in itself, entail a denial of the reality or 
gravity of enmity or oppression.
(2003, p. 127-8)
In other words, to have an understanding of how oppression operates in society does 
not automatically prescribe a confrontational course of action.
Yet I do not wish to elide or stifle the importance of subversive practices and the 
necessity to always ask questions of the culture in which one lives. After all, it could
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be argued that this is one of the key generic features of an experimental cultural 
practice.15 Yet, like Sedgwick, I think it is essential to recognise that a paranoid 
practice is just “one practice among other, alternative ones” (2003, p. 128), and as she 
succinctly asserts, “paranoia knows some things well and other things poorly” (2003, 
p. 130). Over the following pages, I will suggest a possible subversive practice that I 
think is taking place in L ’Ascensore', that is, the way in which the cinematic and the 
theatrical are played through and against each other in the course of the performance. 
In this sense they appear to complicate each other’s signifying practices, and 
potentially question, as well as affirm and honour our investments in, and 
identifications with, both. However, I will argue that this ‘clash’ of two, potentially 
opposing discourses is not a totally violent, undermining practice. Rather, I will keep 
in mind one of the key operations of the performance that a paranoid practice 
probably knows poorly; that of the generation or proliferation of pleasurable effects.
It is probably fair to say that audiences do not take L ’Ascensore for a tragedy as such. 
This is because the main appeal of the show is the ways in which Insomniac work so 
hard to replicate film in the space of the theatre, and this ‘play’ makes the ill-fated 
consequences for the hero of the action (mainly) pleasurable and entertaining. 
However, it is significant that the show’s framing through film certainly, at moments, 
led me to attach psychological attributes to the flat, stereotyped figure of Salvatore, 
played by Richard Hawley. Indeed, this feeling was bolstered by Hawley’s rather 
gripping and sustained performance throughout the show. I found, despite his over­
played New York drawl and clipped, hard-boiled language, that his investment in 
each terrifying moment of his nightmare did have the effect of transporting me (at 
least at certain moments) on his rather disturbing, hallucinogenic journey.16
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Indeed in L ’Ascensore, theatre and film are brought into a constant and excessive 
confrontation with each other. The theatricality o fL ’Ascensore is brought to the fore 
straight away since the lift that Salvatore travels in approximates a miniature ‘box 
set’. The necessary tabs are erected either side to conceal its supporting structure.
L 'Ascensore"s lift doors could be understood as a theatrical ‘interpretation’ of a film 
edit. In this sense the cinematic is subjected to a theatrical treatment, which suggests 
that the signifying practices of theatre are literally imposed on the world of the 
generic gangster film. At the same time, the opposite is also true; that the very 
imposition of the ‘edit’ in the realm of the theatrical subjects the latter to cinematic 
signifying practices, since the show borrows cinema’s discontinuous use of space. In 
other words, the scene changes can happen entirely out of the audience’s view. This 
makes the ‘edit’ really gratifying. This is how it operates. Salvatore and the audience 
witness a series of ‘shots’ or spectacles beyond the lift’s boundary that always change 
from one to the other after the doors have closed. The noise generated by the set 
change is clearly concealed by the loud rattle apparently caused by the lift’s 
mechanisms of motion. Each ‘new’ scene is then revealed as the doors slide open 
again. What is so pleasurable about these moments in L ’Ascensore is the speed at 
which these changes take place, and the sheer delight of witnessing the way the space 
has transformed when the lift doors open again. This is one of the enchanting things 
about theatre: the way it has to work so hard to literally construct illusions or 
transformations, since, as Susan Sontag points out, “the theatre’s capacities for 
manipulating space are simply much cruder and more laboured than film’s” (in Mast, 
Cohen and Braudy 1992, p. 368). In other words, we are aware of how clever theatre 
has to be to produce that sense of effortlessness that film can simply put together in
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the edit suite. 7 Indeed, in film, a cut to a different location is par for the course and 
thus does not invoke wonder or surprise in this way.
If, as I have described, the lift doors operate as an edit, then it follows that the space 
beyond the lift signifies the ‘screen’ that Salvatore both watches, and at certain points 
enters into. This ‘screen’ space is the ‘filmic’ past of Salvatore. Indeed, this, as I 
have already mentioned, is an appropriation of the classic flashback device that is a 
key convention offilm noir. Salvatore then, watches his past life as i f  it is a film. It 
would appear significant then, that our central character is both the viewer of the 
screen action as well as a figure who can literally walk into his celluloid past. In this 
regard he is both the subject of the spectating world (looking at the screen) as well as 
the subject of the filmic world (enacting in the film). What is interesting about this is 
the fact that Salvatore crosses the impossible boundary of the screen by literally 
walking through it -  drawing attention to the liveness and immediacy that 
characterises the theatrical.
If we can differentiate the economies of the filmic and the theatrical temporally, then 
in simple terms, film, as pre-recorded, or as object, could be situated in the past, as 
already completed. On the other hand, theatre, as live event, at least in the sense that
the audience share the same temporality as the actors, could be placed in the present.
18After all, as Christian Metz reminds us:
It is the segregation of spaces that characterises a cinema performance and not 
a theatrical one. [...] [T]he space of film, represented by the screen, is utterly 
heterogeneous, it no longer communicates with that of the auditorium: one is 
real, the other perspective: a stronger break than any line of footlights.
(1982: 64)
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Salvatore then, traverses the ‘break’ of the screen. However, I would argue that 
L Ascensore's staging of the ‘split’ between what could be described as the pre­
recorded (the diegetic past) and the live (the diegetic present) moments is more 
complicated than I have thus far described. For example, when Salvatore walks into 
the alterior space behind the lift, he is not always (diagetically) ‘seen’ by the 
characters that occupy his remembered or fantasised past. In a sense then, he is 
simultaneously inside and outside of his ‘projected’ past experiences, neither entirely 
inhabiting them, nor having a perspectival point of view that might offer him narrative 
(and self) mastery.
Let me describe the first of Salvatore’s hallucinations, in order to describe what I 
mean. This scene occurs just moments after Salvatore collapses from the injuries 
Maria has bestowed upon him. After the dramatic stabbing the following takes place. 
The lights momentarily go out, and then they flicker: Salvatore remains on the floor 
of the lift, motionless. Then he stirs. He gets to his feet, apparently unhurt -  his knife 
wound seems to have vanished. He hurriedly presses the buttons of the lift; it would 
seem in an attempt to exit the confines of the hotel. Instead he only arrives at an 
unspecified floor. He wanders out of the lift, into the hotel corridor, but appears 
unable to find a way out. Already it is clear that something about the world Salvatore 
inhabits has changed. Inside the lift again, he frantically selects another floor. This 
time, the lift doors open to reveal an eerie space. A group of party guests are lined up 
in a darkened area, facing the lift enclosure. Suddenly they begin to clap in unison. 
Salvatore acknowledges the clapping as if it is for him, and, still inside the lift, he 
executes a low, overstated bow. However, the ensemble fail to ‘see him: it is clear 
that he exists in an alternative temporal register. The crowd disperse, and congregate
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around a transversely positioned table. An Italian ballad begins to play and Salvatore 
crouches in the lift enclosure to light a cigarette. A group of men enter the space in 
shirts, trousers and waistcoats; they are larking around. Salvatore clearly knows 
them, so he calls out to them and follows them into the space. They appear not to 
hear or see him. The incompatible time frames of Salvatore and the ensemble figures 
becomes more pronounced since the women and men begin to perform a menacing 
yet perfectly timed eating and drinking ritual, whilst Salvatore moves around them in 
‘real’ time. Salvatore looks on, exasperated. The figures begin to filter out of the 
dream-like world, disappearing in to the shadows, and Salvatore moves out of view. 
Just a man and a woman remain behind, and they start to kiss -  they are later 
identified as Salvatore’s parents. The music gets louder and the temporal register 
appears to shift again as the sounds of a violent windstorm create a threatening 
atmosphere. Salvatore’s mother and father mount the table and perform a simulated 
act of sexual intercourse, and then finally his mother lets out a devastating scream. 
Salvatore appears from out of the shadows and runs to the safety of the lift enclosure. 
He hurriedly shuts the gate. The lift doors slam closed and the elevator appears to 
plunge downwards.
In this scene, as I have already mentioned, Salvatore moves into the territory of the 
‘screen’ space -  however, distinctive time frames separate him narratively from the 
characters of his past. It would appear that he remains temporally, although not 
spatially, in the landscape of the ‘present’ time. In this sense, Salvatore’s time frame 
is still in the theatrical realm. However, importantly, the ‘split’ that divides our main 
protagonist from the other figures is not only temporal. Strangely, the ‘filmic’ world 
that is inhabited by the party guests and the ‘theatrical’ world that Salvatore occupies
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do not appear to hold fast. As the party guest’s actions become increasingly 
ritualised, they arrive at a distinctly theatrical mode of presentation. Their 
expressionistic movements separate them from Salvatore’s pared down, arguably 
filmic style of acting. It is clear that the split between the realms of the filmic and the 
theatrical are always doubled over and played across each other in L ’Ascensore.
It could be argued that in L ’Ascensore, through the device of flashback, the theatrical 
‘live’ is caught in the frame of film’s dependence on repetition, of having to repeat 
the events of the past.19 Indeed, the flashbacks that structure the piece as a whole 
signify the return to numerous moments of Salvatore’s previous existence. At the 
same time, however, the ‘past’ of film is both narratively (as Salvatore’s life) and 
literally (as a pre-recorded and edited document) caught up in the moment of the 
theatrical present -  in the space of immediacy, of material bodies, of ‘live’ voices. 
Furthermore and crucially, the immediacy of the ‘live’ is not placed outside the frame 
of Salvatore’s past experiences, which might be the case if  our hero was to remain in 
the confines of the ‘proscenium arch’ lift. Instead, through the figure of Salvatore, 
who straddles the ‘filmic’ and ‘theatrical’ worlds, the filmic past (as object) is 
constantly contaminated by the live’s materiality. In other words, the interruption of 
the live potentially has the effect of questioning the fixture of Salvatore’s life as a 
document or object that is ordered, made sense of and ultimately left unquestioned 
and unquestionable (like the physical manifestation of a reel of film). This might 
challenge Gorman’s assumption thus:
Post-structuralist theory implies that the concept of historical ‘epochs’ and 
‘periods’ has been problematised and must be acknowledged as illusory 
concepts constructed through language. Similarly, contemporary historical 
research must acknowledge the ideological values of progress and causality
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thought to be conferred through the process of ‘periodization’ (sic) (Ledger 
and McCracken 1995). In the light of this theorising of historicisation, the 
process of retrospectively ordering events at the end of the century and 
millennium end [in L ‘Ascensore] must be deemed as reactionary.
(2002, p. 150)
Alternatively, I suggest that the intrusion of the ‘live’ or the theatrical in the space of 
the ‘filmic’ implies that that Salvatore’s narrative cannot be completely tied down, 
thus questioning the absolute closure that Gorman subjects L Ascensore to. Of 
course, I am aware that I could be charged with romanticising the live in this instance, 
since I am suggesting that the live operates without mediation -  as if the live is always 
an unruly force that ‘undoes’ the teleologies of fixture, imposition and order. Indeed, 
L Ascensore is tied down by its dependence on the tragic structure of the gangster 
genre, which always involves the playing out of fated situations. Salvatore’s journey 
in the fiction can only have one destiny since we know the outcome must be his 
eventual death. However, I would contend that L Ascensore’s operates through a 
continual and disorientating (formal and diegetic) exploration of time frames. This 
exploration is carried out through the placing together of the theatrical and the filmic, 
and arguably invites a comparison of their particular temporal modalities. This 
distinction, I would say, rests on film’s already completed-ness, and theatre’s 
attachment to the happening now. My identification with the narrative journey of 
Salvatore then, reminds me that my search for a fixed identity (through identification) 
is desirable, but always based on unstable premises.
Importantly, in the scene that I described at length above, there is a literal enactment 
of the primal scene. This demonstrates one of the ways in which the critical
y 20discourses that encircle film saturate the theatrical structure of L Ascensore. In the 
show, this scene is made narratively plausible since the show represents the extended
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moment of Salvatore’s life flashing before his eyes. Peggy Phelan argues that the 
primal scene is “remembered and (re)visited through the dream and the symptom — 
through the imaginative attempt of the unconscious to replay the (past) scene on the 
stage of the present” (1993, p. 4). Within the logics of psychoanalysis then, Salvatore 
can be seen to be tracking back over his life, in an attempt to unearth the events 
leading to Maria’s betrayal. In other words, to pinpoint the origin of his own demise. 
However, it is significant that the primal scene is considered a key moment in the 
formation of the subject in psychoanalytical theory, since this could be understood as 
deliberately related to (and indeed in excess of) the cinematic mode. After all, as I 
have already implied, film theorists frequently describe the form in psychoanalytical 
terms. Furthermore, the gangster genre is arguably well suited to this mode of 
explanation since its recurrent thematics of familial relations and conflicts place it 
distinctly within psychoanalytic territory. But what is striking about the situation of 
the primal scene within L ’Ascensore is the downright frankness of its presentation. In 
other words, the show’s material is not just predisposed to a psychoanalytical reading 
which fits easily and logically into the narrative flow. This is arguably the case in the 
Godfather films. Rather, in L ’Ascensore the very discourse o f the psychoanalytical, 
which has come to function as a metanarrative for understanding film, is thrown into 
relief. Furthermore, psychoanalysis as discourse is emphasised by the sheer 
overindulgence of its staging. The shattering crescendo of operatic music, the 
windstorm and indeed the grunting noises made by the actors playing Salvatore’s 
parents, almost turn the menacing scene into something exquisitely ridiculous. So 
much theatrical abundance appears to be invested in this instance, which is extremely 
pleasurable, and also could be said to bring us into the ‘live moment’ of its enaction.
In other words, in L 'Ascensore, we are denied the covert, keyhole effect of the
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cinematic screen that draws us in to a forbidden world. Instead, the ‘cultural truth’ of 
the primal scene and our specific investments in it as a ‘formative’ moment is 
arguably brought into question through its overt theatrical staging. This is a staging 
of what Nichols would describe as a ‘disembodied’ knowledge that produces a 
distancing effect (in Sobchack 1996, p. 62).
L ’Ascensore also invokes film by using the theatrical machinery in order to 
approximate classic film ‘shots’. For instance, there is one scene that is cleverly 
constructed as if it is an overhead camera view. This time, when the lift doors open, 
we see a group of men seated around a table, one of whom is speaking into a 
telephone. Again it is clear that Salvatore occupies a different time frame than the 
figures situated here, since this scene is viewed over the top of the men’s heads, as if 
we are peering down on them. Salvatore is not ‘seen’ but he is nonetheless the focus 
of the telephone discussion. The man on the telephone says, “Where is Salvatore?” 
And then: “we have given him chances, Lucio. He has betrayed the family and now 
he cannot be our son” (Brooks, 1992).21 Despite the seeming seriousness of the 
telephone discussion, I would argue that this moment is visually very amusing. On 
the one hand, it invokes recognition — we identify it as a classic shot from the 
cinematic gangster genre. Indeed, this is a view that we are likely to accept un- 
problematically in the cinema. On the other hand, however, in the theatrical realm, it 
is impossible, and as an audience we are ‘in on the joke’. It is clear that the actors 
must have climbed into a rather elaborate and secure structure that allowed them to be 
wedged in horizontally so they did not fall out. It is also evident that all the items on 
the table itself must be ‘stuck on’ in some way -  the phone, the drinking glasses, the 
cards that are not in the men’s hands. However, I would argue that this ‘shot does
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not only invoke laughter. The way that the view is so literally constructed indicates 
that the machinery of the theatre has to work very hard in order to approximate film.
It also has the effect of drawing attention to the way filmic fictions are put together.
In other words, we see the shot as a shot, so cinema’s mode of production is brought 
to the fore.
In L ’Ascensore, narrative closure is achieved, but the means by which closure is 
attained produces such a spillage of meaning as to invite an ironic reading. This is 
mainly through the clash between the filmic and the theatrical, and questions the 
passive adherence to the generic order that the show might appear, at first sight, to 
prescribe. I would argue that the ways in which film and theatre are made to confront 
each other in L ’Ascensore shows that each discourse cannot be contained or contain 
everything. This causes a displacement of familiar frames of understanding that 
attempt to put the self in (absolute) order.
(In the final moments of L ’Ascensore, as Salvatore lay spluttering and writhing inside 
the lift enclosure, a smile came to my face. I realised that I did not moum the demise 
of this character, but actually wanted to be Richard Hawley in this exquisite theatrical 
moment. I could be lying there instead of Hawley, thrashing about covered in profuse 
amounts of glorious, gloopy stage blood).
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Five Miles and Falling
Production details: the concept for Five Miles was devised by imitating the dog: Alice Booth, Seth 
Honnor, Richard Malcolm and Simon Wainwright. Text written by Andrew Quick with small sections 
by myself. Camera work was carried out by filmmakers Mate Toth and Mark Wordsworth. The show 
was commissioned by the Studio Theatre and Gallery, Leeds Metropolitan Theatre, and supported 
additionally by Arts Council England. It toured in Spring and Summer 200222.
One of the obvious connections between Five Miles and Falling and L ’Ascensore is 
that both involve a lift. However, quite early on in the rehearsal process we decided 
to abandon the idea of our lift being part of a hotel, as in L ’Ascensore. We wanted to 
portray a filmic romance that occurred across different meeting places; so each ‘floor’ 
now represents another location. The lift, then, signifies a journey. I suppose in this 
sense the lift developed a metaphorical rather than a literal function. Lynne Pearce 
and Jackie Stacey point out that a prominent feature of the romance narrative is a 
transformation; often represented through some sort of journey or passage. They 
claim:
This transformative promise holds out possibilities of change, progress and 
escape, which the romance facilitates through its power to make things seem 
possible and to enable us to feel we can overcome all adversities. Such 
possibilities are often figured through both a literal and metaphorical journey 
(to a new self); hence travel, relocation and movement have been central to 
such romantic trajectories [...] In this way, romance offers its subjects the 
possibility of a new ‘becoming’: through the encounter/fusion of the self and 
the other, a new self might be imagined.
(1995, p. 18)
In other words, romance narratives often give us hope of a new and different future, 
and possibly a new self through their transformative potential. Five Miles certainly 
explores the possibility of change through love’s work, and I will go on to discuss this 
further in due course. But for now it is worth mentioning that this performance 
resurrects the beautiful dead that Sontag connects specifically to film. As she claims,
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movies preserve the past, while theatres — no matter how devoted to the classics, to 
old plays -  can only ‘modernize’. Movies resurrect the beautiful dead...” (in (eds.) 
Mast, Cohen and Braudy 1992, p. 370). In other words, the show enacts the journey 
of a potential relationship, since the couple’s union is actually thwarted in their 
simultaneous demise (although by the end of the show, it becomes clear that the 
Woman is the very signifier of death itself — a fallen angel — condemned to repeat love 
trysts for eternity). In this case the metaphor of the lift is stronger than just the 
development or trajectory of a romantic affair. The lift could also be said to signify 
purgatory itself. That is, it represents a transitory, liminal or in-between space that 
can never be concretely placed. Further, this ‘in-between’ could be described as a 
metaphor for the show itself, which, I think, works in-between the gaps of binary 
oppositions. The first is the Filmic/Theatrical as in L ’Ascensore, although others are 
Man/Woman, Alive/Dead, Inside/Outside, Past/Present, Judgement/Redemption, 
Watcher/Watched, and perhaps one of the oldest binary oppositions -  the debate 
between two lovers.
The lift also allowed us to keep the audience in the ‘frame’. In other words, it 
permitted us to make them part of the Five Miles experience. We wanted the 
audience to go on some sort of physical journey that was intrinsically connected to 
their intellectual and empathetic one. The play’s thematics circle around the 
processes of judgement and redemption. That is, the woman ‘judges’ the man in the 
context of a failing romance. The idea is that the audience reflect on the journeys and 
consequences of their own relationships, and as the Man walks towards the lift at the 
end of the show, that they might be ‘next’ in line for judgement. (Perhaps the 
aftermath of love’s fall or promise always demands some sort of ethical assessment?)
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We were interested in the intimacy of the lift, in the difficulty for the audience of 
having to stand for the entire show, and in the sensuality of having the images and 
soundscape come at them in an intense way. We were attracted to the affective 
possibilities of this sort of experience. We also wanted to make the audience part of 
the machine, having to turn to watch the two areas of action. This turn then mimicks 
the Woman’s (my) turn away in the final scene, ‘Leaving’. It also tangentially refers 
to the turn of Orpheus; the ‘looking back’ that transforms his lover, Euridice, into 
stone.
Five Miles draws on the (generic) film romance as a structuring device although the 
show is in many ways very theatrical. Indeed, as I showed in relation to L JAscensore, 
the very act of attempting to present the cinematic within the context of the theatre 
seems to emphasise theatre’s obstinate Tiveness’. Unlike L Ascensore though, we do 
not attempt to ‘reconstruct’ film through the manipulation of the theatrical machinery. 
Rather, film is referenced in various ways throughout the performance, and we also 
incorporate actual pre-recorded material, which arguably invokes film’s material 
conditions. It could be maintained that the pre-recorded and the live demand not only 
different modes of ‘being’ for us as performers, but also different ‘contracts’ of 
viewing for the audience. In this sense varying identificatory interactions possibly 
occur. I will elaborate on these in relation to my own experience as a performer and 
my speculations on audience interactions in just a moment.
However, for now, it is important to point out that I do not wish to assume a binary 
relation between the live and the pre-recorded (present and absent?) in Five Miles, and 
that there is a clear ‘switch’ back and forth between these two viewing practices.
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Indeed, this switch is probably impossible since within the show, the two modes of 
enunciation are not strictly separated. Rather, the co-presentation of the live and the 
pre-recorded might have the effect of complicating identificatory processes, through 
their specific interrelations. However, critically, over the next few pages, I intend to 
conjoin the material conditions of viewing with an integral consideration of the 
show’s narrative ‘content’. Indeed, when invoking film we were not just attempting 
to mimic film’s inherent segregation of itself from the auditorium. Also, in line with 
mainstream generic film, we wanted to maintain a certain degree of narrative 
coherence, taking into account “the evident centrality of narrative to dominant film 
cultures” (Rosen 1986, p. ix). We further intended to bring into play the specific 
thematic concerns of a generic film romance, since, as I remarked earlier, genre is a 
collective cultural language that we were intent on drawing from. Indeed, we take 
scenes from the generic romance such as: “The Meeting Scene” that takes place in a 
restaurant, “The Flirting Scene” (in a bar) “The Argument Scene” (in a cafe) “The 
Passion Scene” (in a hotel room), and finally “The Leaving Scene” (in a car park).
Yet the show is much more eclectic in its references than L Ascensore. The video 
sections on the screen in the lift featuring the Man’s ‘nightmare’ draw on surreal film, 
as well as pop videos and advertising.23 The show itself, for the audience, is probably 
reminiscent of a fairground ride or simulator since the spectators are herded into an 
enclosed space and subjected to sets of rather disorientating images and experiences. 
The narrative of Five Miles as a whole is partly taken from the film Magnolia, which 
is structured on the principle of a set of extraordinary chance coincidences. In the 
film, a number of narrative strands are presented and then converge. One is the 
meeting of a couple through a lonely heart’s column, and we decided to purloin this
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idea, as well as the notion of an extraordinary chance co-incidence. This is where we 
took the narrative in our own direction, since we decided the fate of our couple would 
be the following. They would arrange to meet, and on the way to the meeting the man 
would run the woman over. Our story would be the potential relationship of this 
couple, which was thwarted in death. The figure of the Woman as the Saviour or 
angel of death combines ideas from ancient mythology as well as Christian concepts 
such as the notions of redemption and judgement (which, importantly, still have a 
strong influence in our secular culture). We also draw on specific biblical stories, 
such as the fall of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden, as expressed by the Man in 
scene four. Indeed, in some ways this show makes me think of a Quentin Tarantino 
film, since, although it has a distinct generic frame, it draws on many other genres as 
well as specific films/texts/myths/stories.
Free Fall -  Performing in, and Speculating on, Five Miles
It is strange trying to capture the experience, the materiality, the Tiveness’ of 
performing a show. It is so difficult to describe how it feels for us and, indeed, how 
we imagine the audience will experience it. Because it really is an experience, this 
show. The audience are really put inside its world. However, even though Five Miles 
is very self-contained, with the lift as a constant space for the audience (its own stage 
for us, the actors, and all its own internal components) the ‘outside’ space always 
impacts on the show itself and makes the show feel different. The sound is sometimes 
flat and dead, at others, rich and echoey, bouncing around the space. The temperature 
varies. We try to make the performance space as cold as possible, to reduce the risk
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of audience members feeling woozy, although some venues are hotter than others. If 
it is too warm, I start to panic that the audience will get uncomfortable, restless, or at 
worst, faint. However, when my body feels too cold, it is more difficult to perform.
The show begins with waiting. At least it does for Richard and me. The audience 
have entered the corridor, and the lift doors have shut behind them. I love the fact 
that I know this show so well. The first section is a voiceover played as the audience 
stand inside the lift. It is Richard’s lonely heart advert. There is no music, so Richard 
and I remain quiet, staying still and listening, waiting for the music to kick in before 
we can move about without being heard by the audience. When the music starts, we 
(ever so quietly) put the set in place for the first live scene. We have it all mapped 
out, we do the same things each time, there is a rhythm. I hold the curtain for Richard 
as he carries on the table. He can never decide where to place it -  he moves it 
forward, then back, then stands some distance from it to check it is in the right place.
I lay down my props, I catch Richard’s eye. He winks. These are the little rituals we 
allow ourselves before each scene, and again after the lift doors close, shutting the 
audience out of sight. We always give each other the thumbs up, hearten each other, 
congratulate each other if all goes well. Something to calm the nerves. Meanwhile:
In the first moments of the show the audience are subjected to various modes of 
viewing which could be described as sets of alienation techniques as well as modes of 
drawing them into to the world of Five Miles. There always seems to be a ‘pull 
between these two practices of viewing or interacting. They walk into the lift with a 
number of other people. This is not like a film: they are not in a darkened room, 
separated from everyone around them, able to focus on and project themselves into an
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absent celluloid world. They are in an intimate space; they are standing close to 
others. They are aware of each other. Smells are probably prominent — shampoo, 
deodorant, sweat. Their bodies brush up against other bodies. Then the show begins. 
The doors close behind them. A voiceover starts.
[SOUND: It is the Man (Richard) announcing his lonely heart advert.]
The sound appears to be coming from the screen although there are no visuals. Where 
do the audience look? They might shut their eyes, so they do not have to make eye 
contact with anyone standing around them. Otherwise their eyes might wonder up, as 
if the sound is emanating from somewhere above them. This is different from being 
in one’s own world, like in the cinema, or to a lesser extent, in a conventional theatre 
set up. Here the audience will be distinctly conscious of others -  and it might make 
them more aware of themselves. A moment of crisis perhaps? They are (almost) part 
of this performance.24 Indeed it would seem that to a certain extent, they are 
performing too. Throughout the show, they are watching, but also potentially being 
watched watching, by the other viewers standing so close to them. They are aware 
that others will probably notice their reactions or interactions with the performance. 
Suddenly the screen switches on and the audience turn to look in the direction of the 
light.
[IMAGE: It is the Woman (me) and then the Man (Richard), her in a cafe, him in a 
car; SOUND: The Woman’s voice is heard over the images, she responds to his ad 
with a few words o f her own. SOUND: He leaves a message on her mobile. IMAGE: 
You see her listening to it. SOUND: He asks to meet her and tells her when and 
where].
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The images give the audience something to focus on. Now they can watch, direct 
their attention, look away from those standing close to them. This contract is a 
straightforward one. The image is pre-recorded, we, the actors, have ‘gone’. In other 
words, the audience occupy a different time/space to us. They can be a little more 
voyeuristic, since they can watch without us knowing they are there. They can play 
the ‘role’ of being invisible. The film sections can be viewed in the comfort that we 
cannot see or acknowledge them. Perhaps contradictorily, the distance or divide of 
the screen allows them to move closer to the action. That is, the screen positions 
them in a perspectival relation, as a passive receiver of its spectacle whilst permitting 
them the illusion of specular mastery. This is because they see without being seen in 
return. Thus the screen facilitates their projection into this imaginary world. Of 
course, at the same time, they know that they are not in command of this narrative. 
After all, it already has its own destiny, and the audience willingly let it unfold before 
them. As Elizabeth Cowie reminds us:
Voyeurism is not a relation of unmitigated mastery. In identifying with the 
other (the mirror image) we are also separated from it as other. It is this which 
allows us to both be and not be the camera. We take the camera’s look as our 
own, yet we are not at all disturbed when it suddenly pans, although we have 
not turned our own heads [...] cinema depends on producing in the spectator 
an oscillation between two knowledges, between seeing events for the first 
time (identification with the camera) and knowing that the events being seen 
have already happened, in so far as the spectator is aware that the scene he or 
she is now seeing precedes scenes which are yet-to-be-seen but which the 
spectator knows he or she will see, implying a separation from the camera. 
What is involved here is a disavowal.
(1997, p. 101, emphasis in original)
It is through a process of disavowal then, that the audience, if they so wish, can get 
sucked into the recognisable narrative flow. Simple, sequential edits with alternate 
voiceovers (him, then her) that suture the images together, and allow them to
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interchange identifications between the two characters. This is a convention of film 
that is easy to follow.25
[IMAGE: She leaves the cafe to meet him. He is still driving. By terrible and chance 
coincidence, she crosses the road in front o f his car. He knocks her over and Palis 
her. There is a tremendous CRASH].
The screen switches o ff abruptly.
[SOUND: A voiceover, although this time the voice fills the whole o f the lift. It is the 
Woman].
Their attention is drawn away from the screen. The lift doors open and the voiceover 
continues. It connects the two spaces. In the lift, there is a shuffle to turn around and 
see what is beyond the lift doors. There is usually an audible intake of breath from 
the audience members closest to the front, since the Woman (me) seems to have just 
appeared in the corridor space wearing a sparkling dress. Ahead is a raised stage, and 
the Man is seated at a table. Beyond him is a projected backdrop that gives a false 
impression of space. It is a restaurant.26
In the performance, I feel reassured listening to my voiceovers. The same each time, 
same words, no mistakes. No slight deviations. Same rhythm, same intonation. My 
own soft whispery voice, calm and assured. It is me but it is not me — rather like 
looking at a photo of myself. That picture, staring back at me, as if it does not know 
me either — has never seen me before in its life. But, of course, it is me and I 
sometimes think back to recording those voiceovers. Sitting at a table in an empty 
theatre, quietly leafing through the script. Sitting there, with my microphone, 
speaking those soft words — very quiet and underplayed — like film. And when I 
slipped up and went wrong (tripped up over my words or put emphasis in the wrong 
place) I could just stop the recording and start again. That was the beauty of it. But
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that very recording, in the moments of the performance, ensures that there are no 
more mistakes. This final version of my voice that I listen to in the show reflects a 
version of me that is infallible; I just cannot go wrong. It is a rendering of Alice (and 
indeed the character of the Woman) that has the whole thing worked out. I like her. I 
like her a lot. That air of control and the seeming ownership of all those well-ordered 
words. In fact, the text for the whole show is so rhythmical — so placed. Each word is 
significant, like poetry, mimicking real speech with a little bit more. Heightened. I 
know each word and their order so well. I always listen, rarely loosing concentration, 
letting myself be taken on the journey of my character’s thoughts, letting her words 
pull the character around me, like clothing. In this way I can project myself into the 
words instead of embodying them - 1 am my Other -  removed but sucked in at the 
same time.
The voiceovers are one of the ways in which ‘interiority’ is touched on in Five Miles. 
They are the classic (film noir) device used to allow audiences ‘access’ to the 
character, or the narrator’s thoughts. In style, they border on the poetic, although they 
probably represent the most ‘naturally’ spoken parts of the show. As the Woman, I 
adopt a mode of delivery that is suitably underplayed, gently attempting to draw the 
audience into my world. However, significantly, Five Miles is not the Woman’s 
world, even though the technique of the voiceover usually signifies a single narrative 
perspective or point of view. In Five Miles the audience are also taken on the Man s 
journey through his nightmarish visions shown on the screen inside the lift. Arguably 
then, throughout the show, identification moves back and forth between the Woman 
and Man. In fact, the Man’s hallucinogenic moments frame him in close-up, a device 
often considered to deliver the ‘emotional truth’ of a character. He is shown in a
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number of disorientating situations, accompanied by corresponding soundtracks, 
plainly indicative of his existential crisis. One shows him in a cinema, with a 
projected credit sequence’ running across his face. The camera pans out to reveal 
rows and rows of empty seats. He is clearly trapped, alone and terrified. Another 
sequence places him in kitchen, and as the camera pulls out it becomes clear that he is 
not in a conventional kitchen at all. Rather, he is standing in a kitchen showroom, and 
the camera rotates around and around depicting kitchen after empty kitchen, 
compounding his isolation and detachment from the world.
Back in the performance (and rewinding a little -  the Man’s nightmare scenes have 
not happened yet) I am walking towards Richard as he sits at the table. As my first 
voiceover ends I utter my first line. I am facing the audience now. To the Man I say, 
“I’m not sure this is going to work” and the Man replies, “It can, it will, I promise” 
(itd, 2002). In this moment, I can feel the audience’s presence, although I honour the 
classic ‘fourth wall’ contract. This is theatre’s version of the silver screen, although, 
of course, it pre-dates cinema. In Five Miles this ‘fourth wall’ actually refers to the 
concrete divide of the screen in the cinema rather (or as well as) reinstating the ‘false’ 
divide between audience and players in the space of the theatre. To make it work, we 
lock ourselves inside the action and stare through the audience in front of us. Of 
course, we know the audience are there. The audience know we know they are there. 
Yet they obediently play the parts of theatre viewers, standing only a few feet away 
from us but treating us like ‘actors’. That is, they do not attempting to interact with us 
in any way. (However, we have had young audiences that seem to think we cannot 
hear them talking in the lift. They make me angry and nervous. Can t they adhere to 
the very British tradition of shutting the hell up when they come and see a piece of 
theatre? On occasion I have wanted so much to break the performance contract and
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tell them to be quiet and concentrate. After all, if they do not listen to the text they 
are likely to lose the thread of the narrative and then we will never get them back27).
It is here, in the live moment, that we ‘play’ our characters. These characters are not 
psychologically rounded, although they bear traces of psychology. I would say that 
they move between the psychological, the stereotypical and the archetypal, and that 
the staging of the show itself, as I will go on to demonstrate, reflects these transitions 
(even though they are not always easy to separate). The Man is individualistic, driven 
by money and the pursuit of profit, and sees the world as a place that can be rationally 
calculated and measured. The Woman, on the contrary, believes in the disorderly 
forces of the earth, flesh, blood and desire -  a vision of mythological proportions. It 
is true that these viewpoints are attached to classic gender representations, since the 
Man represents the Head and the ‘real’ or mortal world, and the Woman represents 
the Body and the metaphorical world. However, within the mise-en-scene of the 
performance, the Woman apparently sets herself up as the Man’s antithesis, in order 
to disrupt or question his rigid worldview. Nevertheless, even though the Woman’s 
‘stance’ appears to be taken up by choice, I attempt to embody the ‘reality’ of her 
discursive position. In other words, I identify with it. In this sense each worldview 
has equal ‘authority’ within the piece.
The conflict between the two potential lovers as a barrier to fulfilment is indeed a 
classic of the romance genre. As Pearce and Stacey state:
Typically, the [romance] story offers the potential of a heterosexual love union 
whose fulfilment is threatened by a series of barriers or problems. At the most 
general level, then, romance might be described as a quest for love; a quest for 
another about whom the subject has very definite fantasies, investments and 
beliefs. This quest involves the staging of desire whose fulfilment may be 
realised with attainment, or just as likely, with loss. To whichever closure the
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narrative tends, however, like all quests its structure involves the overcoming 
of obstacles: in the case of romance this means the conquest of barriers in the 
name of love, and perhaps, by extension, also in the name of truth, knowledge, 
justice or freedom.
(1995, p. 15-16, emphasis in original)
However, within our ‘quest’ narrative we were aware when making the piece that the 
risk of instituting archetypes and/or stereotypes in fictional structures is that these 
depictions will be reinforced rather than put into question. Indeed, these stereotyped 
figures appear to obey the ‘Law of Genre’ that Derrida describes, since they sustain 
an interpretation of things according to what is already understood about the world. 
However, specific formal and narrative operations at work in the show are an attempt 
to disrupt these belief systems or ‘self-ordering’ mechanisms. In other words, there 
are certain ways in which we (itd) attempted to wear away at the rigidity of such 
entrenched ways of being. As I will go on to show, this ‘wearing away’ at the 
character’s identificatory positions required that Richard and I ‘embodied’ our roles.
Indeed, while performing in Five Miles, I attempt a certain psychological investment 
in my character in order to prepare me for scene three, ‘The Argument’. My character 
is hard-nosed, but also sympathetic, and she clearly has real affection for the Man. I 
imagine that there has to be something at stake in this partnership, otherwise its 
eventual failure does not work as well.28 In the scene, before the lift doors open, I sit 
at the cafe table and watch the projected sea behind me, lapping at the shore. Here I 
‘get into character’ by working myself up to deliver a torrent of angry words. Despite 
the poetic style of the text, I really try to play this scene ‘for real’, and to make my 
vehemence convincing.29 I imagine the rows that might have gone before this one, 
the endless rows, and I attempt to inject enough emotion into my words as if this 
speech stands in for a whole host of rows and battles that have gone before it. I try to
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embody, to a certain extent, the tension between couples on the brink of love, on the 
edge of that devastating fall that is tearing them apart. It is generic and stereotypical, 
that is, the relationship between the Man and the Woman stands in for many 
relationships, but as actors embodying characters we make it particular as well. Like 
Richard Hawley playing Salvatore in L Ascensore, we invest in the moment. This is 
perhaps one of the difficulties (or one of the interesting things?) about Five Miles. It 
almost makes the promise of realism but never fully delivers it. The flirting scene 
moves towards the awkwardness of a first or second date, where conversation is 
strained and the whole thing is a bit embarrassing, yet never quite sees it through 
since the scene is so formal. The scene is too ordered and controlled for that -  it 
hurtles forward at great speed, spinning through the question-and-answer game with 
slick precision. There is a possibility of identification here but probably always 
distance as well.
Importantly, however, the Woman speaks the Man's words in this scene and not her 
own. We always understood this as a crucial dynamic of the show. We were really 
interested in the notion of ‘replay’, which is something we probably all associate with 
matters the heart. This is that classic argument that is rerun again and again after it is 
all over. It is the cliched ritual of going over and over what was said, as well as 
rehearsing what one should have said, or could have said, given the chance to go back 
in time. This is reversed in scene four when the Man recounts the Woman’s words. 
The Man and the Woman both describe, in exact detail, the worldview of the other, 
and the other replies, “you’ve quite a memory”. This is perhaps unusual of these 
kinds of arguments, since the rejoinder might usually be I never said that! or you 
are taking my argument the wrong way” or “out of context . Instead, the precise
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replicas of each other s arguments intimate a rehearsal of these ideas, in the rehearsal 
of the show itself as well as the plethora of cultural narratives of romance. In Five 
Miles, the repetition of arguments also implies the actual ‘enactment’ of memory 
space, since the ‘real’ argument is accurately re-constructed after it is said and done. 
Indeed, the more I thought about it while enacting the show, I felt that we spoke each 
other’s voices as memory.
It seems to me that these scenes explore the very processes of identification, since 
they reveal an attempt by both characters to actually occupy the position of the other 
by literally taking on the other’s words. If we observe that our image of ourselves 
always comes to us from outside ourselves, from the place of the other, then I would 
say that Five Miles re-enacts this process through the way the Man and Woman speak. 
As Elizabeth Cowie makes clear, “our image of ourselves always comes to us from 
outside ourselves, from the place of the other. The story of our identities is the 
negotiation of this otherness of ourselves” (1997, p. 3-4). Put another way, we can 
only ever see ourselves through the other, from the other’s point of view or even as 
other in time, thus as other to the self. It could be argued then, that the ‘I’ only enters 
consciousness as a delayed reproduction. Thus there is no true self to be 
retrospectively recovered, or real self to be uncovered, since the self is continually 
revised from the point of view of the present and in relation to future imaginings. 
Recognition, then, is also re-cognition. In this respect identity cannot be seen as an 
unchanging set of contents but a position in relation to the other of identification. In 
Five Miles, when I actually speak the Man’s words, I actually give up my own 
position through my identification with, or contamination by, his.
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The notion of replay is emphasised since the real me disappears altogether in the 
fourth performed scene, as my voice and image are literally ‘played’ on the projection 
screen with Richard interacting, live. The process of my character being recorded 
also refers to the line in the play when Richard says:
When I first heard your voice, it sounds stupid to say this, but it.. .it electrified 
me - 1 played the message again and again. Moving the words back and forth. 
As if they might let me know what you looked like, what you would be 
wearing, your occupation, your age, your scent.
(itd 2002)
And my character repeats this later on, when she says, “To push me, like my words on 
your answer machine, back and forth in your imagination” (itd 2002). I am recorded 
in the scene itself, so the Man can literally ‘play’ the Woman again and again. This 
hints at this narrative having been told over and over again. Not only in the three 
performances a night, but in the classic (film) romance that everyone knows. Indeed, 
Pearce and Stacey explore the argument that romance is indeed still a central pre­
occupation in society precisely because of its narrativity, or as a phenomenon that is 
“always already written” (1994, p. 12), and is, in Stevi Jackson’s terms, “one of the 
most compelling discourses by which any one of us is inscribed” (in Pearce and 
Stacey’s words, 1994, p. 12). In this sense romantic discourse survives as a set of 
conventions (in film, literature, theatre and life) since it exerts an extraordinary power 
over us.
I think the formal construction of this scene in Five Miles is highly significant since, 
for the first time in the show, the human figure is imprinted on the projected backdrop 
behind the stage. I love this part of the performance. Partly, of course, because my
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work is done: I can sit with my feet up behind the set and simply enjoy the last half of 
the show. But I also think this is a huge turning point in Five Miles. Prior to this, the 
picture on the screen has been motionless, save for the flickering of candle flames 
on the tables in scene one, a fan rotating on the bar in scene two and the lapping of the 
waves on the shore in scene three. Thinking about it when the show was made, and 
while having time to reflect on it on tour, these backdrops remind me of nineteenth 
century illusionistic theatre, in which painted scenery is made to look as ‘real’ as 
possible, rather than appearing to reference the cinematic screen. It is interesting that 
when we conceived of these ‘backdrops’ we had in mind 1950s and 60s film sets in 
which the background of the action was faked. Sometimes they were studio 
constructions of certain locations that the actors would perform in front of, for 
example, in Mary Poppins (1964). Another classic device is where a static car is 
made to appear ‘in motion’ using projected film. That is, when pieces of film 
depicting disappearing landscapes are played through the back window of a 
stationary, and studio-housed, vehicle. Yet in reality, these backdrops are much more 
‘theatrical’ than we had first anticipated. It is not until the moment when my life- 
sized body stretches out on a projected bed that cinema appears to be invoked 
directly. However, where traditional narrative cinema seeks to cancel out the screen 
through the three dimensional continuity of space and sound, this screen seems to 
become stubbornly visible at the back of the stage. It is no longer a backdrop or 
support for the action but a solid structure, cut out from the cinema’s Imaginary 
continuity (or the ‘world’ as Bazin might describe it). I would argue that this device 
pulls the action even farther away from realism since the audience must negotiate 
Richard’s spoken text played against my already-said utterances, as well as move 
between my screened body and Richard’s live one.
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Because of this interplay, it is not appropriate to argue that the audience identify with 
my character instead of Richard’s, since I am ‘cut off from the audience and Richard 
is not. If we accept Bazin’s assertion that film invokes identification more readily 
than theatre, since we can project ourselves into its absent world, then in this case, the 
absent screen is made present by its contrast with Richard’s body on stage. In this 
case there is probably a measure of distance existent between my character and the 
audience. Furthermore, Richard’s heightened theatrical language and declamatory 
delivery are arguably already distancing, since poetry is an opening onto an 
abstracted encounter with language, where one is presented with the materiality of 
language itself rather than (or as well as) its signifying components. But it might 
seem more so when compared to my underplayed voice and movements reminiscent 
of film acting (and I really did have to underplay this scene -  it is funny how the 
camera really emphasises everything). Finally, there must be an extent to which the 
audience know they are being cheated, thus separating them further from the fictional 
action. In fact, I wonder if they try to work out how this scene actually operates, 
since Richard performs in perfect synch with my speaking image.
However, since the formal arrangement of this scene actually impacts on the narrative 
meaning of this scene, I wonder if the audience still get sucked into its world. I would 
say that the scene could be read in the following ways. The first is that the Woman, 
once she is ‘screened’, is revealed as archetype or mythical fiction, whereas the Man, 
at least within the diagesis, is ‘real’. The Woman could also be seen as a spectre of 
his imagination, since she actually dissolves into the world of the screen. In fact, this 
is how we had originally understood this scene in its making. Otherwise, she might
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seem destined to play out her role within the repetitive structure of this and other 
relationships, since she occupies the ‘repetitive’ medium of the cinematic itself. 
Furthermore and significantly, her existence inside the screen world suggests that she 
remains out of the reach (and out of the time-space) of the Man. This would appear to 
secure the eventual failure of their love affair since the Woman’s plea to the Man at 
the end of the scene, “take my hand” is literally impossible (itd, 2002).
However, whilst I sit behind the set watching my (back-to-front) imprinted body on 
the screen, I listen to the way Richard’s words are perfectly timed with mine. It 
seems to me that these characters are irrefutably connected. Each character, and each 
medium, that is, the live and the pre-recorded, occupies the other, produces the other 
and leans on the other in a symbiotic relationship. Indeed, if I am trapped by the 
technological frame then so is he -  he must stick unremittingly to the track I have laid 
down for him. Put another way, his words must always fit ‘in-between’ mine (or my 
character’s). Also, as I have thus far mentioned, he is destined to speak in her words, 
since his voice, the very origin of presence as Plato would have it, is denied. It would 
appear that he too is trapped within this mediating apparatus; he can only speak as 
part o f her.
The Man and Woman are connected in Five Miles, yet they never actually fall in love. 
This is their destiny within the mise-en-scene of the performance. After all, narratives 
of romance, as Pearce and Stacey remind us, are just as likely to end with loss (1994, 
p. 18). He must walk away (to death, it is suggested) and she must continue the 
process of meeting other lovers for eternity. In the final corridor section, the Man 
stands before the backdrop whilst the Woman’s (my) last recorded voiceover is
146
played. I am projected onto the screen and my image circles a camera that spins on its 
axis. Her last few lines are as follows:
So much already endured but nothing but time lies ahead of me. You see, I 
would like the chance to fall, to be utterly lost, to submit myself to somebody 
else, to be at their mercy, to ask them for forgiveness, to give myself over 
utterly, selflessly, to always coming back, whatever happens, to always 
coming back, whatever is said and done.
(itd 2000)
The Woman’s greatest desire then, is to fall in love, since love signals an escape from 
the endless cycle of affairs. This desire possibly falls in line with Pearce and Stacey’s 
statement that “we may (as individuals, as communities, as nations) no longer believe 
in love, but we still fall for it” (1995, p. 12). Love’s ability to transcend all is perhaps 
why the question raised at the opening of romance narratives is, according to Pearce 
and Stacey, “ ‘will they or won’t they?’ or, rather, how will they?” (1995, p. 16).
They claim, “Pleasure in the ‘progress of romance’ lies in the solution to the narrative 
problems, and the affirmation of the desire to see ‘love conquering all’, thus 
confirming its transcendental power” (1995, p. 16). In Five Miles, the Man and the 
Woman do not fall in love, although the Woman still puts her trust in the ultimate 
‘fall’ as a chance to take flight, to break away from a succession of hollow and 
unfulfilling partnerships.
It is clear then, that we wanted love and its intricacies to frame Five Miles. However, 
whilst being interested in the conventions of romance narratives that tend to explore 
love’s transformative power, we were also drawn to the dangerous characteristics of 
love. After all, love itself is an identification that might signify the loss of self into an 
Other. Love, according to Jean-Luc Nancy, is a cut, or cleft in the self. In other
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words, love, however affirmative it may be, always undoes the self, and might have 
the capacity to trouble such deep-rooted systems of understanding and configuring the 
world that are presented by the Man and the Woman in Five Miles. Love’s potential 
to ‘disrupt’ the self is articulated by Nancy:
Love presents the ‘I’ to itself as broken... To the T  it presents this: that it, this 
subject, has been touched, breached in its subjectivity, and from now on, it is, 
for the time of love, broken or cracked, however slightly. It is so, which 
means that the break or the wound is neither an accident nor a property that 
the subject could make its own. Since it is a break of its property as subject, it 
is, essentially, an interruption in the process of relating to oneself outside 
oneself... For as long as it lasts, love does not cease to come from without and 
to remain, not outside but this outside itself, each time singular, a blade 
plunged into me and that I cannot rejoin because it disjoins me.
(in (ed.) Royle 2000 p. 155-6)
Love is perhaps the strongest form of identification and identification’s ultimate risk. 
However, the framing of Five Miles as a filmic romance narrative, particularly in 
terms of our emphasis on the notion of replay and the interactions between the filmic 
and the theatrical, are important since they implicitly recognise the cultural dimension 
of love relations. After all, even though love can be imagined as “mysterious, 
inexplicable, irrational, uncontrollable, compelling and ecstatic” and appears to be 
“experienced as a dramatic, deeply felt inner transformation, as something that lifts 
us above the everyday world”, I would argue that romantic narratives themselves 
contribute to the cultural construction of love — which arguably style or fashion our 
emotions on the matter (Stevi Jackson in ed. Pearce and Stacey 1995, p. 58). As 
Michelle Rosaldo claims, “feelings are not substances to be discovered in our blood, 
but social practices organised by stories that we both enact and tell. They are 
structured by our forms of understanding” (1985 p. 243). In other words, the love we 
feel for others is learnt, cultured and ritualised through discourses such as the classic
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romance narrative and its derivatives, and these discourses arguably help us know 
what to do when we have loving feelings. However, as Jackson points out, as 
subjects, we play an active role in negotiating cultural discourses in order to locate 
our own ways of being in the world and in our interaction with others. Indeed, she 
locates a need to:
explore further the possibility that our subjectivities -  including our emotions 
-  are shaped by the social and cultural milieu we inhabit through processes 
that involve our active participation. We create for ourselves a sense of what 
our emotions are, of what being in love is, through positioning ourselves 
within discourses, constructing narratives of the self, drawing on whatever 
cultural resources are available to us.
(1995, p. 58)
In other words, as subjects of culture we play an active role in self construction, since 
we are both complicit with, as well as actively resist, the cultural objects (such as film 
romances) to which we are attached.
As Five Miles draws to a close, I sit behind the set and listen, or occasionally leave 
before the end of the show. I tiptoe out in the final (‘night-club’) video section; go 
back to the dressing room. I abandon the finale, leaving the machine to play itself 
out, leaving my recorded voice to speak out the show for me. The show loses its 
ending as I get ready for the next one or get changed to go home. Yet sometimes I 
stay to hear the story out, listen to the final words, and try to catch the audience s 
reaction. The music is always too loud so I can only ever hear a low murmur. I press 
my ear to the drapes as the audience walk out, imagining their words, picturing their 
expressions. We never get to see them, to look them in the eye, as we do not perform 
the rather strange and slightly embarrassing ritual of the curtain call. As we do not
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see this show as strictly a theatre piece, so we felt we could get away with not 
bowing. Mind you, this leaves us with no finality, nothing to mark the end. Instead 
we get caught in the cycle of the performance, its endless repetition, three times a 
night. The love story endlessly circulated, spun and re-spun. And here I am now, 
repeating (and rewriting) it all again as I contemplate the show in my own 
narritivisation.
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Although, of course, their presentation on small monitor screens might associate them more 
specifically with television.
Pastiche, unlike the satire and parody that show a critical attitude, pastiche does not display a specific 
attitude -  is usually affectionate/celebratory/nostalgic.
However, Derrida would argue that genre is always attached to the author’s name since it is 
impossible to write outside of genre.
Since my discussion here will revolve around specific theatre pieces, perhaps it is important to point 
out at this stage that the theatre is rarely discussed in explicitly generic terms. (This is paradoxical since 
it was probably Aristotle who invented the concept of generic kinds). This could be said about the 
depiction of plays themselves as well as associated critical and analytical material. Mainstream theatre 
particularly tends to be referred to by author or director rather than by genre; a Shakespeare or Beckett 
performance say, or a Peter Brook production. However, that does not mean to say that theatrical 
genres do not exist. Indeed, comedy of manners, farce, melodrama, theatre of the absurd, (German) 
expressionism etc. could be described as genres, although they tend to be referred to instead as 
‘historical movements’. Also Shakespeare clearly uses the generic structures of comedy and tragedy 
(or tragi-comedy), which I will discuss in more detail in just a moment. It is perhaps fair to say that is 
the more commercial art forms, such as film, television and popular (written) fiction, which are 
regularly defined in generic terms. It is interesting that the West End musical is probably the exception 
in the realm of theatre, although this is probably the most commercial form of theatre in Western 
societies.
5 It is important to point out that genres do not only refer to specific narrative kinds. Indeed, Lyotard 
finds a philosophical use for the word to describe the ‘norms’ by which human beings make sense of 
who or what they are. He uses the phrase “genres of discourse” (Lyotard 1988 p. 29) to describe 
meaning-making paradigms such as history, biology, psychology or philosophy. The filmic and the 
theatrical could, as meaning making paradigms, be duly added to this list. As Simon Malpas explains 
in reference to Lyotard’s argument:
Different genres of discourse have different criteria for judging the value o f particular ways of 
linking onto phrases, and each genre would forbid certain forms of linking. In science, for 
instance, it would not be legitimate to link the phrase ‘Isn’t that pretty! ’ to ‘Copper sulphate in 
a solid state consists of blue crystals’ as to do so would take one out of the discourse of 
science and into aesthetics.
(2003, p. 65)
A genre of discourse is, therefore, a way of giving authority to particular types of linkage and 
categorising phrases into a body of knowledge. These bodies of knowledge provide recognisable and 
established parameters for understanding. He contends that a genre of discourse “imposes its mode of 
linking onto ‘our’ phrase and onto ‘us’” (Malpas 2003, p. 65) and that this is so because:
No phrase is the first. This does not only mean that others precede it, but also that the modes 
of linking implied in the preceding phrases -  possible modes of linking therefore -  are ready 
to take the phrase into account and to inscribe it into the pursuit of certain stakes, to actualize 
themselves by means of it. In this sense, a phrase that comes along is put into play within a 
conflict between genres of discourse.
(2003, p. 65)
He declares that “[tjhis conflict is a differend, since the success (or the validation) proper to one genre 
is not proper to the others” (Lyotard 1988, p. 136). Put another way, whenever a particular link is 
made, all other possible linkages (that is, ones that are not legitimate within the particular genre one is 
employing) are suppressed. Several linkages are viable, but only one can be instituted at any one time. 
This triumph o f one phrase over all other potential phrases invokes the politics of the differend, since 
certain possibilities of speaking are excluded, certain voices are silenced and there is a failure to 
represent the importance of some events. In other words, genres of discourse permit only select forms 
o f phrasing. Furthermore, those linkages impose silences since genres always operate through a 
process of exclusion. In the show, L ’Ascensore, it could be argued that the consensus generated by the 
dominant generic discourses of both the filmic and the theatrical might be tested by the differend that 
emerges when the two are placed in opposition.
6 In Christian Metz’s landmark essay, “The Imaginary Signifier”, he maintains that the crucial 
identification that we make in film, what he terms ‘primary cinematic identification, is fundamentally
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tied up with Lacan’s formation o f the constitutive instance o f identity: that is, the mirror phase that I 
have already discussed. Christian Metz assumes that the spectator identifies, not with her own image, 
as in the mirror phase, but with the act o f looking itself. In other words, the spectator sees herself 
seeing herself (from the place of the other). The cinema spectator imagines thus:
I am all-perceiving. All perceiving as one says all-powerful [...] the instance, in other words, 
which constitutes the cinematic signifier (it is I who make the film). [T]he spectator identifies 
with himself with himself as a pure act of perception (as wakefulness, alertness): as the 
condition of possibility of the perceived and hence as a kind of transcendental subject, which 
comes before every there is.
(Metz 1982, p. 48)
According to Metz then, the primary identification in mainstream cinema is an identification with the 
camera itself. Indeed, the spectator takes on the ‘look’ of the director through specific shots, as if it 
was by her own look that the images unfold on the screen before her. This identification subsequently 
places the subject everywhere at once, and is thus a repetition of the formative moment in which the 
subject imagines itself as complete, autonomous and all-powerful. In other words, the ‘pull’ o f cinema 
is that it offers us the pleasure and security of imagined unity. This theory is a very narrow 
conceptualisation of identification, which is opened up by Elizabeth Cowie in her exploration of 
identifications that are not specifically connected to cinema’s ‘apparatus’. See Cowie, 1984, chapter 
two.
7 Of course realist cinema demands a transparency of form, so every effort is made to conceal and 
contain the camera.
8 The 1930s is the classic age of the gangster movie -  see Haywood 1996, p. 148.
9 The elevator appears to transport him to his destination, and this passage is indicated using the 
creaking sounds o f the lift’s mechanisms, and the display of floor numbers on an overhead panel that 
light up in succession.
10 The Femme Fatale is also clearly a figure from theatre, although tends now to be associated with 
film. Clytemnestra (from Greek Mythology) and Lady Macbeth (from Shakespeare’s Macbeth) are 
obvious Femme Fatale heroines.
11 Although reversed here, since his death happens at the beginning of the drama, Haywood maintains 
that the gangster’s “death at the end of the film is an ideological necessity” because as a member of the 
“proletarian class”, this was the only way he could achieve success was “by stealing it”. He must 
“ultimately fail because the American Dream cannot be fulfilled in this cynical way” (Haywood 1996, 
p. 146).
12 Indeed, cinema is characterised as form able to set in motion the unconscious fantasies of the 
spectator. This is because arguably, as Robert Stam and company point out, “the signifiers [of film]
(its mode of meaning production) are activated in the viewing. The film’s images and sounds are not 
meaningful without the (unconscious) work of the spectator, and it is in this sense that every film is a 
construction of its viewer” (Stam, Burgoyne and Flitterman-Lewis 1992, p. 139). So it follows, as 
Stam and company elucidate, “The cinema-spectator of psychoanalytic film theory is thus central to the 
“mechanism” of the entire cinematic operation” (1992, p. 142). They continue “The film-text — whose 
affinity with the dream is signalled by the fact that both are “stories told in images” that the subject 
recounts to itself — engages this viewer in a complex o f pleasure and meaning by mobilizing deep- 
rooted structures of fantasy, identification and vision, and it does this through interlocking systems of 
narrative, continuity and point of view. The result is that in every viewing of a film, spectators can be 
said to repeatedly ‘enunciate their own economy o f desire.’” (1992, p. 139). In other words, the 
practices of dreaming and watching film are understood to similarly activate the subject s subconscious 
desires.
13 However, there are possible ways that we do identify with the characters, and the actors behind the 
characters, at certain moments in the show. I will go on to explore these in due course.
14 Music videos, advertising, etc.
15 However, as Harris astutely points out:
There is no one theory, strategy or form that can ensure, provoke or even explicate how 
subversion may be achieved in any given situation in any given sphere. To imply that there is, 
is to reininstate a notion of author’s intentions and to ignore the significance o f the staging, 
deciding in advance on the terms and conditions of any future subversion or contestation.
(1999, p. 80, emphasis in original)
152
It is perhaps interesting that Richard Hawley now works in soap opera, a ‘realistic’ form that 
habitually uses the close up shot as a means to deliver the emotional truth of a particular character’s 
situation.
This is apparent again in a scene where Salvatore’s father, Lucio, shoots himself in the head. At this 
moment, what appears to be the character’s brains spurt out of the back of his head. This instance is so 
gratifying because the illusion is so convincing — yet, as is classic when watching theatre, I could not 
help wondering how on earth it was achieved. I found out later that an air pipe containing the ‘bra in s’ 
was attached to the actor’s back and up to his head. At the moment o f the shot, a button was pressed 
which released the air and the ‘brains’. If this scene was in a film, I am sure I would have been totally 
‘taken in’ by this moment and responded with horror rather than delight.
Of course, the piece has already been conceived and rehearsed, so in this sense it is ‘historical”, that 
is, already made.
19 Flashback literally refers to the past whereas narrative itself is established as in the ‘present’ but with 
a destiny -  the end has already been decided.
20 Insomniac clearly demonstrate a knowledge of ‘film theory’ in the show, which may effect spectator 
identification -  after all, not all audience members will be familiar with the way theorists have 
frequently read film through a psychoanalytical lens. However, arguably Freudian theories of child 
development are very ingrained in culture and events/stories such as the ‘primal scene’ can probably be 
assumed to be widely understood.
21 We find out later on that Lucio is Salvatore’s father when the scene is replayed from the other end of 
the telephone.
22 See Appendix 1 for a detailed description of roles and responsibilities.
231 sometimes think of these nightmare scenes as similar to advertisements since a condensed story is 
told through images in just a few seconds.
24 It is worth noting however that the audience are never addressed directly.
25 And indeed television and video.
261 will comment on these backdrops shortly.
27 It is perhaps interesting that in the context o f experimental performance that apparently breaks with 
certain theatrical conventions, I still want, as a performer, the traditional boundaries between performer 
and audience to remain in tact. I see that this is a contradiction, yet in the performance moment I am 
trying to stick to a rather regimented theatrical score, and require the audience’s attention and 
concentration in order to carry the performance out. I also want them to follow the narrative thread of 
the performance, which is again an adherence to a more traditional mode of theatre, and perhaps part of 
the generic ‘trap’. However, I have to accept that their placing in an unconventional audience space 
might open out their interpretation of their ‘role’ as spectators — they may not feel they have to stick to 
the traditional audience/performer contract. Or more simply, they may assume that we just can’t hear 
them chattering in the lift enclosure! It is perhaps interesting that that the maintenance of the symbolic 
world we have created is still so important for us as performers, and this is certainly related to the 
traditional fourth wall and generic contract. Take another example. Now and again, a member of the 
audience gets hot, dizzy or claustrophobic, and has to leave the performance. The usher presses the 
panic button and our technician closes the show down until she can restore order. The first time it 
happened was in Richard’s scene, the part that has to be the most precise, and the most ordered. Our 
technician suddenly stopped the video, and asked if  everyone would ‘bear with us for a moment. 
Richard was in the middle of his first long speech. My image on screen flicked off and turned to static, 
and Richard stood on stage. I couldn’t see him, but imagined him standing, head down, waiting. I 
stood by the technician’s box, horrified. The worst had happened. The boundary was broken. The 
space-time co-ordinates of the performance had been shattered, ripped apart. It’s surprising how 
unbreakable that boundary is. When the show is stopped, the rhythm punctured, when time is made to 
slow down. It is literally a matter out of place, a violation of the symbolic world. As a performer, it is 
utterly terrifying. This is the ultimate interruption of the ‘live’ in the theatre space -  this is indeed the 
really live — not the structured and rehearsed performance of Five Miles. In this instance the man in the 
lift was led out, and the usher asked Richard if he was ready to continue. He said he was. I stood 
behind the set, in nervous anticipation. The video was switched on again and my image reappeared. 
Richard promptly jumped forward a couple of lines (good judgement — VHS always reels on a little bit) 
and the video me came in right on cue. It was really something. It could not have been better had it 
been planned. It happened again just a couple of weeks later with a lift full of reviewers. This time it 
was during my long speech, and someone in the audience fainted. The light came on in the lift and I 
froze, stock-still, frightened to catch anyone’s eye, desperate to maintain some semblance of the
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performance contract, the ‘illusion’, the pretence. How foolish I felt, and how ridiculous. What a 
strange thing to do, make a bargain with the audience, pretend they are not there and look through 
them. I could do nothing but wait until those around me could establish some sort of order. I just 
wanted to remain in the performance; not letting the outside world let me loose my train of thought. In 
retrospect I feel I should have looked at the audience and said without embarrassment, “Don’t worry. 
We will get the show back on as soon as possible. Is everyone else feeling alright?” This would have 
allowed the interruption to become a part of the show’s order -  an integrated moment — the order one 
so desires as a performer in a show bound by a fourth wall generic structure. I should have handed out 
glasses of water and observed everyone in the lift, perhaps even acknowledging the people in the 
audience that I knew. “How are you? Ok? See you after the show.” But in that moment I could not. I 
was stupefied. All I could think was, “what is my next line? Where am I?” My mind had gone blank 
and I was starting to panic. I was convinced I could not go on. Until: Are you ready to continue? I 
nodded, automatically. Then w e’ll begin. Again. And in the machine, just like clockwork, I came
back in on cue.
28 Having said all this I suppose I have always considered my character as part of a relationship rather 
than being a character in her own right. This is partly because her ‘job’ is to set herself up in 
opposition to the partners she meets, in order that she might bring them to a better understanding of 
themselves. A feminist critique of my role in the show might be raised by Sally Potter’s experimental 
film Thriller (1989) in which the heroine returns to life and asks, “why is it that the romantic heroines 
must suffer, if not die, for the tragic heroes to achieve universal transcendence?” My character is 
indeed an angel of death, attempting to bring the man’s character to a sense of self understanding. We 
do attempt to address these stereotyped positions through our wearing away at the male/female cultural 
positions.
29 We wanted to use a stylised language for a number of reasons. One is that we required a space in 
which quite philosophical ideas about love and partnership might be explored. For example, the notion 
of the rational mind versus the unruly flesh in the context of the story of the Garden of Eden. We also 
feel that in such a short space of time the story needed a stylised frame in order that quite a lot of 
information could be revealed. Further, we like the poetry and beauty of the language as a way of 
exploring notions of love, which is difficult to express in ordinary speech.
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CONCLUSION
I  don ’tfe e l that I ’m in a position to choose between an operation that w e ’ll call negative 
a nihilist, an operation that would set about furiously dismantling systems, and the other 
operation. I  love very much everything that I  deconstruct in my own manner; the texts I  
want to read from  a deconstructive point o f  view are texts I  love, with that impulse o f  
identification which is indispensable fo r  reading.
(Derrida 1988, p. 152, emphasis in original)
Individuals as subjects identify (or do not identify) with the 'positions' to which 
they are summoned; [they also] fashion, stylise, produce and ‘perform ’ these 
positions, and [...] they never do so completely, for once and for all time, and 
some never do, or are in a constant, agonistic process o f struggling with, 
resisting, re-negotiating and accommodating the normative or regulative rules 
with which they confront and regulate themselves.
(Hall 1998, p. 4)
...the process o f becoming a subject is more fractured and potentially 
unsuccessful than Althusser’s schema seems on the surface to suggest, and that 
this fracturing and failure is a way of theorising differences between structures o f 
identification does not fully or adequately name the subject, or divides subjects by 
naming them in contradictory and conflicting ways. Given this, the subject as 
such is never the subject as such, because its points o f excess to the very name or 
signifier o f ‘the subject' locates it precisely as marked or named by colliding 
regimes o f address which attach (asymmetrical) value and meaning to specific 
subject positions.
(Ahmed 1998, p. 114, emphasis in original)
It is [ . . . ]  characteristic that not only a m an’s (sic) knowledge or wisdom, but above all 
his real life — and this is the stu ff that stories are made o f—first assumes transmissible 
form  at the moment o f  his death. Just as a sequence o f  images is set in motion inside a 
man as his life comes to an end — unfolding the views o f  himself under which he has 
encountered him self without being aware o f  it — suddenly in his expressions and looks the 
unforgettable emerges and imparts to everything that concerned him that authority which 
even the poorest wretch in dying possesses fo r  the living around him. This authority is at 
the very source o f  the story.
(Benjamin 1973, p. 94)
So here it is. The ending. This project has had so many beginnings and so many endings 
that I feel somewhat at a loss in my confrontation with the actual and final end of it all. I
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suppose it all began in 1998 when a group of us decided to establish a performance 
company. But was that the ‘real’ beginning? My practice-as-research actually began 
after we had made and toured both Einmal ist Keinmal and Ark. Armed with research 
questions that were written in response to our first two pieces, I embarked, with the other 
company members, on another piece. Guilty Pleasures began, was in some sense 
‘finished’, taken on tour and then finally laid to rest, after many months of intensity: the 
process and then performance after performance. Eventually I moved on to the task of 
finding ways to express it all in writing, piecing together my notes and anecdotes as well 
as reflecting on and judging what we had made. Then I began it all again with another 
show. Finally, here I am now, searching for the right words to sum it all up, to conclude, 
to bring it all together.
The writing of this thesis began with a struggle of expression: a grappling with what it 
means to write about itd’s work from a place within. Another complication, perhaps, is 
that this work is not my work, but the endeavour of a collective. We are a group of 
people that make work together and apparently share a common vision. Of course, the 
process of making theatre is nowhere near as romantic as the consummation of a shared 
vision or practice. It is always a struggle — a movement with and between ideas, an effort 
to agree without yielding to compromise, a negotiation of personalities, personal interests 
as well as a race against the clock. Both pieces were made in only four weeks each.
Such is the pressure of making work in a professional context.
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However, in some senses Guilty Pleasures and Five Miles were less difficult than our 
first two shows, since they both had very clear starting points and sites of reference. 
Guilty Pleasures was made in response to Eliot’s text. This response took place through 
play — playing with the words, improvising around them. Attempting different stagings. 
We also talked. A lot. In Five Miles, the original ideas and concepts for the show came 
about through a series of long conversations, where one idea led on from another, so it’s 
impossible to attribute particular ideas to individual group members. I worked with 
Andrew Quick on the script, read and commented on his drafts and came up with the 
concept for scene two (Flirting), although he extended it and altered the voiceover so it 
suited the style of the rest of the piece. I liked the stylised nature of the question-and- 
answer game, as it gave us a mechanism that allowed us to avoid the ‘soap opera’ of 
general chitchat. It also permitted our characters to ‘reveal themselves’, as answering a 
question (making a choice) is always ethical. I am also convinced that it was my idea to 
have my image projected onto the backdrop, with Richard interacting ‘live’. I was 
interested in the narrative possibilities of the Woman becoming trapped in the televisual 
world, out of the Man’s grasp. However, it was a pinch from Station House Opera’s 
Roadmetal Sweetbread (1998).
The ‘we’ and the ‘our’ that I have continually referred to in this thesis then, is the 
collaborative eye/I of itd. However, whilst I am going about attributing authorship, then 
it is obviously the case that the words and that fall outside quotation marks in these pages 
are mine. Nevertheless I have tried not to submit our performance work to a single 
academic voice. Of course I am compelled, within the rigor of a thesis to present a
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relatively linear argument, drawing ‘evidence’ from philosophical writings, history and 
cultural theory. In my search for this verification and in keeping with the tradition of 
thesis writing, I have abandoned one source for another, slashed sentences or whole 
paragraphs out of the writings of others in order to create quotable quotations: quotations 
that (at least in my opinion) get to the heart of my argument.
At the same time I have tried to explore what it means to return -  that is, to go back to a 
performance in writing. The act of remembering, or reminiscing, is always critical, 
affirmative and selective. It always involves the placing of edges around a story to give it 
shape and coherence. My story presents its own omissions, conflations and forgettings.
It also involves re-writing. In the ‘repeat’ there is always shifting or movement. 
Movement away from the truth -  if that is ever graspable -  and movement towards 
something other. A gift to the event of our performances maybe? In my writing, I have 
always attempted to do justice to our work, to be as honest and open as I can, to offer my 
love. Like any act of love, frustration, loss and anguish surround and penetrate it.
Making these shows, and submitting them to an exploration in this thesis, has had its 
difficult and painful moments.
Further, re-visiting these shows has inevitably provoked my own critical reflection, since 
now, with the benefit of hindsight, I have more distance. I can see ways in which these 
shows could have developed and moved on. As I mentioned in chapter one, I feel there 
was too much distance and not enough closeness or intimacy in our execution of Guilty 
Pleasures. My own personal closeness and attachment to this show, I feel, has much to
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do with the time I had to share with it. I leamt to love this show through performing it 
and contemplating its operations night after night. On a single viewing, some audiences 
found it difficult to ‘access’. It was a complex piece that required a really attentive and 
switched on audience. (However, the performance work I like most is that which 
demands a second or third viewing. When I saw Play-boy for the first time my response 
at the end was: I have to see that piece again.)
So to return from my digression, how can I place myself inside the work, speak from 
inside it, explore its very mechanisms from the very place that I occupy -  its inside? At 
the same time, how can I speak of my position outside the work since, as I have argued 
throughout this thesis, our work always negotiates the place of detachment? Further, as I 
have just mentioned, I have accrued or built up a distance from the work by performing it 
again and again, reading it again, imagining it all over again. Now, writing this, I am 
distanced in time. It has been almost two years since Five Miles stopped touring. Of 
course, the risk of distanciation is the attempt to fix objects in space and time, and accede 
to the violence of universalism. This is why I have tried to move from closeness and 
distance in negotiation with my own work, which also, as I have argued throughout this 
thesis, reflects its very practices. I have used different registers of expression, such as the 
academic Alice, the practitioner Alice, the performer Alice, as well as the Alice that is 
one fifth of itd. I have also moved between different temporalities in my writing. I have 
attempted to return, to get back inside those moments of the performance, to occupy 
them once more, to read the work as an insider. This, of course, is partly narrative 
technique -  a ‘true’ return is not really possible.
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Of course, identification in performance is a difficult subject to address since one’s own 
identifications, although regulated, also depend on the ways in which one is materially, 
historically and experientially constituted. This is where autobiographical criticism 
potentially undoes itself. To speak of my own placing through identification is how I 
speak of and for myself. How then, to speak of oneself without presuming to speak for 
others, for you, who is already absent? How can I speak of your identifications? Of 
course, I cannot. As I have already described, my relationship with my work is a long 
one that includes many extensive and involved discussions with other company members 
(in the theatre, in the pub, late-night phone-calls, long car journeys), rehearsals, writing, 
performing, touring and performing. My identifications have shifted, I have cared more 
about some things than others, I have fallen in love with moments in our shows and fallen 
out of love with others. In Five Miles and Falling a huge part of our preparation for the 
show was the taking hundreds of photographs of me in various places all over the 
country. This took several months, and was done for the gallery installation that 
accompanied the performance. Here the floor outside the performance space was 
covered with thousands of photographs that piled up on a desk and then flowed onto the 
floor. Each photograph depicts me as the Woman dressed in the purple sequinned dress 
that I wore throughout the show. On a tape player my voice called out different names 
and meeting places in a kind of litany. We imagined that audience members might hear 
their own name, to implicate them in the narratives that this scene provokes, encouraging 
them to contemplate how they might act (or have previously behaved) in such an 
encounter. The taking of these photographs took up many hours of our time, and was
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fascinating to me during the process since it marked a departure from our other work.
For the first time we had included an installation’ aspect to Five Miles. It gave the 
performance another element, and other narrative possibilities. I suppose whilst writing 
this I have concentrated on the performance elements of the show since they are what I 
finally felt closer to - 1 had a deeper attachment to them since they are what I really 
experienced night after night on tour. I felt a little separated from the installation, and it 
was almost lost to me. It seems a shame that all those hours of posing and snapping away 
have disappeared in my final rendering of the show. Here, as I have inevitably 
succumbed to narrative’s exclusionary practice, I have had to cut some things out. (At 
least I have managed to mention it here. What a relief).
Yet, whilst being my own story of identification in relation to narrative practices, I feel 
that my practice with itd has taken into account an operation or set of operations that have 
often been excluded from experimental performance. This, I feel, is our contribution to 
knowledge through practice-as-research. As I have shown in this thesis, after Brecht, 
identification in the theatre has predominantly been imagined as a conservative practice 
that always aligns us with the status quo. Indeed, identification in experimental 
performance is very rarely, if ever, addressed. Having said this it would be remiss to 
suggest that other experimental work does not invoke my identifications; indeed, as I 
have argued throughout this thesis, the absolute suppression of identifications is probably 
not really possible. However, it is important to note that itd s work and the other work 
analysed in this thesis stage the movement between identification and distance as a 
deliberate or conscious practice (although of course, consciousness perhaps does not take
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into account the un-conscious aspects of identification). In other words, the way in which 
we feel love or attachment to the objects of culture that we choose to make performance 
from is something we embrace and try to accentuate, whilst also taking into account the 
place of distance and contemplation. This is in recognition of the shifting sense of 
ourselves as subjects and objects, as being acted upon in the world and acting upon it, of 
living with and without certainty, of belonging and also being estranged or having to ask 
questions of our investments. I would also like to take into account the way in which 
identificatory practices are undervalued and undermined by critical discourse, which 
creates a problem for practitioners. After all, as Sedgwick maintains in relation to what 
she describes as the ‘reparative motive’:
The vocabulary for articulating any reader’s reparative motive toward a text or a 
culture has long been so sappy, aesthetisizing, defensive, anti-intellectual, or 
reactionary that it’s no wonder that few critics are willing to describe their 
acquaintance with such motives.
(2003, p. 150)
In this sense it is not just the practice that matters, but the practice of reading -  it marks a 
refusal to see certain elements in performance as legitimate or worthwhile. One 
particular example is Elin Diamond’s chapter entitled “Identification and Mimesis: The 
theatre of Adrienne Kennedy” (1997). According to Diamond, Kennedy actually stages 
the ways in which her historical identifications are felt and embodied. In Diamond s 
terms, this demonstrates the “historisizing power of identification” (1997, p. 109). Let 
me elaborate. Through a reading of Freud, Diamond explores the ways in which 
historical identifications bear consequences for the subject. As Freud describes in The
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Ego and the Id’ (1923), the human ego is made up of ‘lost’ or forgotten object 
identifications:
It may be that identification is the sole condition under which the id can give up 
its objects. At any rate, the process, especially in the early phases of development 
is a very frequent one, and it makes it possible to suppose that the character of the 
ego is a precipitate of abandoned object cathexes and that it contains the history of 
those object choices.
(inDiamond, 1997p. I l l )
In this case, the ego is not a fixed place of origin but a site of discarded objects that have 
been introjected and assimilated by the subject. In other words, the subject’s identity 
represents the amassed history of her/his identifications.
This theory certainly relates to the argument I have been making all along in this thesis: 
that through identificatory practices, we are made (or make) or are unmade (or we 
unmake) ourselves and our worlds. However, according to Diamond, in interaction with 
Kennedy’s theatre, identifications between performer and spectator never actually take 
place. Instead, they are shown by Kennedy to, “have material effects — in the imaginary 
coherences that smooth over the racism of everyday modes of thought, and in the 
‘abraded’ bodies we choose not to see” (1997, p. 115). As maintained by Diamond, 
identifications need to be recognised and narrated from a temporal distance, in order to 
“permit access to subjective, cultural, finally political meanings” (1997, p. 109).
Whilst I am interested in Diamond’s investigation of the processes of subjective 
identifications, she appears to assume that reflective distance can be absolute in a
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performative situation. This supposition falls in line with a Brechtian notion of (good) 
practice. She also appears to characterise identification as always and necessarily violent. 
Indeed, Diamond proposes that through Kennedy’s performance practice we can see 
identifications for what they really are, that is, fantasies of annihilation and destruction. I 
cannot comment here on Kennedy’s work specifically, since I have not seen it. Nor do I 
wish to undermine the value and significance of addressing the violence, inequality and 
injustices that are normalised and naturalised in our world. However, Diamond’s 
paradigm for a subversive practice that imagines identifications as always and inevitably 
monsterous is, as Sedgwick would describe, a distinctly paranoid position. To respond in 
Sedgwick’s terms, “to recognize (sic) in paranoia a distinctively rigid relation to 
temporality, at once anticipatory and retroactive averse above all to surprise, is also to 
glimpse the lineaments of other possibilities” (2003, p. 146). Sedgwick elucidates these 
“other possibilities” in relation to the reparative motive that I mentioned above:
No less acute than the paranoid position, no less realistic, no less attached to a 
project of survival, and neither less nor more delusional or fantasmatic, the 
reparative reading position undertakes a different range of affects, ambitions and 
risks. What we can best learn from such practices are, perhaps, the many ways 
selves and communities succeed in extracting sustenance from the objects of 
culture -  even of a culture whose avowed desire has often been not to sustain 
them.
(2003, p. 150)
In this thesis, I have shown that itd, like Desperate Optimists and Insomniac, make work 
from a ‘reparative’ position, since we are enriched by an affectionate engagement with 
cultural objects. However, I would be interested in developing our performance work by 
exploring other ways in which we have contact or connect with the stuff of culture.
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These might be other emotional states that are not loving, such as pain, hate, fear, disgust 
or even shame. These, after all, are different sorts of investments, but no less compelling. 
Nevertheless in these pages what I have attempted to do is describe how we are moved in 
a loving way by cultural objects. We move, and that movement denotes the negotiation 
of proximity and distance. This movement, this constant negotiation of identifications 
means that we never stop in place, but are in the place of becoming, of coming into place. 
Our work, and the work of Desperate Optimists and Insomniac, follows the trajectory of 
our uncertain and messy embodiment. After all, this is the stuff that stories are made of.
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Appendix 1: Roles and Responsibilities
Guilty Pleasures (2000) and Five Miles and Falling (2002) were both created in 
collaboration with the other members of the performance collective Imitating the Dog 
(itd). These are: Seth Honnor, Richard Malcolm, Andrew Quick and Simon 
Wainwright. itd are a group of artists with direction mainly taken on by Andrew 
Quick, although all the members take responsibility for the conceptual development, 
devising and technical design of these works. However, within this collaborative 
framework, there are certain aspects of the production in which I have taken a lead 
role. These are, in Guilty Pleasures, the cutting and arrangement of the T.S Eliot text 
in Guilty Pleasures, and the design and sourcing of costumes and props. In Five 
Miles and Falling, I collaborated with Seth Honnor and Richard Malcolm on the 
conceptualisation, storyboarding and direction of recorded material for projection and 
the television screen. I also wrote sections of the script. In Five Miles and Falling, 
the actual camerawork was carried out by filmmakers Mate Toth and Mark 
Wordsworth.
Other important credits are as follows: the text of Five Miles and Falling was written 
in the main by Andrew Quick. The soundtrack for both productions was principally 
sourced and designed by Simon Wainwright; the directing of performers in both 
shows was principally carried out by Andrew Quick. Guilty Pleasures was performed 
by Andrea Carpenter, Seth Honnor, Richard Malcolm, Simon Wainwright and myself. 
Five Miles and Falling was performed by Richard Malcolm and myself.
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Appendix 2: Performance Texts
Guilty Pleasures -  MAP OF ACTION 
The Stage:
There are three rooms (The Eliot Room, The Control Box and The Bathroom) that are divided with 
silver trussing (i.e. no solid walls) which is eight foot high.
Each room is marked out on the floor with green tape.
Behind the set is a blue-cloth backdrop.
The Eliot Room:
This room is contains just 3 mics on stands and one white chair.
The Control Box:
This room contains all the technology for the show bar the lighting -  the board, as well as two 
television monitors that are housed on top of a flight case and positioned laterally across the front of 
the room. They play a road movie or live-relay scenes from the two video cameras that a pointed 
towards each room either side of the box.
The Bathroom:
Thi s room contains a sink SL and a toilet SR, as well as a white chair SR at the back of the room. 
There are Vodka bottles and drinking glasses in all rooms.
Cast of Eliot Character’s:
Alice -  Agatha 
Rich -  Charles
Si -  Violet, Downing and Policeman 
Andrea -  Amy 
Seth -  Harry 
Abbreviations:
E/R -  Eliot Room 
T/B -  Technical Box 
B/R -  Bathroom
O/S -  OffStage (back of the set or at the edges -  still ‘on view’)
ECU -  Extreme Close Up 
T V R -T V  on the Right 





Agatha, Amy and Charles enter.
Actors ‘drop out’ of the action 
and drink vodka when they are 
not speaking.
They occasionally acknowledge 
the TV’s and the T/B and B/R.
They wisper to each other as 
‘themselves’ and command the 
action.
The actors appear to listen to the 
music and tap their feet in time 
to the beat. They wisper to each 
other and pour drinks.
Scene lb
Seth enters. He sets up the 
camera and his mic before his 
speech begins. The other actors 
acknowledge his presence but 
do not acknowledge him as 
'‘H arry’ until Simon ‘plays’ his 
footsteps.
‘Eye’speech by Harry
All actors leave except Charles. 
He swaps places with Simon, 
and Simon plays Downing
Andrea enters and DANCES 
Andrea jumps back and Simon 
DANCES.
Simon jumps back and Andrea 
DANCES.
Andrea jumps back and Simon 
DANCES.
Technical Box (T/B)_________
Simon enters. Swiches on TV’s. 
The Road Movie. Music from 
Radio Play.
Andrea’s mouth in ECU on 
TVR. Road on TVL.
Simon plays Violet (a female 
character)
Simon films Seth on the floor 
and zooms into a digital close 
up into his mouth.
Characters not filled by actors 
are ‘played’ on the radio.
Sound effects of doors opening 
and closing, clocks ticking etc. 
Some non-literal sound effects, 
like the sound of the storm.
Scene ends and CHORUS 1 is 
played on the radio with a 
contemporary dance track 
played underneath. TVL back to 
road.
TVR goes back to the road 
movie.
TVR ECU on Harry’s eye. Then 
back to road.
Rich, ‘playing’ Charles operates 
the technology.
Rich ends the scene and plays 
loud dance music.




Drinks vodka, acts drunk and 
attempts to get dressed. Prepares 
to enter the E/R.
Seth lies on the floor.
• the others stand in before of 
the blue cloth, drink and 
watch the action.
Alice enters the B/R and sits on 
the chair drinking vodka.
Seth enters and DANCES 
Seth jumps back and Alice 
DANCES.
Alice jumps back and Seth 
DANCES. ________
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Simon sings: BLUE MOON
Scene 2a
Mary and Agatha enter.
Scene 2b
Agatha exits and Harry enters.
Performers ‘control’ the music. 
(Made louder etc.)
Harry and Mary exit.
Scene 3
Agatha and Harry enter, (then 
Andrea)
Harry leaves at end.
Agatha wispers curse
Alice sings: CAN’T TAKE MY 
EYES OFF YOU.
Scene 4
Downing scene. Accident with 
John.
Richard exits the T/B.
Seth operates the camera.
Digital close up on Richard’s 
wet pants.
Seth operates the technology. 
ECU on Alice’s eyes.
Alice operates the technology. 
ECU on Seth’s hands.
“The Past” -  Alice plays 
romantic music.
Alice plays loud music.
Alice leaves the tec. Box.
Si enters the tec box and films a 
digital close up into Rich’s 
mouth.
Si ‘playing’ Violet.
Si goes into B/R. Rich operates 
technology.
Alice operates tec. 
Si operates tec.
CHORUS 2
Alice sits on the toilet and 
Richard DANCES. Rich signals 
for Simon to stop. Rich wispers 
to Alice.
Rich and Alice kiss into the 
camera, kiss belly button and 
nipple. Alice pushes Rich over 
and pours vodka on his crotch.
Rich and Simon talk and 
prepare.
Si ties Rich up with the mic 
cord, puts a plastic bag over his 
head etc.
Rich puts on his shirt for the 
next scene.
Si plays drunk -  falls down and 
gets up repeatedly.
Pissing Scene -  seth enacts 
pissing on Simons face using a 
water bottle.
ALL ACTORS GO TO THE FRONT OF THE STAGE AND DANCE -  all drop out except Seth
Alice puts chair in the middle of 
the room and sits, talks into mic.
Scene 5 
Harry enters.
Si wispers into the mic.
Shouts: SHUT THE FUCK UP! 
Alice’s eye in ECU.
Rich, drunk, bellows into the 
toilet.
Andrea enters and slouches at 
the sink, crying.
Si and Rich chunk
Si and Rich blindfold each other
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Rich bursts into the room.
and spin.
Si wispers “I only looked 
through the little door...” with 
Als.
Lots of laughter, Si pushes Rich 
and falls over.
Alice leaves.
Richard sings: SWEET 
CAROLINE.
Seth comes in with Andrea. 
Slapping and drowning scene.
Scene 6a
(starts with Rich lying on the 
floor)
Amy in chair.
Agatha front stage right. (Big 
argument).
Andrea’s mouth in ECU 
Si operates the tec.
Si plays dance music.
Seth and Rich drink vodka
DANCE IN THE THREE ROOMS. EVERYONE STAYS WHERE THEY ARE. EXTRA SLOW.
Scene 6b
Amy and Harry. Rich and Seth continue to 
dance. They leave.
Seth sings: THE GOOD LIFE
Rich operates the tec. Si comes in and pulls down his 
trousers, and lies on the floor in 
front of the toilet.
Alice enters, drunk. Throws 
vodka around, drinks, pours 
vodka on Simon’s arse and gets
Andrea films the B/R Andrea to film.
Scene 6c
Seth operates the tec. Simon dresses and goes to the
Si plays Downing.
Amy says her last lines from 
here “Agatha, Mary come! The 
clock has stopped in the dark.”
Sound o f a car driving away.
Seth plays the CHORUS 3
SUNRISE.
E/R
Alice remains in the B/R and 
Seth brings her a mic so she can 
play Agatha from here
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Five Miles and Falling
Below are the texts written for this piece by Andrew Quick (and myself).
Scene 1: Rendezvous
Voice-over as Alice walks towards the raised platform. The voice-over continues 
while the two figures eat a meal at a restaurant table. A glass is knocked over. They 
sit in silence until the final lines are spoken live on stage.
(Alice): What do look for when you first meet someone? A smile of recognition -  a 
meeting of souls? That they look you directly in the eye, an unflinching contact in 
which nothing is left to chance? Do they stand up to greet you or do they feign 
indifference, even though you are always expected? Will I have to speak first, soft 
words to break the ice? A contradiction don’t you think? Or will it be all nerves, the 
body barely in control, jerking and shuddering, arms all over the place. A move to 
shake the hand or a clumsy kiss placed on my cheek, a tiny moist patch a promise of 
something to come. A knocked over wineglass, liquid disappearing into a thick white 
tablecloth. Confused apologies in which verbs, prepositions, indefinite articles hover 
un- connected, swirling in the mouth leaving sentences broken and unfinished. Then 
silence. That terrifying cold silence, thinking what do I say, what story to tell? Until, 
‘It’s alright, don’t worry, it’s only wine. Salt, yes, salt that’s the answer, call the 
waiter, ask for the salt.’
Will he speak first, make small talk: the journey here -  snow, ice, rain, heat, traffic 
congestion, pedestrians, condensation -  wiping away at a windscreen dripping with 
water, peering into the mist, everything blurred?
Or will there be sweeping gestures, large talk -  of economics, politics, the latest war, 
foreign policies? Why bombs fall on a particular people. Who’s safe and who’s at 
risk. Who will be captured and who will be released? What will be the punishment? 
Will there be a reprieve? Numbers, calculations, statistics, financial advice. 
Conversation, assured and uncluttered — efficient, balanced, and full of restraint.
What do you look for when you first meet someone? A sign of recognition, something 
different but the same. Promise? Promise: a little word overburdened with 
expectation. The promise of something more.. .exciting, something more 
.. .exhilarating, something .. .utterly new.
Alice: I’m not sure this is...
Richard: It can. It will, I promise...
Alice: Ok. Let’s meet again.
The lift doors close
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Scene 2: Flirting
Voice over o f Alice. Alice and Richard are at a bar.
(Alice): Meeting a second time is always a challenge. It’s easy to leave after the first 
occasion, promise to get back in touch and then break off all contact, never speak 
again. Put the answer machine on and hope he stops calling. Then move on. A new 
beginning. Pause. I mean, what am I looking for? What am I doing now? Making this 
small talk. Trying to move it on, on to something... significant. But here I am again, 
attempting to look him in the eye, glimpse behind the mask, ‘Is anybody there?’ And 
what do I think I’ll find? Solace?
Richard: You’re lost in thought.
Alice: Am I?
Richard: I feel like I’m losing you. This is difficult.. .meeting like this.. .It’s so 
artificial.. .thinking of something to say. I’m not sure I’m good at conversation, 
making small...
Alice: It’s okay.. .lets just be normal shall we.. .just relax.
There is a short silence, they do not relax.
Alice: Hey, let’s ask each other questions, in turn.
Richard: Okay.
Alice: But there are rules.
Richard: Rules?
Alice: Yes. We get ten questions each, but they have be about preference, not 
incident, you know, choice, not fact.
Richard: Example?
Alice: Well, I can ask you your favourite colour, but not what car you drive, or where 
you live.




Richard: I can’t think.
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Alice: Me then. Your first love, did they chose you or did you chose them? 
Richard: They chose me.
Alice: Did you end it?
Richard: No, but surely the questions can’t all be related.
Alice: You’re right. You ask.
Richard: What’s your mother’s maiden name?
Alice: That’s incidental.
Richard: If your mother and your lover were drowning, who would you save? 
Alice: I don’t have a lover.
Richard: That’s what I wanted to know, only the question was incidental. 
Alice: You’re cheating!
Richard: You didn’t answer my question though.
Alice: I can’t answer it. I told you.
Richard: Well, past lovers, when you loved them, who would you choose? 




Alice: She came first. Anyway, lovers come and go.
Richard: Do they?
Alice: Not always.
Richard: Do you remember your dreams?
Alice: Never 
Richard: Do you smoke?
Alice: Incidental
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Richard: No I mean, do you smoke -  do you want one?
Both laugh. They light up.
Alice: Looking at the cigarette. What would you choose, health or pleasure, or do I 
really mean virtue or vice?
Richard: Is this still the game?
Alice: It’s always a bit of a game isn’t it?
Richard: Even when things get serious?
Alice: Yes. I think so. Even when things are serious. Let’s stick to the rules. This is 
breaking into conversation. We can’t have that. Too successful too soon. You’re 
giving yourself away. Health or pleasure?
Richard: Health, but I don’t feel virtuous.
Alice: Maybe you’re just kidding yourself.
Richard: ‘Vice’, not an attractive word, not like pleasure.
Alice: No, but you know where you are with vice, whereas pleasure... well where do 
you begin?
Richard: Well I could think of somewhere...
Alice: What would you choose, security or hope?
Richard: Surely, the ten questions are up?
Alice: What would you choose, security or hope?
Richard: Security. It might buy me hope.
Alice: Can hope really be bought?
Richard: I think so. Yes. Suffering, poverty, illness. To solve these would bring hope 
to many people.
Alice: I read somewhere that only humans can feel hope, it’s not experienced 
by animals. What you’re saying is that humanity can be purchased, bought 
off.
Richard: You’re taking my logic too far. It’s obvious, though, isn’t it, that having a
bit of money solves people’s problems? Do you have a problem with
money?
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Alice: Not personally. I’m not looking for a loan.
Richard: I don’t mean that. I mean in principle, with the ‘filthy lucre’.
Alice: It is filthy isn’t it, how it grinds everything into submission?
Richard: Well, that’s a shame.
Alice: Why?
Richard: I’m sure we’ve broken the rules.
Alice: It’s only a game.




Alice: Let’s say goodbye to the rules. Let’s say I work in gristle and bone, in flesh and 
blood, in sinew and muscle. Just to make things exciting, let’s say I’m a butcher. She 
kisses him lightly on the mouth. H e’s slightly taken aback. The butcher and the 
banker, it’s almost too neat isn’t it, but it will make a great story.
Richard: Is this part of the game?
Alice: As I said, it’s always a bit of a game. Pause. It’s a beautiful day outside.
Almost balmy.
Richard: That doesn’t appear to be a question.
Alice: No. It’s the warmest it’s been in ages.
Richard: You’re right. I’ve got a question. The last one.
Alice: Oh?
Richard: Can we do this again?
Alice: Yes.
Scene 3: Argument
Voice-over as Alice sits at a cafe table looking at a view o f the sea. It is daytime. 
Richard enters the space at the end o f the voice-over.
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(Alice): How do you mark the first argument? I mean it doesn’t have an anniversary, 
does it? Do minor disagreements, small quibbles, little irritations count? Or is it 
violence? Not fists, I mean harsh words, phrases that bite and scar, that leave you 
reeling, with nowhere to go. Is it rowing that tips the balance away from 
companionship and moves everything relentlessly towards love?
It’s alarming how quickly conversation can slide into conflict. Sitting by the sea. 
Looking out. Listening and reacting. Argument has a rhythm, a tempo -  like the 
waves -  force meeting force, motion against inertia. Beat. Beat. Beat. He’ll be back 
soon. ‘Got to go to the bathroom’, he said. Time out. Round one. The bell is ringing.
Richard returns and sits at the table.
Richard: I’m sorry.
Alice: Sorry? Sorry about what?
Richard: I’m sorry.
Alice: There’s nothing...
Richard: When I’m on a roll I go too far...
Alice: Too herself. When you’re on a roll...
Richard: ... go too far
Alice: ...Look
Richard: .. .and push at things...
Alice: Look...
Richard: .. .to lay everything out...
Alice: .. .on the table.
Richard: Yes. No, no not literally.. .not on the...
Alice: I was joking.
Richard: ... so that you might know me, who I am, that...
Alice: ...look, I was joking.
Richard: ... that you might see beyond this. Points at himself.
Alice: I was...




Alice: You’re more than that suit.
Richard: Meaning?
Alice: Meaning, I look beyond the surface.
Richard: It’s starting again isn’t it?
Alice: No. No. Let’s straighten this out...




Richard: No, let me...
Alice: Train, yes a mad train...
Richard: Listen!
Alice: Out of control...
Richard: Listen!
Alice: .. .careering towards a disastrous conclusion.
Richard: Listen! Richard slams his hand on the table.
Silence.
Alice: I’ve heard. I have been listening. I’ve taken it in. Your talk of circulation. Your 
laws of motion. How money moves everything, or is it everything moves with 
money? I got confused, no, no.. .let me speak. Just so I know I’ve got it right. She 
recounts a previous conversation. There is no law but money. Money is the law, you 
say. But this does not mean chaos, anarchy produced through the pursuit of endless 
greed. No, quite the contrary, this means order, and sanity. Correct me if I’m wrong. 
Richard attempts to interrupt. No, I’ll continue. I think this is right. The circulation of 
money encourages value, moral value, because when everything has its price, and 
everything can be priced -  like beauty, like pain, like love - then through a process of 
differentiation, the true worth of what we really want can be calculated. That which is 
good will then be marked down as expensive, a gold standard of value- highly prized.
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That which is bad will be placed at such a low level that nobody will be interested in 
it. ‘Morality - only for the rich’, I countered. ‘The poor are damned’. ‘No’, you said, 
money circulates, it filters, it falls, touching everyone and everything. Everybody 
takes their share in proportion to what they produced. Those who make less receive 
less. Demands are not met through need or greed but on what the market will offer. 
This system is just. Just. Just. Just. The judge being the market place and the law that 
rules it: the law of supply and demand. People, you say, are always ambitious, 
wanting the best, seeking comfort, both materially and spiritually. They will rise to 
the good and money paves the way, forges a way forward, cuts a path through the 
cant, the blather of history and culture that holds us all back. Aspiration you call it, 
and money gives aspiration its fuel, its very energy. Once everybody grasps this then 
the world might really change, although concepts such as nation and community will 
have to be abandoned. Hospitals will be built, malaria extinguished, AIDS cured, 
encyclopaedia’s read, child mortality rates lowered, racial hatred eradicated, wars 
ended - all through the operation, the eddy and flow of money changing hands across 
the globe.
Silence.
Richard: You’ve quite a memory.
Scene 4: Passion
A hotel bedroom, early morning, soft light just coming in through a net curtained 
window. The room is sparsely furnished- bed, bedside table, a landscape painting by 
an unknown artist. Alice is sitting on a chair and Richard is standing by the window 
as i f  looking out. Voice-over.
(Alice): Somehow it always comes to this. There’s a moment, isn’t there, when you 
let go of everything, take a risk, abandon yourself to— that other person, so utterly 
different. This is when the talking has to stop. You think, no more chitter chatter, no 
more hedging your bets, no more procrastination. Softly sings. ‘It’s now or never’. 
And then, after the battle -  if there’s been a bloody battle -  what have you learned? 
What can you actually remember? What do you take back with you? Maybe, no 
matter how beautiful the song, you don’t look back, you just move on and out. To 
look back, to want too, too much, why that would turn you to stone.
Richard: I’m sorry.
Alice: Stop saying that word.
Richard: I mean it.
Alice: I know. I don’t doubt it.
Richard: It’s just...
Alice: Do we have to talk about it, I mean it’s such a bloody cliche...
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Richard: I think that.
Alice: Men do, though, don’t they? Pause. Have to talk about it -  as if it’s just up to 
them. This messy, stupid, ridiculous thing that we seem to have to do to each other. 
And if it goes wrong, doesn’t quite come off, if you excuse the pun, it’s somehow all 
down them to sort out and explain.
Richard: I don’t seem to be able to get things together at the moment. Lost in...
Alice: Why don’t you turn around and look at me? Then we might be able to talk to 
each other. And then we might...
Richard: It’s not that simple is it? Do this and then that happens. Consequences. 
Painting by numbers.
Alice: I thought you were into numbers.
Richard: Haven’t we exhausted this?
Alice: You’re the one that speaks so eloquently, once you get going, past the stop- 
start, the stammer, of casual conversation....
Richard: Well, words fail me now. Laughs to himself. Everything failing.
Alice: We could always try again?
Richard: No, I’m not sure I’m up to it.
Alice: Laughs.
Richard: It is ridiculous, you’re right. This thing that we’re supposed to do. We can 
put a name to it you know. Face it unabashed, without shame. Sex. Fucking. Or 
rather, not fucking.
Alice: Softly. There’s no shame. I can say those words too. Fucking, or rather, not 
fucking.
Richard: Pause. When I first heard your voice, it sounds stupid to say this, but it.. .it 
electrified me - 1 played the message again and again. Moving the words back and 
forth. As if they might let me know what you looked like, what you would be 
wearing, your occupation, your age, your scent.
Alice: So, have I disappointed you?
Richard: No, no, that’s not what I’m trying to say. When, you first appeared in the 
doorway, I couldn’t quite make you out, the light behind you blinded me. I held a 
dirty serviette to my face to shield my eyes, it spotted my shirt with olive oil -  
something you pointed out a little later. Even in the shadows you were intriguing and 
half of me wanted you to stay in the dark. Forever unknown, only imagined. Then 
walking forward, you almost appeared to fall into the light.
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Alice: You make me sound like an angel.
Richard: Don’t worry, no choral music accompanied your grand entrance. I can’t 
remember what was playing in the restaurant. Something smulchy .. .unmemorable. 
And when you sat down at the table, the light somehow seemed to stay with you.
Alice: It was the dress.
Richard: That dress. Well it certainly catches the eye.
Alice: And takes away the tongue. Long pause. And now the cat’s got it?
Richard: What?
Alice: Your tongue, the cats got it.
Richard: And I couldn’t think of anything to say, not even blather. Pause. At the 
table, when you sat down. And usually I ’m good at blather, letting the words run free, 
adding a bit of humour here and pathos there, you know, to keep somebody interested. 
In me. To get their attention. On me. Good at spinning a bit of a tale, making life an 
adventure. It’s seduction, I know, seduction bordering on down right bloody lying. 
You start with a half-truth, an embellishment and before you know it you’re in charge 
of the company, driving a mere., flying planes, snow boarding in Canada, taking a 
cocktail of drugs that would finish off an elephant, clubbing all night, making two 
million pounds in a fortnight on options, driving off on a whim to Land’s End and 
swimming bollock freezing naked in the Atlantic Ocean at midnight, fucking flat out 
through the whole weekend drinking and living off nothing but vodka and Doritos.
All that energy expended, all that imagination used up, wrung dry, for this. This. This 
moment when the talking has to stop. No more flannel. No more hard sell. No 
hesitation. When the blathering ends and the body takes over. Pause. And now I can’t 
stop talking. I ’m awash with fucking words.
Alice: Then stop. Stop talking and come over here.
Richard: I can’t.
Alice: There’s no shame in ...
Richard: Shame in the fact that I’ve been here before. Many times. So many times.
All great successes, at least as far as I was concerned.
Alice: Satisfied customers.
Richard: Yes. I think so. Yes. Satisfied. As much as you can be, as much as you can 
be...
Alice: In an evening...
Richard: Passing time together,
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Alice: ... of pleasure.
Richard: Passing time without ...
Alice: Restraint? Guilt? Without history, the baggage of years of being together.
Richard: Maybe we’ve said too much. Maybe we know too much about each other. 
Too many words, opinions exchanged.
Alice: I don’t think it’s that.
Richard: I wanted you to be a stranger, you know.
Alice: That’s obvious.
Richard: That’s why I wanted you to remain in the dark, so I could always...
Alice: Dress and undress me.
Richard: No, too... raw, too.. .uncomplicated.
Alice: To push me, like my words on your answer machine, back and forth in your 
imagination.
Richard: Too judgmental. A stranger, so that we couldn’t have any hold on each 
other.
Alice: A stranger to make your life comfortable, keeping it simple, with you always 
in control.
Richard: A stranger to leave us our freedom, to keep us wanting and coming back for 
more.
Alice: And this talking...
Richard: .. .this talking taking over, consuming everything, all my energies. Endless 
driving accompanied by debate, arguments in cafe’s, in shopping malls, walking 
along the beach. Everything I .. .believed in, unpicked and ...
Alice: I wasn’t always being serious.
Richard: I know. So hard to tell with you. Your stories. ‘You’re the banker’, you’d 
say. ‘What’ll that make me... Butcher, baker, candlestick maker?’ And before I can 
answer you reply, ‘butcher, yes, today, I’ll be the butcher.’ And then you’re off with 
your ‘Economy of flesh’ or whatever you bloody well call it.Bit of a laugh now isn’t 
it, thinking of the flesh after this fiasco. Or maybe not. Maybe you’ve been here 
before, as many times as me. I mean your words sound pretty rehearsed, like you’ve 
often repeated them. So I’d put my money on a few hearing it before me, flinching at 
the way you describe the world. How does it go, so bloody weird I should be able to
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remember it. Alice moves to interrupt. No, no I’ll get it, yes. Let’s see if I can get this 
right. OK. Something like: Recounts her speech. The butcher touches things as they 
really are, unhidden, unabashed, unashamed. The carcass naked, unburdened by 
morality or conscience. The butcher cuts and scapes, renders and skins. How did you 
describe it? ‘A modem day anatomist’, hidden right in the heart of us without the 
mask of qualification that distinguishes doctors and surgeons from the rest. There is a 
beauty to this meat, this blood, a beauty that we’re all drawn to and yet vehemently 
deny. We all live in world that has become so disconnected, where we’re removed 
from anything visceral. Everything is neat, cleansed, boxed, cling-wrapped, take­
away. We’ve banished the slaughterhouses and the cemeteries to the edge of our 
cities. The dead and the dying are no longer with us, they’ve been removed from 
view.
Alice: I spoke of hope; you seemed to have forgotten hope.
Richard: Have I?
Alice: Don’t you remember, I tried to tell you a story about falling, about a fall from 
grace. How your version of the Garden of Eden was a complete lie. How, in reality ...
Richard: .. .the garden is ugly, horrible, terrifying. Cold and terrible winds blow, 
snow and ice arrive with a frightening frequency. Everything the man and woman 
build rots away and falls to pieces. They find solace and comfort in the warmth of 
their bodies. They bury themselves in the smell of hair, in the scent of sweat, 
excrement and sex. They walk on all fours, noses glued to the forest floor. Being so 
connected with the bare earth, they become obsessed with their hands and feet. Soon 
they are fascinated by their thumbs and big toes. These gnarled, broken and blistered 
parts of the body are picked over and sucked, groomed, and revered. They become the 
sites of intense pleasure, worship even. Then a snake enters the garden and holds an 
apple above the man and womans’ heads. Every time they reach up to grab at the 
fruit, the snake would pull it a little further out of reach. After many months, maybe 
even years, the man and woman finally find themselves able to stand upright and they 
reach for the apple and snatch it from the serpent’s mouth. Eating the apple, they spit 
out the pips and as they look down, the ground now seems very far away. Overcome 
with guilt they kill the snake and blame it for having lured them from the safety of the 
forest floor. And, try as they might, they find that they are unable to return to their life 
close to the ground. The soil disgusts them, they flinch at the sight of their bare flesh 
and cover their bodies with animal skins. Soon houses are built and as the man and 
woman increasingly drift apart they discover language and tell stories to themselves to 
mask the loneliness of their separation.
Alice: You’ve quite a memory.
Richard: Ascension is the fall. The further we think we have climbed, the more, in 
reality we have descended. Is that it, is that the moral of your tale?
Alice: It’s just a story.. .it’s ju s t ...
Richard: .. .about me, about my life, picking me apart. And then I’m expected to...
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Alice: We’re back to you again, aren’t we? At the centre, as if you’re expected to do 
anything.
Richard: So where’s the hope? Where’s the bloody hope that you talked of?
Alice: It’s in the realisation.
Richard: Realisation?
Alice: In the realisation of what we are really doing. Then we might truly see once 
more. Come here. Turn around and look at me. Take my arms.
Richard moves towards Alice and the doors shut
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